## **Final Report**

Terminal Evaluation of the project "Enhancing Resilience of Coastal Communities of Samoa to Climate Change" Implementing partner & other partners: MNRE, MoWCSD, MoWTI, LTA, SWA, CSSP, EPC UNDP PIMS ID: 4667/ UNDP Atlas ID: 079525 Project sites: 25 districts on Upolu and Savaii Country / region: Samoa / Asia/Pacific Sector: coastal management



Evaluation timeframe: 02/07/2018 - 23/07/2018

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### **Executive Summary**

Samoa is prone to natural disasters whether they are weather- or climate-related, with flood, storms and wave surges associated with tropical cyclones. It is mostly at risk to the negative consequences of climate change. With most of its coastline sensitive to erosion, flooding or landslides, over 70% of the population is located in hazard-prone coastal areas. With more frequent and intense cyclone occurring since the 90s, impacting significantly the national economy, the Government engaged as a pilot intervention into the development of Coastal Infrastructures Management (CIM) Plans based on a Coastal Infrastructure strategy in the early 2000s. This strategy was updated in 2006 and CIM Plans were extended nation-wide. By 2010, all districts had a CIM Plan. These plans were taking into consideration extreme risks and climate risks. CIM Plans are guiding documents that detail possible solutions to increase community resilience but with no direct budget attached, it is difficult to cover these plans. Furthermore, with updated climate change and risks information, it was deemed necessary to review the CIM Plans with a Ridge-to-Reef approach by 2010.

The review of CIM Plans with a Ridge to Reef approach and development of these plans with a significant budget are the object of the project "Enhancing Resilience of Coastal Communities of Samoa to Climate Change" under review.

#### **Project summary table**

Project Enhancing resilience of coastal communities of Samoa to Climate Change **GEF Project ID:** at endorsement at completion 00069456 (Million US\$) (Million US\$) **UNDP Atlas** 7.923.000 AF financing: 8.048.750 079525 Project ID: (incl. UNDP admin costs) (8.732.351)(8.616.351)IA/EA (UNDP) own: Country: Samoa 0 Region: Government (In-kind): Asia Pacific 0 Government (parallel): Focal Area: Other: Community 55.583 Coastal management 0 PPCR<sup>1</sup> 1.396.100 FA Objectives, Promote climate change Total co-financing: 0 (OP/SP): adaptation / strengthened capacity of developing countries to mainstream climate change adaptation policies into national development plans Executing Total Project Cost: **UNDP** 8.048.750 10.059.034 Agency: Other Partners Ministry of Natural Resources & ProDoc Signature (date project began): November involved: Environment, Ministry of 2011 Women, Community and Social (Operational) Closing Proposed: Nov 2016 Actual: Jun Development, Ministry of Date: 2018 Works, Trade & Industry

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> At project start-up, an agreement was made so that the ERCC project would take advantage of PPCR's PMU; eventually, little support was provided by the unit; hence it was not considered as co-financing (US\$1.674.561)

#### **Project description**

The project's objective was to reduce the vulnerability of Samoa to the effects of climate change and respond to this threat through reducing the population's exposure to climate-related events, strengthen in institutional capacity to reduce risks and economic losses, increase awareness and ownership of adaptation at local level and increase capacity of relevant development and natural resources sectors. The project is a follow-up of Samoa's climate change response with the upgrading of community CIM Plans developed originally in the early 2000s through the integration of watershed and Ridge to Reef approach, therefore moving from only coastal infrastructures to a more integrated approach to climate change adaptation.

#### The project had 3 components:

- (i) community engagement in coastal vulnerability assessment, adaptation planning and awareness: the communities participated in the formulation of new CIM plans so as to strengthen their awareness and ownership of coastal adaptation and climate change reduction processes
- (ii) integrated community -based coastal adaptation and disaster risk management measures: through a set of adaptation activities against coastal and climate change risks (water supply, roads, watershed protection...)
- (iii) institutional strengthening to support climate resilient coastal management policy: to capture lessons learned and build capacity within ministries responsible for climate change adaptation

The main institutional stakeholders were: The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE), the Ministry of Women, Community and Social Development (MWCSD), the Ministry of Works, Transport and Infrastructure (MWTI), the Land Transport Authority (LTA), the Samoa Water Authority (SWA) and the Ministry of Finance.

The final beneficiaries were the Samoa communities and their representatives (village councils, women's groups, youth groups). The project covered 25 districts and 139 villages in both Savai and Upolu.

#### Terminal evaluation purpose and methodology

The project that started in 2013 for a duration of 5 years initially, was extended several times and is now completed. It had to undergo a terminal evaluation so as to assess the project results and draw lessons learned to improve the project's sustainability and aid in the overall improvement of UNDP and Government's future programming.

The project's assessment was carried out using the 5 DAC evaluation criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

The evaluation delivery consisted of a 4-step approach: (i) documentary review, (ii) in-country data collection (interviews at central level and on-site visits), (iii) data analysis and (iv) report drafting. The methodology that was used followed several key principles: effective participation of stakeholders, data crosschecking and consensus and agreement of recommendations).

#### **Evaluation findings**

#### Design and formulation:

Analysis of logical framework / results framework: the log frame analysis shows that most indicators were SMART but for outcome 2 that was too ambitious (prior to MTR, the targets were reduced by 50%). The

project was ground-breaking from previous interventions on CIM Plans as it included an infrastructure component; however, there was little information as to if and how the institutional / final beneficiaries would take advantage of the project's benefits after its closure (no indicators): there was no indicator based on Government/beneficiary empowerment (e.g. national road standard, NRM community empowerment, budget alignment on CIM Plans...).

Assumptions and risks: all the assumptions were well identified (community / line ministries coordination, political stability, low staff turnover, continuing funding support...). Several risks were well identified (extreme climatic events, poor collaboration between partners, land disputes, limited HR in line ministries, insufficient gender support) but the lack of coordination with PPCR was completely overlooked as different administrative donor procedures were highly detrimental to the ERCC project when both projects were relying on each other to deliver, resulting in asymmetric implementation.

Lesson learned from other projects incorporated into project design: these included the need to raise community awareness through climate-proof measures, mainstreaming DRM, climate change, livelihoods, NRM and governance, adopting a watershed and ridge-to-reef approach, increase the participatory nature of CIM Plans design and integrating an investment component to fund some of the communities' priorities.

Planned stakeholder's participation: the main (institutional) stakeholders of the project were under MNRE including PUMA responsible for the project management and other division (land, water, forestry), the MoF, MWCSD, and MWTI and LTA.

Replication approach: the project is a scaled-up version of previous CIM Plans but with the integration of a watershed and ridge-to-reef approach with an investment component to enhance community involvement; the replication approach was based on a series of activities that included the Village Hazard Zone Relocation handbook, the CIM Plan handbook, communication activities and knowledge management (good practices and lessons learned) and the CIM Plans.

*UNDP comparative advantage:* it is its ability to mobilise financial resources for the Government as it is a multi-purpose agency favouring small-scale investments and a sector-wide approach with an emphasis on the most vulnerable.it has acquired extensive experience in GEF-funded interventions (6 projects), all under the climate change focal area.

Linkages between project and interventions within the sector: the project was designed to be aligned with other interventions through the Government-led Climate Resilience Steering Committee and in particular the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR) supported by the World Bank, a sister project that supports the remaining 15 districts not covered by the ERCC project.

Management arrangements: these deviated widely from the original project document with the option to twin this project with PPCR (harmonised CIM Plan methodology, common steering committee, common reporting mechanism under PUMA, joint PMU under PUMA). Furthermore, the decision to take advantage of PPCR's PMU was reversed as it took considerable time for PPCR to recruit the team, leaving project management of the ERCC project under PUMA.

#### **Project implementation:**

Adaptive management: the project under the NIM modality due to start in March 2012 eventually was initiated in January 2013 for 5 years due to recruitment delays. The decision to combine this project's PMU with PPCR's one further delayed the implementation. This resulted in few activities being carried out during the first years of the implementation; a bit before the mid-term review, it was decided to take some key decision to accelerate implementation for the remaining period including the recruitment of the technical CIM Plan team through UNDP, initiating the infrastructures prior to the finalisation of the upgraded CIM Plans, taking advantage of Government existing modalities for the water supply and reforestation

subcomponents, abandoning a common ERCC/PPCR PMU. These decisions were game-changing in accelerating delivery but still required 2 extensions.

Partnership arrangements: the key partner of the project was the WB-funded PPCR, a very similar project with the same components that supported the remaining districts not covered by the ERCC. Extensive discussions were held initially to ensure proper alignment of methodology but the administrative and financial procedure differences resulted in major implementation offsets between the 2 projects. Eventually, it became difficult to take advantage of PPCR's added value.

M&E feedback for adaptative management: Despite extensive discussions about the implementation delays between the main stakeholders, feedbacks from regular M&E were not initially incorporated into changes of planned project activities. By 2015, implementation became less tied to PPCR and several activities were implemented without PPCR (e.g. Lidar procurement, use of PUMA's own HR for environmental compliance safeguards, recruiting the CIM Plan technical team prior to PPCR's team, project extensions).

*Project finance:* the project had a budget of 8,05M\$ plus over 3M\$ co-financing (mainly PPCR). The implementation delays during the first 2 years resulted in a nearly 2-year lag in terms of delivery, resolved through an 18 months project extension. Eventually, all but 0.1M\$ were spent (±1%).

M&E design at entry and implementation: with the decision at inception to take advantage of PPCR's PMU, there was initially no specific M&E system for the project. However, with the delays to contract the PPCR PMU team, PUMA had to assume the M&E functions and this continued eventually until the end of the project, hence not taking advantage of PPCR's PMU. With limited HR, PUMA used the work plan and result framework as the main M&E tools. There was no concerted effort to harmonise M&E carried out by partners on roads, reforestation, WATSAN, coastal infrastructure, hence a weak involvement of these in M&E and an ad-hoc M&E system based on discussions.

UNDP and implementing partner: the project was supervised by PUMA. Because the PPCR PMU team was located outside PUMA and under the responsibility of another ministry, it was difficult to request support from this team and to align delivery between the 2 projects. Despite these difficulties, PUMA managed to deliver on the main results thanks to a small dedicated team for this project. UNDP provided regular support to the PUMA project team but its ability to provide strategic advice was limited as it could not participate in the Government-led Climate Resilience Steering Committee. UNDP successfully supported PUMA in accelerating the CIM Plan technical tram recruitment through using the UNDP recruitment procedures.

#### **Project results:**

There were three outcomes under the project:

Outcome 1: Strengthened awareness and ownership of coastal adaptation and climate risk reduction processes at community and national levels in 25 Districts and 139 villages: CIM plans were reviewed and upgraded as planned adopting a watershed and ridge-to-reef approach; participation including from vulnerable groups was high (extensive trainings carried out) and the plans were endorsed by the end of the project (June 2018). The main issue has been that CIM plans were developed after the initiation of community infrastructures; these were not based on the upgraded CIM Plans but priorities from the previous CIM plans and confirmed by the communities. A national Relocation Roadmap / Strategy has been formulated and operational plans developed in villages at risk.

Outcome 2: Increased adaptive capacity of coastal communities to adapt to coastal hazards and risks induced by climate change in 25 Districts and 139 villages: overall, there has been a reduction of ambitions as per project document; climate proofing measures through roads totalled over 30 km (80 km in the PRODOC); shoreline and watershed protection measures covered 3 km coastline and replanting covered 19 ha in 14 sites. The PRODOC indicators did not allow for comparison of achievements ("protection of 140km of steams and coast"). Over 9.000 inhabitants in 45 villages are now benefitting from improved water supply. The

project contributed (with other interventions) to the major Vaisigano scheme on flood protection measures that protects 11 communities.

Outcome 3: Strengthened institutional capacity of government sectors to integrate climate and disaster risk and resilience into coastal management-related policy frameworks, processes and responses: most objectives were achieved: an institutional review of relevant ministries was conducted with recommendations currently being discussed on the roles and responsibilities of institutions and line ministries in charge of CIM Plan implementation; the village relocation handbooks were prepared and the revised PUMA act 2004 is still under review by the Attorney General's office; training of technical staff and policymakers on climate risk assessment and planning processes for coastal adaptation was conducted in 2018 and a communication strategy devised by the end of the project — hence too late for MNRE appropriation despite a number of communication activities developed all over the course of the project.

**Relevance:** the project was highly relevant in relation to the issues and priorities set by the Government, in particular in relation to the 2007 Samoa Infrastructure Strategic Plan and the 2012 Strategy for the Development of Samoa (SDS) with an increased emphasis on mainstreaming climate change and disaster resilience in development processes.

Effectiveness and efficiency: as for outcome 1 (CIM Plan) the project's methodology was participative and increase community's awareness, in particular amongst influential people (matai, youth/women representatives) in defining their key priorities for the upgraded CIM plans. However, implementation delays resulted in first selecting priorities from previous CIM Plans for the infrastructures before initiating the consultation process to upgrade the CIM Plan. Under outcome 2 (infrastructures), the adaptive capacity of communities increased but not as planned in the PRODOC as the targets were too ambitious and costing was not realistic for some targets (e.g. roads). For outcome 3 (capacity building) the effectiveness depended of the activities: most effective were the revised national organisation and institutional structures for CIM Plans implementation, the revision of the 2004 PUMA Act and communication products on adaptation lessons learned and best practices. Resources were efficiently utilised: this had a lot to do with the Government ownership of the project that facilitated the use of existing delivery modalities (roads under LTA regular activities, replanting under the "2 million tree campaign, water supply through CSSP).

**Country ownership:** it is very high with the Steering Committee fully Government-driven and extensive Government discussions so far on the existing and future modalities of CIM Plan monitoring and responsibilities of relevant ministries. At community level, results are more mixed with ownership least on roads, replanting and highest for coastal infrastructures and micro-projects supported by CSSP.

Mainstreaming: the project significantly contributed to the 2013-2017 UNDAF, in particular in integrating Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change policies, being supportive in knowledge and information management and for enhancing community resilience. Gender considerations were poorly taken into consideration in the project document; however, thanks to the CIM Plan technical team, gender was adequately mainstreamed into the formulation of CIM Plans and also vulnerable groups had a chance to contribute in identifying their priorities. The project has directly contributed to several SDG goals, in particular those on (i) water and sanitation (goal 6), (ii) sustainable economic growth (goal 8), resilience and safe cities (goal 11), climate change (goal 13) and on the sustainable use of ecosystems and in halting reforestation and biodiversity loss (goal 15).

**Sustainability:** under social and cultural sustainability, community ownership is overall insufficient but highest for CSSP microprojects. Still, all CIM Plans were officially endorsed by the communities in June 2018; obviously, there is a need to further support communities with adequate budgets to ensure that CIM Plans are being implemented; the technical risks are variable: as for roads, there is still no national climate proof standard (current standards have been debated since the project started) but LTA is committed to ensure road maintenance; as for IWS, preventive maintenance is non-existent but will occur should there be major

breakdowns; communities are committed to ensure the maintenance of coastal infrastructures if these can be managed at community level (not involving machinery). The institutional and organisational risks are limited with the Government now assessing the proposal to implement an institutional reform of MNRE to increase its effectiveness and mainstream better the CIM Plans. There are economic and financial risks involved as by the ned of the project, no Government budget was assigned directly to CIM Plans completion; under outcome 2 (infrastructures), the risks are limited with LTA with a regular maintenance budget (roads) and for IWS, the villagers do have a financial capacity to contribute to repairs. As for replanting, it is mostly valued by communities for individual replanting. The environmental risks are limited so far but coastal protections and exploitation patterns through the upgrading of existing roads should be monitored for signs of degradation. The socio-political risks are very limited with full Government agencies commitment in CIM Plans rolling-out.

Potential impact: overall, the social impact of the project has been high with more awareness created, especially amongst key decision makers at community level on adaptation and resilience; the economic impact is indirect: road upgrading has facilitated inland transit to agricultural areas and coastal infrastructures so far limit property destruction and costly relocation. Seawall infrastructures do have the inconvenience of chasing out tourists as it reduces the appeal of the Samoan coast. The impact on local and Government institutions has been substantial: village representatives are now clustering around the CIM Plan to voice better their issues, PULMA's management of the project without any PMU gained substantial expertise in the delivery of complex development projects and most specialised training of Government staff resulted in substantial increased capacity building. The environmental impact is somewhat limited so far but not necessarily non-existent: there are uncertainties about the impact on forestry of upgrading inland roads without the involvement of MAFF and there are unexpected effects of coastal wave breakers on beach sand replenishment. The gender impact has been most positive for roads and water supply.

#### **Evaluation rating table**

Evaluation Ratings:							
1. Monitoring and Evaluation	rating	2. IA& EA Execution	rating				
M&E design at entry	MU	Quality of UNDP Implementation	S				
M&E Plan Implementation	MS	Quality of Execution - Executing Agency	S				
Overall quality of M&E	MS	Overall quality of Implementation / Execution	S				
3. Assessment of Outcomes	rating	4. Sustainability	rating				
Relevance	R	Financial resources:	ML				
Effectiveness	MS	Socio-political:	ML				
Efficiency	S	Institutional framework and governance:	L				
Overall Project Outcome Rating	MS	Environmental:	U/A				
		Overall likelihood of sustainability:	ML				

Ratings for Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, M&E, I&E Execution	Sustainability ratings:	Relevance ratings
6: Highly Satisfactory (HS): no shortcomings 5: Satisfactory (S): minor shortcomings 4: Moderately Satisfactory (MS): moderate shortcomings 3. Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): significant shortcomings 2. Unsatisfactory (U): major problems 1. Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): severe problems	<ol> <li>Likely (L): negligible risks to sustainability</li> <li>Moderately Likely (ML): moderate risks</li> <li>Moderately Unlikely (MU): significant risks</li> <li>Unlikely (U): severe risks</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Relevant (R)</li> <li>Not relevant (NR)</li> <li>Impact Ratings:</li> <li>Significant (S)</li> <li>Minimal (M)</li> <li>Negligible (N)</li> </ol>
Additional ratings where relevant: Not Applicable (N/A)		

Summary of conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned

#### Corrective actions for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project:

*Project design*: in terms of design, the original budget allocation at project start-up was too optimistic not considering the slow delivery in the project's rolling out stages. This results in complex budget reallocations and unanticipated planning exercises.

There is a need to consider at project formulation stage a **more extensive inception phase** to allow a smoother project operationalisation for more logical activity sequencing and progressive project outputs delivery.

Stakeholders' flexibility: fixed delivery timeframes even with a limited number of extensions remain an issue for complex projects with unexpected implementation issues. **Donor and implementing agency's flexibility** can resolve outstanding issues (technical staff recruitment under this project) in support of the executing agency.

*M&E*: The results framework and annual work plan are usually utilised as the M&E tools by the executing agency. However, these may be insufficient for specialised activities implemented by third parties that can have their own (more adapted) monitoring tools. A **customised M&E system** – discussed with third parties – , combined with M&E and RBM training, would be a better M&E tool to monitor project results.

Exit strategy: as per project document, the exit strategy was that Government would ensure the sustainability of the project by integrating project results into its own work programming and budgetary planning processes. There is little evidence of this yet although extensive discussions are being held within Government as part as a follow-up on an institutional review of MNRE as to how to integrate and take ownership of CIM plans within Government structures. There is a need to finalise this negotiation process and allocate financial resources to responsible agencies so that CIM plans are monitored and Government financial resources are aligned sector-wide, to the community priorities as per CIM plans.

Project decision-making process: Government is fully in charge of strategic decision-making processes through several Government agencies-led groups/meetings (e.g. CRSC). While this ensures ownership and results empowerment at its best, the implementing agency's contribution to a smooth implementation is only at a technical level ("TAG meetings). In that context, Government does not fully take advantage of the implementing agency's viewpoint and perspective based on its regional/technical experience (including through other interventions elsewhere), hence the need for a structure that integrates the implementing agency - possibly with an advisory role – in project strategic decision-making processes.

Co-financing: the lack of co-financing does not stimulate local ownership of results and should there be some form of community co-financing, it is in any case not reported within the M&E system. There is a need to integrate systematically local co-financing into project monitoring to evidence community's commitment to project delivery.

#### Actions to follow-up or reinforce initial benefits from the project:

Monitoring capacity of CSSP: While CSSP has devised an efficient screening system for its water supply and DRM-related grants, it appears that there are some shortcomings regarding its monitoring capability with the detection of substandard infrastructures; CSSP should (i) review its micro-project monitoring capacity, possibly (ii) strengthen IWS national CBO to develop a capability to support IWS in maintenance and water governance and (iii) ensure a more in-depth involvement of Government technical staff in charge of WATSAN.

Communication: During most of the project implementation, a substantial number of activities were carried out despite the lack of a communication strategy. With the late recruitment of a communication expert, a knowledge-based platform ("Samoa Cares") was partially developed but not completed as per initial idea. Resources should be devoted to finalising this architecture and support MNRE in endorsing "Samoa Cares".

Climate-proof standards: Under outcome 2, a substantial chunk of the budget was allocated to road rehabilitation. However, due to a lack of national standards, there is no information as to whether these roads are climate-proof. MWTI should follow-up with LTA the **definition of new national road standards**, assess the additional budget costs and integrate these into regular Government budgets for future roadworks at community level.

*PUMA and CIM plan database:* With **CIM plans** becoming a critical tool for community climate resilience and disaster risk management, they **should be integrated into a monitoring mechanism** with **PUMA given the financial means to maintain a database**.

Insufficient sector-wide alignment: While the project supported key sectors (transport, environment & natural resources, tourism to some extent) active in climate change adaptation with activities related to roads, water supply, reforestation, coastal protections, there was little evidence of interactions with other observer agencies (energy, education, agriculture, health) not directly involved in the project but also dealing with climate change adaptation and coastal and watershed issues. The climate resilience sector-wide approach should be adjusted to ensure a much closer budget and planning alignment between sectors according to CIM plans for all community-related infrastructures.

#### **Proposals for future directions underlining main objectives:**

CIM plan institutionalisation: Under outcome 3, capacity building activities were conducted to enhance Government's capability accompany the formulation, drafting and monitoring of CIM plans. Further support should be invested in ensuring that CIM Plans are being institutionalised within Government agencies / ministries so that they become key reference documents for community development; this should be achieved through following up closely MNRE's institutional reform, formalising the roles and responsibilities of major CIM Plan institutional stakeholders and ensuring minimum budget allocation for CIM Plans monitoring and upgrading if required.

Ecosystem rehabilitation (replanting): mixed results are most often achieved with conventional tree replanting. Community ownership remains weak with nurseries soon abandoned once free seedling distribution ceases. A more holistic approach in ecosystem management through a full-scale long-term

**education program involving with MNRE, MAFF, MESC** should be devised with a much stronger emphasis on children and the youth in general (curriculum development, camps, site visits, reforestation days...).

Institutional review and strengthening the institution in charge of CIM plans M&E: The Government should position itself swiftly as to which institution would be in charge of monitoring CIM plan compliance. Currently, this role is devoted to PUMA and should it be confirmed, PUMA's capability in M&E (both hardware and human resources) should be strengthened and support provided through the AF's remaining budget (1.3M\$) as part of Samoa's AF budget allocation.

District Development plans: With CIM plans becoming the key development tool for district infrastructures development, there is a need to boost governance at district level by supporting the creation district CBOs, establishing a formal district platform to discuss with Government representatives, investment plans at district level.

Community development plans: Communities take part on a regular basis in various planning exercises (Village Development Plans, previous CIM plans, District Development Plans...) with some sort of community fatigue as most plans are only very partially funded by relevant sectors. Government support should be streamlined to communities by integrating all initiatives under a unified community development plan.

#### Best and worst practices in addressing issues relating to relevance, performance and success:

- - Government should review its donor approach for such interventions and avoid the development of parallel projects; instead it should combine different donor's funding within a basket fund (or similar delivery mechanism) to avoid coordination issues and ensure a smoother implementation.
- +++ The project design can be considered as very effective as it combined CIM Plan reviews under component 1 supported by an infrastructure component (component 2); this ensured Government empowerment for community infrastructure investments and community ownership of project results
- - The initial implementation delays resulted in implementing the project in reverse: financing infrastructures based on previous CIM Plans and then design the new generation of plans instead of a more logical approach of CIM Plan design followed up by prioritised investments.
- - An initial agreement with PCCR resulted in the project being dependant of another one; this resulted in significantly delaying the implementation as the approach and procedures were widely different. This setup should be avoided in the future. Parallel implementation should be more logical, especially for donors with different administrative and financial procedures.
- +++ The methodological approach adopted by the technical team was very effective for formulating gender-balanced priorities for infrastructures development.
- - Community interest in climate change adaptation and disaster risk management remains insufficient unless there are direct threats to their livelihoods. This is evidence that constant awareness is necessary and should be systematic in all Government projects.
- - The involvement of institutional Government key and observer stakeholders in TAG meetings did not necessarily result in planning and investment alignment between them; this is a lesson learned about insufficient sectoral dialogue but also shows that it may be necessary to integrate such issues in future interventions.
- - The accelerated implementation may have resulted in the project taking some risks on outputs delivery quality: roads were built without a climate-proof national standard and micro-project implemented swiftly through calls for proposals have shown excessive community expectations that resulted in reducing actual infrastructures quality and/or quantity.

+++ The CIM Plans drafting process was fully piloted by Government and not by an external technical team; this ensured Government ownership of project results (there are now Government discussions on how to institutionalise the CIM Plans).

+++ Despite extensive delivery delays due to attempts to harmonise PPCR and ERCC projects, the project team managed to overcome these issues and accelerate implementation through taking advantage of UNDP's procurement expertise for the contracting of the CIM Plan technical team and using different Government modalities (e.g. CCSP for water supply and "2 Million Tree Campaign" for reforestation) to speed up implementation.

+++ Despite the lack of PMU, PUMA had to resort to using its own human resources to manage the project, in addition to its regular activities in permit delivery and land use planning; PUMA managed successfully to complete the project on most project outputs. However, there is still uncertainty within some Government institutions as to which agency should be in charge of CIM Plan monitoring; this is currently the role of PUMA but at the very least, its support is being debated in the context of a potential institutional reform of MNRE. this is a most inconvenient time as it is right by the project's end that Government should invest resources to strengthen the institutionalisation of CIM Plans. This uncertainty should be as short as possible so as to avoid creating a vacuum that would become detrimental to the communities.

## **List of Abbreviations**

asap	as soon as possible
AWP	Annual Work Plan
CARES	Climate Adaptation, Resiliency and Enhancement of Samoa
СВ	Cost Benefit
СВА	Community-based Adaptation
CC	Climate Change
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
CCSDP	Community-centred Sustainable Development Programme
CDR	Combined Delivery Report
СРАР	Country Programme Action Plan
CPIER	Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review
CRSC	Climate Resilience Steering Committee
CSSP	(Samoa) Civil Society Support Programme
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DB	Database
DDP	District Development Plan
DEC	Division for Environment and Conservation (MNRE)
DKBM	Data and Knowledge Base Management
DMO	Disaster Management Office
EPC	Electric and Power Corporation
ERCC	Enhancing the Resilience of Coastal Communities / Enhancing Climate Resilience of Coastal Communities of Samoa to Climate Change (project)
EU	European Union
EWACC	Economy-wide integration of climate change adaptation and disaster risk management to reduce climate vulnerability of communities in Samoa
FD	Forestry Division (MNRE)
GEF	Global Environment Fund
HR	Human Resources
IAMP	Infrastructure Asset Management Programme
ICCRIFS	Integration of Climate Change Risk and Resilience into Forestry Management
IMPRESS	Improving the Performance and Reliability of Renewable Power Systems in Samoa

IP	Implementing Partner
IT	Information Technology
LPAC	Local Project Appraisal Committee
LTA	Land and Transport Authority
MAF	Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
MESC	Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture
MIE	Multilateral Implementing Agency
MNRE	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
MoF	Ministry of Finance
МоН	Ministry of Health
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTR	Mid-Term Review
MNRE	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
MWCSD	Ministry of Women, Community and Social Development
MWTI	Ministry of Works, Transport and Infrastructure
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
NCCCT	National Climate Change Country Team
NIM	National Implementation Modality
PACC	Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change Project
PICCAP	Pacific Islands Climate Change Assistance Project
PIGGAREP	Pacific Islands Greenhouse Gas Abatement through Renewable Energy Project
PIREP	Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Programme
PPCR	Pilot Program for Climate Resilience
PMU	Project Management Unit
PPR	Project Performance Report
PRODOC	Project Document
PUMA	Planning and Urban Management Agency
RBAP	Regional Bureau Asia Pacific
RBM	Results Based Management
SGP	Small Grant Programme
SIAM	Samoa Infrastructure Asset Management
SIDS	Small Island Developing States

SMART	Specific Measurable Accessible Relevant Time-bound
SWA	Samoa Water Authority
TAG	Technical Advisory Group
TE	Terminal Evaluation
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
US\$	United States Dollar
VHZRP	Village Hazard Zone Relocation Plan
WB	World Bank
WRD	Water Resource Division (MNRE)

#### 1. Introduction

This report presents the findings of the Terminal Review (TE) of the UNDP-supported ERCC project "Enhancing Resilience of Coastal Communities of Samoa to Climate Change". This terminal review was carried out by an Independent Consultant, Vincent Lefebvre, on behalf of UNDP.

#### 1.1 Purpose of the evaluation

The project "Enhancing Resilience of Coastal Communities of Samoa to Climate Change", has started since May 2013. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE) in partnership with the Ministry of Women, Community and Social Development, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Land and Transport Authority (LTA) were the executing agencies and the Adaptation Fund (AF) through the Global Environment Fund (GEF), the main donor.

Pursuing the UNDP and GEF monitoring and evaluation (M&E) policies and procedures, all UNDP implemented and Adaptation Fund-sponsored projects are required to undergo a terminal evaluation upon completion of implementation. Towards this end, UNDP has commissioned the terminal evaluation by contracting an independent evaluator. It was carried out in accordance with the UNDP-GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy and facilitated by the UNDP Pacific Multi-Country Office in Samoa.

The purpose of the terminal evaluation was to assess the achievement of project results and to draw lessons that can both improve the sustainability of benefits from this project, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP and Government programming.

A systematic and comprehensive evaluation of the performance of the project using the five DAC criteria assessing its design, processes of implementation, and achievements relative to project objectives, was carried out. It was aimed to obtain and provide timely, precise and reliable information on how well the project was designed, implemented, progress towards project objectives, how well resources were used cost-effectively, project impacts, and potential ownership for future sustainability. This information is needed by key stakeholders: (i) Government: MNRE, MoF, MWCSD, LTA, SWA, EPC and subcontracted projects: CSSP and (iii) district/village representatives for decision-making and planning similar projects in the future.

The specific objectives of the terminal evaluation are:

- To assess the design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation processes;
- To assess project achievements toward project goals, objectives and outcomes planned;
- Determine whether resources (finance, human and material) were used economically and wisely;
- Assess the potential impact of CIM plans on communities, of resilient infrastructures completed under this project's communities (technical, economic, financial, and social and environmental);
- Assess management and potentials for project results ownership, sustainability and any basis to decide on future program design;
- Provide specific and practical recommendations and document lessons that can be utilized for improving sustainability future projects to be designed.

#### 1.2 Scope and methodology

#### 1.2.1 Scope

Regarding the scope, the evaluation focused primarily on assessing the performance of the project in light of the accomplished outcomes, objectives and effects using the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact, as defined and explained in the UNDP Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported and GEF-financed Projects.

*Relevance* assesses how the project relates to the development priorities at the local, regional and national levels for climate change and coherent with the main objectives of GEF focal areas. It also assesses whether the project addressed the needs of targeted beneficiaries at the local, regional and national levels.

*Effectiveness* measures the extent to which the project achieved the expected outcomes and objectives. It assesses whether the project under evaluation has been effective in achieving expected outcomes and objectives; how risks and risk mitigation were being managed, and what lessons can be drawn for other similar projects in the future.

*Efficiency* is the measure of how economically resources (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results. It also examines how efficient were partnership arrangements (linkages between institutions/ organizations) for the project.

*Impact* examines the positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by the development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. It examines whether the project achieved the intended changes or improvements (technical, economic, social, cultural, political, and ecological). In GEF terms, impacts/results include direct project outputs, short to medium-term outcomes, and longer-term impact including global environmental benefits, replication effects and other local effects including on communities.

Sustainability is the ability of the project interventions to continue delivering benefits for an extended period of time after completion; it examines the project's sustainability in terms of finance, institutional, social and environment.

Employing the above-explained evaluation criteria, the terminal evaluation covered all activities supported by UNDP and completed by MNRE, MoF, LTA as well as activities that other collaborating partners participated in (STA, SWA, EPC...). In terms of timing, the evaluation covered all interventions of the project from its inception, May 2012 to the planned closing date, June 2018. The evaluation has been conducted in a way it provides evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful.

#### 1.2.2 Methodology

The terminal evaluators adopted a participatory and consultative approach ensuring close engagement with government counterparts, UNDP Multi-Country Office, project team, and key stakeholders based at national and district levels (community representatives).

Several basic principles used to carry out the evaluation include:

- Effective participation of all stakeholders (government, agencies, donors, final beneficiaries)
- **Crosschecking** of gathered information
- Emphasis on **consensus and agreement** on the recommendations by the stakeholders.

#### • Transparency of debriefing

Overall, the evaluation tools employed during the evaluation were the following: a review of key documents and literature, consultation and interview of stakeholders, and field missions to project sites. In this context, the data collection tools used included semi-structured questionnaires for key informants (checklists) and interview guides for focus group discussions by beneficiaries. The tools were developed by the evaluator focusing on evaluation criteria and major outcomes planned and agreed upon with UNDP before application. The interview guides and semi-structured questionnaires are presented in Annex 3.

The adopted methodology is detailed in Annex 2.

#### 1.2.3 Limitations

The main limitation of this evaluation has been the limited interactions with community representatives: it appeared that some community representatives were unavailable<sup>2</sup> for the upcoming evaluation in Savaii; hence, limited data gathering from beneficiary's viewpoint. This did not occur in Upolu.

It was also not possible to re-discuss with some stakeholders after the field trip to Savaii.

#### 1.3 Structure of the evaluation report

The present terminal evaluation report is presented in five sections. It initially presents an *executive summary* of the terminal evaluation, giving a brief background of the project and its design, a summary of its findings related to the activities, management, and important aspects such as partnership and sustainability, conclusions and recommendations for future action and programming.

It is followed by an *introduction*, which describes the context and background of the evaluation and gives a brief description of the purpose, scope and focus of the evaluation, and methodology used, and the structure of the report. The next section presents information on the project, including project description, development context, and strategy.

The *findings* section is dedicated to the results achieved towards the outcomes of the project, which is the core of the report, presented under three subheadings related to program design, implementation, and the evaluation criteria. The final section considers the *conclusions* of the evaluation and *recommendations* for future action.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Village mayor and chiefs for the Sili IWSA & Saleia Revet. Wall & Bridge project sites had to attend the National Annual Methodist Church Conference

### 2. Project description and development context

#### 2.1 Project start and duration

The project entitled 'Enhancing resilience of coastal communities of Samoa to Climate Change' was initially prepared by UNDP in partnership with the Government of Samoa and submitted to GEF/AF for review in July 2011. Upon comments from AF's technical committee, a reviewed project was resubmitted in August 2011 and approved by the AF in December 2011. The AF Board eventually endorsed the proposal in March 2012 and an AF-UNDP agreement was signed shortly afterwards.

The LPAC meeting of September 2012 emphasized the need for coordination with World Bank-funded PPCR: alignment of projects' management, harmonisation of methodological and technical aspects, in particular for the CIM plan review methodology.

The PRODOC was signed in November 2012 between UNDP and the Government, the endorsed project document led to the official project start-up in January 2013 with an estimated end date by January 2017 (four years). Several decisions (three) were made to extend the project (at no additional cost) from January 2017 to June 2018.

An inception workshop was held in February 2013 following the PRODOC signature a month earlier to review the approved document and seek stakeholder contribution to the overall project implementation approach: (1) project rationale, (2) objective & project results, (3) outcomes & targets, (4) alignment with PPCR (common PMU under PUMA) and coordination with other partner agencies through MoUs, (6) update activities, and (7) Monitoring and Evaluation requirements.

#### 2.2 Problems that the project sought to address

Samoa is prone to natural disasters, mostly, extreme weather events like flooding, storms and wave surges associated with tropical cyclones, all the more frequent due to climate change but also unpredictable earthquakes that resulted in a devastating tsunami in 2009.

Approximately 80 per cent of the 403 km coastline is 'sensitive' or 'highly sensitive' to erosion, flooding or landslip<sup>3</sup> and over 70% of the population is located in hazard-prone coastal areas. With most of the population relying on natural resources and ecosystems for their food, water, shelter and livelihoods, communities are characterised by little resilience to external shocks that leave them vulnerable to extreme events.

With more frequent and intense cyclonic events that resulted in the 90s with unsustainable foreign dependency for recovery and rebuilding costs, the Government developed the Samoan building code and designed in 2000 and updated in 2006 its Coastal Infrastructure Management Strategy. This led to the development of district Coastal Infrastructure Management plans as a pilot intervention from 2000 to 2002 (15 districts and 92 villages) and as a full-scale intervention from 2005 to 2007 (28 districts and 191 villages) so as to better prepare communities to increased occurrence of extreme weather and climate change events. By 2010, these plans covered all 41 Samoa districts and integrated climate change related issues (2005 NAPA and 2007 Climate Risks Profiles).

The first generation of CIM plans (2002) focussed on Coastal Infrastructure Management and extreme

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Source: Gibb (2001): Samoa Sensitivity Index Database, Beca, New Zealand

weather risks at village level while the second generation included in addition climate risks, a framework for disaster risks management response and district issues (2007). With updated climate change and disaster risks information by 2010, the project scope was broadened to include a Ridge to Reef Approach that integrates coastal infrastructures as well into the third generation CIM plans.

CIM plans are meant to be guiding planning documents that detail possible solutions to build community resilience. However, with no budget attached, their completion is somewhat difficult to achieve. Furthermore, national priorities are not matched with CIM plans; this has resulted in community fatigue in previous generations of CIM planning exercises4. Therefore, the project responded to the lack of systematic investment with an investment component.

Finally, Government staff awareness on CIM planning, risk management and climate change mainstreaming into communities was deemed insufficient at the time and the project integrated a capacity building component to raise stakeholder's awareness on the importance of CIM plans as a Government and community planning tool.

#### 2.3 Immediate and development objectives of the project

The project was designed to reduce the vulnerability to the adverse impacts of climate change and respond to the impacts of climate change including variability at local and national levels through (i) reduced exposure at national level to climate-related hazards ,(ii) strengthening institutional capacity to reduce risks associated with climate-induced economic losses and (iii) strengthening awareness and ownership of adaptation and climate risk reduction processes at local level and (iv) increasing adaptive capacity within the relevant development and natural resources sectors.

The programme had a three-pronged approach:

- A main focus upon on-the-ground implementation of coastal adaptation measures, addressing climate change impacts on key infrastructure elements and coastal ecosystems in an integrated way. Integration is achieved within the framework of a comprehensive village land use plan the CIM Plan -.
- Strengthened institutional policies and capacities to provide an enabling environment for climate resilient coastal development; and,
- The systematic capture and dissemination of knowledge and lessons learned to aid and inform further implementation and pursuit of climate resilient development.

# Component 1: Community-engagement in coastal vulnerability assessment, adaptation planning and awareness

The process of coastal adaptation in Samoa is strongly community-based. The CIM Plans are community-based plans focusing upon response planning for individual villages and for common district planning considering their particular geographical circumstances and the community's perceptions of their needs. The partnership principle of the CIM Plans underpins the success of implementation of adaptation works (Component 2) and needs to be supported by increased institutional capacity and knowledge (Component 3); therefore, the proposed programme components have strong inter-dependencies.

Outcome 1: Strengthened awareness and ownership of coastal adaptation and climate risk reduction

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Source: community leaders / beneficiary interviews

processes at community and national levels in 25 Districts and 139 villages.

# Component 2: Integrated Community-Based Coastal Adaptation and Disaster Risk Management measures

The component owns much of the physical actions, outcomes and outputs. It is the practical response to adaptation activities identified in the CIM Plans which are all designed to increase community resilience. In each village, a set of concerted adaptation and district actions will be carried out in a programmatic fashion, in order to have a significant impact on reducing community vulnerability. The actions were to be implemented upon the plan base established and reconfirmed under Component 1 and require the capacity enhancements which Component 3 will deliver.

Outcome 2: Increased adaptive capacity of coastal communities to adapt to coastal hazards and risks induced by climate change in 25 Districts and 139 villages.

# Component 3: Institutional strengthening to support climate resilient coastal management policy frameworks

Component 3 was designed to secure the institutional and capacity improvements to enable the full realization of the benefits of Components 1 and 2. It was to provide targeted support in key areas in the main Ministries responsible for CCA action. The focus was to be on capturing key lessons learned and building capacity improvements so that they can be sustained as core activities of the Government in the future.

Outcome 3: Strengthened institutional capacity of government sectors to integrate climate and disaster risk and resilience into coastal management-related policy frameworks, processes and responses.

#### 2.4 Main stakeholders

According to the project implementation arrangement, the main stakeholders of the project were the following:

- Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE) responsible for developing the key policy and planning documents that guide climate change programmes in Samoa (e.g. National Policy Statement on Climate Change 2007 and NAPA), including:
  - o PUMA: as the key executing entity and guardian of the database of the recommended actions contained in the CIM Plans
  - o GEF Division for coordination with other GEF-financed projects
  - Technical Divisions (Forestry for replanting, Water for water catchment protection, Land Management for supporting the CIM plan team in cartography
  - o Disaster Management Office (DMO) to ensure
- Ministry of Women, Community and Social Development (MWCSD): to facilitate programme intervention into communities and create linkages between communities and the project for the elaboration of CIM plans
- Ministry of Works, Transport and Infrastructure (MWTI) for works supervision (roads, seawalls...)
- Land Transport Authority (LTA) for roads, drainage and culvert construction and rehabilitation
- Samoa Water Authority (SWA) to review water supply interventions

- Electric Power Corporation (EPC) as an external stakeholder
- Ministry of Finance (MoF) to overall ensure project financial delivery and support coordination activities with WB-funded PPCR
- Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture (MESC) to stimulate youth and schools in project activities and
- Ministry of Health (MoH) to ensure project activities do not have unexpected effects on beneficiary population

Overall, these stakeholders were members of the project because of their mandates and technical knowledge on issues (e.g. water, electricity, drainage, etc.) relating to their organic functions that would be of interest when formulating the new CIM plans.

Key private sector stakeholders included the Samoa Tourism Authority and Samoa Hotel Association as potential partners for activities potentially impacting the tourism sector.

Finally, the programme actively engaged various stakeholders in Samoan communities during the programme's activities planning and implementation phase: representatives of all key vulnerable groups in the communities, including the *matais* (both men and women), women and youth representative groups, public and private sector stakeholders, the council of chiefs.

Implementation showed that some stakeholders would not be associated with implementation at all and others barely having a supervisory role or even little or no advisory role.

## 3. Findings

#### 3.1 Project design / Formulation

The programme's objective was to strengthen the ability of Samoan communities and of the public service to make informed decisions and manage likely climate change driven pressures in a pro-active, integrated and strategic manner.

It sought to upgrade the Coastal Infrastructure Management (CIM) Plans on the ground as a practical community-based response to adaptation. Necessary technical and financial resources for this were used in a programmatic manner and combined with the parallel complementary works undertaken through the WB-funded PPCR.

The programme has been part of a very comprehensive framework of coastal adaptation and climate risks mitigation in Samoa. It upgraded previously implemented Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans in order to consider climate change-induced effects in their formulation. Further to this and based on previous CIM plans interventions, it also adopted a Watershed and Ridge to Reef Management approach, hence no longer being limited to coastal risks only; this resulted in a more integrated approach to coastal risks.

As mentioned above, the programme took into consideration the Climate Resilience Investment Programme under the PPCR through parallel and complementary implementation: the design of the programme was done in full coordination with the Climate Resilience Steering Committee.in charge of the effective coordination of the various ongoing and pipeline initiatives related to Adaptation in Samoa.

The programme was designed to complete a holistic and country-wide approach to climate change adaptation in the coastal zones in Samoa. It proposed a 3-pronged approach, with the climate change and risks resilience planning, the implementation of on-the-ground adaptation measures (e.g. coastal roads climate-proofing, shoreline protection, flood protection and water supply enhancement measures) at community level, integrated with sustainable development processes and supported through enhanced national institutional and knowledge management capacities.

The project design addressed climate change adaptation and disaster resilience from a community perspective and integrated an investment component that was mostly mission in previous CIM plan generations (2003, 2007).

The strengthening, engagement and coordination of key institutions at national and community levels was to enhance mainstreaming of both Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) in national and community policies, plans and work programmes, and with training of key stakeholders to ensure the success of the intervention designed to enhance national and community resilience to climate change, including climate-related disasters. These actions were to be supported by, and contribute to, knowledge management initiatives.

The alignment of this AF initiative with PPCR has been a critical element of the programme design. This was to be achieved through high level coordination between the two programmes and the sharing of a Steering Committee so as to (i) coordinate and complement actions across the districts supported by each programme and (ii) adopt common processes to execute works items: the 41 districts of the country were divided between the two programmes. WB-financed PPCR covered 15 districts (8 along a major road climate proofing and upgrade project and 8 other districts focussing on earlier CIM Plan completed under IAMP1.

The AF programme targeted the remaining 25 districts in Samoa (6 districts where CIM Plans were completed under the IAMP1 project between 2000 - 2003 and a further 19 completed more recently under the SIAM. Upon completion of the two programmes, the entire country would have made substantial progress toward adaptation to CC-induced changes in the environment.

At project start-up, this project twinning approach was viewed as efficient and effective; however, as implementation advanced, this approach became an impediment to swift project delivery.

The Programme was to be implemented through UNDP's **National Execution Modality (NEX)**, with the MNRE serving as the designated national executing agency ("*Implementing Partner*") of the project.

#### 3.1.1 Analysis of logical framework / Results Framework

The analysis of the log frame and its set of indicators shows that most if not all of these are SMART with some reservations under outcome 2 on the Achievability criteria (smArt) for a series of infrastructures (e.g. nr of rehabilitated roads/ coastal infrastructures). By MTR stage, the mileage objective was already reduced (by 50%) and interviews confirmed that it was much over-ambitious; as it is highly unlikely that infrastructure costs would have increased by 100% by 2-3 years (from start-up to MTR), one may question either the efficiency of road and infrastructure works (over-charging by companies due to limited competition in the country) or poor unit cost estimates at formulation stage by the relevant authorities (LTA).

The project was significantly different from previous interventions on CIM plans as it included the infrastructure component; this was a major step forward as lessons learned from previous CIM plans had shown that Government support through an investment component was necessary so as to implement these plans. If the project can adequately assess its results, there was little if any information whether the targeted final beneficiaries (mostly communities) would take advantage of the project's benefits after closure either locally (actual use of infrastructures/level of ownership [maintenance schemes, degree of use...]) or through a multiplication effect (CIM plan empowerment by communities to assert more Government support or seek further support [increased bargaining power]) through own internal community resources, similar donor-funded or regular Government resources schemes.

Overall, additional indicators would have been welcome to measure any multiplication effect from Government's side: indeed, key stakeholders involved in project monitoring did not align their budgets and work plans to ensure a more integrated/holistic approach to development (e.g. access/emergency roads, relocation and provision of basic services).

The design lacked somehow ambition on how to empower central government with the future lessons learned from the project (e.g. fast-tracking/ institutionalisation of national road standards, community empowerment on NRM [replanting in damaged areas and catchment protection].

Often, projects include perception indicators that are systematically unrealistic and difficult to measure. This project is no different with indicators on how communities view climate change adaptation and disaster risks preparedness. This is not very relevant and it is better to measure any awareness through actual community engagement (through measuring ownership of results and empowerment through additionalities).

Additional project activities with relevant financial resources to support government into integrating lessons learned within relevant ministries through an updated national policy framework for climate proofing (improved legal frameworks [road construction guidelines], supporting relocation for communities under

extreme coastal risks as per reviewed CIM plans, innovative collaboration mechanisms between entities [SWA and MWCSW on IWS], etc.) would have been welcome.

### A detailed analysis is under Table 1

Description	Description of Indicator	Target Level at end of project	Specific	Measurable	Achievable	Relevant	Time-bound
Strengthened ability of coastal communities to make informed	protected through coastal adaptation measures based on climate-sensitive Coastal infrastructure Management Plans (CIM plans)	from climate-induced risks as a result of coastal adaptation measures	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome 1 Strengthened awareness and	updated CIM Plans with climate change risks fully integrated	of the programme at least 25districts will have their CIM Plans reviewed and updated with climate change risks fully integrated through balanced involvement of man, women and youth population	,	Y	Y	Y	Y
community and national levels in 25 Districts and 139 villages through gender-sensitive processes	relocation plans competed	programme at least 15 districts will have at least one village hazard zone relocation plan completed through balanced involvement of man women and youth population	ļ	Y	Y	Y	Y
	coastal risk assessment and adaptation and numbers of individuals engaged in those sessions	matais, women and youth groups) trained (year 1- 50, year 2- 100 year 3- 200), involving traditional leaders, women and youth group representatives	,	Y	Y	Y	Y
Outcome 2  Increased adaptive capacity of	improved to withstand climate change and			Y	N	Y	Y
to coastal hazards and risks induced by climate change in	and flood protection measures introduced, including vegetation planting along the coast and riparian streams and beach replenishment	flood protection measures are introduced in at least 140km coastline and riparian streams, including vegetation planting in at least 60 km coast and 50 km of riparian streams, and beach replenishment	1	Y	N	Y	Y
	improved water sector services and	r of risk-exposed coastal communities By the end of the programme, 139 Villages in 25 districts are protected V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V					
			Y	N	Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y		
	structures to implement CIM Plans	end of year one of the project		Y	Y	Y	Y
to integrate climate and	relocation processes	developed by the end of the project to guide future relocation planning	5	Y	Y	Y	Y
policy frameworks, processes	Improved regulatory procedures for physical works implementation with climate change and disaster risk considerations incorporated.	Revised regulatory procedures for CIM Plan works is prepared by the end of year 3 of the programme	Υ	Y	Y	Y	Y
and responses	Number of policymakers and Technical officers trained on climate risk assessment and	and institutional A revised CIM Plan management institutional structure is set up by Y Y Y Y Y Plans end of year one of the project to guide future relocation planning exercises  res for physical Revised regulatory procedures for CIM Plan works is prepared by the Y Y Y Y Y T mate change and end of year 3 of the programme at least 100 policymakers and technical Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y A gassessment and officers exhibit improved levels of understanding of climate risk adaptation.  gement products By the end of the programme, a communication strategy is developed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y					
	and South-South exchange events carried out	and information and lessons learnt are compiled and disseminated to local, regional and international stakeholders through at least 4 different mediums. By the end of Year 1, the project website is operational and not fewer than 5 project communications have been published. By the end of Year 2, not fewer than 10 further project	)  - 	Y	Y	Y	Y

Table 1.

Description	Description of Indicator	Target Level at end of project	Specific	Measurable	Achievable	Relevant	Time-bound
Strengthened ability of coastal communities to make informed	protected through coastal adaptation measures based on climate-sensitive Coastal infrastructure Management Plans (CIM plans)	By the end of the programme, 139 Villages in 25 districts are protected from climate-induced risks as a result of coastal adaptation measures implemented guided by revised CIM Plans	Y	Y	Y	Y	Ÿ
Outcome 1 Strengthened awareness and	updated CIM Plans with climate change risks fully integrated	By the end of year one at least 8, year two 18 and by the completion of the programme at least 25districts will have their CIM Plans reviewed and updated with climate change risks fully integrated through balanced involvement of man, women and youth population	,	Y	Y	Y	Y
community and national levels in 25 Districts and 139 villages through gender-sensitive processes	relocation plans competed	By the end of year one 5, year two 10 and by the completion of the programme at least 15 districts will have at least one village hazard zone relocation plan completed through balanced involvement of man women and youth population		Y	Y	Y	Y
	coastal risk assessment and adaptation and numbers of individuals engaged in those sessions	By the end of the project at least 300 village representatives (including <i>matais</i> , women and youth groups) trained (year 1- 50, year 2- 100 year 3- 200), involving traditional leaders, women and youth group representatives	,	Y	Y	Y	Y
	improved to withstand climate change and	By the end of the programme, at least 80km of coastal roads and related infrastructure is improved to withstand climate change and variability-induced stress		Y	N	Y	Y
to coastal hazards and risks induced by climate change in	and flood protection measures introduced, including vegetation planting along the coast and riparian streams and beach replenishment	By the completion of the programme climate resilient shoreline and flood protection measures are introduced in at least 140km coastline and riparian streams, including vegetation planting in at least 60 km coast and 50 km of riparian streams, and beach replenishment techniques applied in at least 2 sites and 10 Km coastline	1	Y	N	Y	
	improved water sector services and	By the end of the programme at least 9,000 inhabitants in 15 villages have their water supply and associated infrastructure improved to manage climate-induced impacts on water supply		Y	Y	Y	Y
		By the end of the project, at least 80% of the coastal communities involved perceive risk reduction to climate-induced hazards	tal roads and Y Y N Y Y change and Y Y Y Y ch				
	structures to implement CIM Plans	A revised CIM Plan management institutional structure is set up by end of year one of the project		Y	Y	Y	Y
to integrate climate and	relocation processes	A completed and operationally tested village relocation handbook is developed by the end of the project to guide future relocation planning exercises	5	Y	Y	Y	Y
policy frameworks, processes	lworks implementation with climate change and	Revised regulatory procedures for CIM Plan works is prepared by the end of year 3 of the programme	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
disaster risk considerations incorporated.  Number of policymakers and Technical By the end of the programme at least 100 policymakers and technical Y Y officers trained on climate risk assessment and officers exhibit improved levels of understanding of climate risk planning processes for coastal adaptation.	Y	Y	Y				
	and South-South exchange events carried out	By the end of the programme, a communication strategy is developed and information and lessons learnt are compiled and disseminated to local, regional and international stakeholders through at least 4 different mediums. By the end of Year 1, the project website is operational and not fewer than 5 project communications have been published. By the end of Year 2, not fewer than 10 further project communications have been published		Y	Y	Y	Y

Table 1: SMART analysis of the logical framework

#### 3.1.2 Assumptions and risks

The log frame contains several assumptions: 1. linkages between national institutional coordination and local development processes facilitate the timely review of CIM Plans and the implementation of community-level coastal adaptation measures, 2. Political stability is maintained; strong coordination amongst climate change stakeholders in the country; strong community leadership, cooperation and support for project activities, 3. Low staff turnover resulting in a sustained capacity of Government and partner institutions; communities are willing and committed to actively participate in the project; no political interference in the selection of districts and village works sites, 4. Government and NGOs provide on-going funding support to units responsible for information management and dissemination processes; strong strategic leadership and management within Government and NGO agencies and national institutions; senior officials and technical officers have the time to commit to planning and training activities; Government senior officials committed to incorporating climate change considerations in annual and strategic plans and budgeting.

Overall, all these assumptions were well identified.

The risk assessment and rating identified the following: 1. negative impact of PPCR delayed implementation, 2. Extreme climatic events damaging results or delaying implementation, 3. poor collaboration between project partners, 4. weak cooperation by villages, 5. land disputes amongst village members adversely affecting village relocation land use planning, 6. limited human resources in Government ministries and agencies to contribute to the activities, 7. not enough gender-specific techniques and technologies developed increasing inequity or changing negatively social roles, 8. unsupportive Government to embrace a cross-sectoral and integrated approach to the management of climate risks and opportunities, 9. stakeholders unable to perceive reductions in vulnerability over the timescale determined by programme duration and to distinguish vulnerability to climate change. Most risks were correctly identified.

The lack of coordination with PPCR was rated as low; this was a gross underestimation of difficulties ahead as one could anticipate already in the PRODOC that different implementation procedures could lead to significant implementation delays while both interventions were relying on each other at least for the CIM plans formulation process (initial data acquisition, synchronised imagery analysis and aligned community interaction procedures, aligned methodology for community priorities definition, CIM plan format...). Furthermore, the implementation responsibilities were asymmetric with an initial PMU under PUMA for the project and under MoF for PPCR.

The PPCR risk, although analysed *a posteriori*, has had significant constraints for the project (see findings and in particular sustainability).

#### 3.1.3 Lessons learned from other projects incorporated into project design

The project design took into consideration lessons learned from SIAM2, IAMP1 and IAMP2 and other post-2009 tsunami recovery projects, previous CCA projects (e.g. CCSDP, PACC, SGP-CBA projects). It built on complementarities with the – at the time – under formulation PPCR sister project. It also integrated lessons learned from 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> CIM plans generations:

- The need to raise community awareness of disaster risk and CCA activities through climate proof measures
- Mainstreaming livelihoods, DRM, coastal infrastructures, environment and governance
- Considering a watershed and ridge to reef approach

- Adopting a more holistic approach: sector-wide and smaller scale resolution including both village and district levels as a watershed and R2R approach will inevitably cover common village issues
- Prioritise activities that are more climate-resilient
- Balancing the added value of relocation of communities at risk against coastal infrastructures to maintain them on-site
- Ensure a more participatory approach with communities determining their own climate-proof priorities
- Move away from an externalised project implementation approach (subcontracted / independent consulting firm fully implementing the project) to a more Government managed implementation process (NEX modality with national procurement of external expertise)
- The need to integrate an investment component to avoid community fatigue with projects that plan but lack resources to implement community priorities

These considerations resulted in the design of a project that critically integrated the following:

- Ensuring that CIM plans are followed up with an investment modality
- Adopting a more sector-wide approach so as to create synergetic effects between sectors and relevant stakeholders
- Investing in infrastructures that are durable through higher standards of quality (climate proofing), maintenance/repairs policy (community and Government ownership) ensuring capital investment protection
- Linking communities through CIM plans at district level so as to adopt a more systemic approach to CCA and disaster resilience and create linkages between communities for common issues.

#### 3.1.4 Planned stakeholders' participation

The planned stakeholders and an estimate of their actual contribution to the project are indicated in Table 3.

The actual core stakeholders of the project in addition to the final beneficiaries (villages' communities) were MNRE, MoF (including CSSP), MWTI, LTA, MWCSD.

MNRE through PUMA was responsible for the overall project implementation; several key divisions (Land, Forestry, Water) from MNRE were put to contribution under outcomes 1 (CIM plans) and 2 (infrastructures). There was an overall positive contribution of Government stakeholders in holding discussions with communities to prioritise development issues related to CCA and resilience.

Overall, the final beneficiaries were very receptive to the project with active participation in awareness raising sessions, feedback and discussions on the potential benefits of the project.

Key institutions / stakeholders	Outcome 1	Outcome 2	Outcome 3	Board member
MNRE	✓	✓	✓	
- PUMA	✓	✓	✓	✓
- Forestry	✓	✓	0	✓
- Water	✓	✓	0	✓
- Land	✓	✓	0	✓
- DMO	✓	0	0	✓
UNDP	+ (CIM team recruitment)	0	+ (communication recruitment)	✓
MoF	0	+ (CSSP)	✓	✓
MWCSD	✓	✓	✓	✓
MWTI	0	0	✓	✓
STA	+	+ (Savaii site)	0	0
SWA	+	×	0	✓
LTA	✓	✓	✓	✓
MESC	0	0	0	0
МоН	0	0	0	0
EPC	+	0	0	✓
MAFF	0	0	0	0
Institution of Professional Engineers of Samoa	0	0	0	0
Samoa Chamber of Commerce	0	0	0	0
Samoa Hotel Association	0	0	0	0

<sup>✓:</sup> participation as planned; ★: no/little evidence of participation as planned; + included during implementation; O: mentioned in PRODOC but no role

Table 2: Planned / actual stakeholders' participation

#### 3.1.5 Replication approach

As mentioned in the PRODOC, the project is a scaled-up version of previous CIM plans interventions, integrating a watershed and R2R approach and an investment component to ensure communities involvement and potential for replication; some key activities were formulated to ensure some degree of replicability:

- Village hazard zone relocation handbook prepared to guide further relocation planning activities under component 3
- CIM Plan Handbook setting out the procedures and protocols to be followed to formulate and update a CIM Plan
- Experience from the planning and implementation processes to be systematically captured through the knowledge management activities
- Communication activities to ensure knowledge sharing targeting mostly Government staff
- Specific output on knowledge management (Output 3.5) through systematically documenting and disseminating good practices, linking with school programmes, in order to secure broad dissemination of project results and the transmission of know-how and experience to next generations of community practitioners, government planners and policymakers.
- CIM plans themselves for replication of the adaptation measures and experience delivered in the selected villages, as well as for further resource mobilization to secure additional funds in the future.

#### 3.1.6 UNDP comparative advantage

UNDP has been committed to building up the capacity of the country through mainstreaming environmental and climate change related considerations in the development processes at national and community levels.

The main advantage of UNDP is its capacity to mobilise financial resources on behalf of Samoa's Government to prepare with the Government project proposals that are endorsed and implemented.

UNDP's comparative advantage is several-fold: (i) UNDP is a neutral platform for development and has been able to build a trustful relationship with Government; (ii) UNDP is seen by Government as a multipurpose agency that favours a sector-wide approach to development while other (non-)UN agencies/donors are more sector-based (UNDP is active in many sectors like agriculture, forestry, WATSAN, energy, governance, CCA and DRR/DRM...); (iii) UNDP's strategy favours a pro-poor / participatory approach focussing on engaging with and empowering the most vulnerable – a focus on the population living under the poverty level - while many other donors will support large-scale interventions that will benefit large swaths of the population but based only on economic cost/benefit ratios; (iv) UNDP will support preferably small-scale investments (e.g. small-scale rural infrastructure under this project) benefitting primarily isolated and vulnerable people instead of large-scale nation-wide infrastructure programs; (v) UNDP has the ability to bring together specialised UN agencies for a common intervention.

Under the Samoa context, UNDP has acquired extensive experience with GEF through implementing over 6 GEF-funded national interventions, all of them under the climate change focal area (IMPRESS on energy, Enhancing the Resilience of Tourism-reliant Communities to Climate Change Risks on tourism, ICCRIFS on forestry, Integrating Climate Change Risks into the Agriculture and Health Sectors in Samoa and CC resilience), regional programmes on climate change (multisectoral PACC, CBA, PIGGAREP, PICCAP, PIREP on energy...) and several others under biodiversity and land degradation. These have supported the integration of CCA and DRM/DRR concerns of poor and vulnerable groups into policy, planning and implementation processes for poverty reduction, pro-poor growth and achievement of SDGs.

Finally, UNDP can bring valuable expertise – including directly through its country office HR – in RBM and identification of relevant RH to support interventions' implementation as a mean to raise implementation efficiency and effectiveness. Finally, UNDP's support is valuable for optimising projects' planning exercises during Board meetings and for advice to resolve outstanding issues (e.g. speed up recruitment processes).

#### 3.1.7 Linkages between project and interventions within the sector

The AF programme has been designed to be directly aligned with other interventions through the Climate Resilience Steering Committee chaired by MNRE so as to ensure the timely and effective coordination of the various ongoing and pipeline initiatives as per NAPA priorities.

The multi-donor contributions are coordinated by the Aid Coordination Division under MoF and approved by the Cabinet Development Committee.

The project design took into consideration other existing or recently terminated interventions as well as Government work plans:

• Pilot Program for Climate Resilience: a WB-funded sister project on CIM plan upgrading that covers the remaining 15 districts not covered by the project; the programme is implementing

revised CIM Plans in coordination with Sustainable Management Plans and Village Disaster Risk Management Plans; this geographic alignment is complemented by a strong thematic alignment as both are implementing the actions previously identified in the highly participatory CIM Plan formulation process. There has been strong institutional co-ordination through a shared Project/Programme Steering Committee as well as significant knowledge sharing between the two programmes.

- Alignment with sector plans (water sector, forestry management, village DM plans).
- Civil Society Support Programme: it is implemented by MoF and has absorbed the project's budget for CIM priorities under a small-scale grants scheme (e.g. IWS, small access/ evacuation roads & tracks...).
- Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change: the AF programme built on PACC experience in increasing the resilience of the piloted coastal and riverside communities to adapt to the impacts of climate change through the construction and implementation of integrated coastal protection mechanisms comprising of both structural works and soft measures; the AF supported PACC's replication and upscaling in the 25 target districts, while contributing to the further strengthening and completing of the demo technical guideline and village regulatory (by-law) applications being pursued through the pilot interventions.
- Tsunami recovery: the activities of the recovery plan spread across all sectors and sector agencies in charge of the various networks that were damaged and or affected by the 2009 tsunami. The MNRE component covered environment rehabilitation which includes marine and terrestrial resources supplies. The DMO component included hazard identification, assessment and mapping that were upscaled under the AF programme through relocation strategy and guidelines.
- The UNDP ER project focused mainly on rehabilitation of livelihoods through investment in green enterprise and alternative and sustainable long-term skills transfer among individuals and communities affected by the tsunami. Activities included improved DRR and CCA strengthening adaptive capacity and resiliency at community level, construction of seawalls and river embankments and rehabilitation of village springs as well as coastal replanting to reinforce structural preventative measures such as seawalls. The AF programme built on this project for several activities under component 2.
- Community-Based Adaptation (through SGP): the programme sought to encourage systematic change in national adaptation related policy through evidence-based results from a portfolio of community-driven climate change risk management projects. The programme promoted global learning related to community adaptation by sharing lessons from a range of initiatives focusing on natural resource management. The AF programme upscaled and replicated such community-based experiences across the target 25 districts, and to further facilitate the practical implementation of such measures through the community engagement processes.
- Samoa national Ridge to Reef programme: it supported the formulation of a national strategy for
  water resources and sector-wide approach; the AF programme integrated the R2R concept within
  the upgrading of the CIM plans by mainstreaming a watershed and R2R approach in assessing
  district and communities' issues and priorities for CCA and increased disaster risk resilience.

#### 3.1.8 Management arrangements

The 4-year project (January 2013 – January 2017) has been implemented under UNDP's NIM modality (eventually extended 12 and 6 months to June 2018). The planned management arrangements as per

PRODOC was reviewed during the Inception Workshop and is illustrated in the organisational chart shown in Figure 1.

The PMU unit was to be located within MNRE-PUMA as the executing agency.

The actual management arrangements deviated widely from the original PRODOC setup due to an extensive discussion between UNDP and Government and between Government ministries on how to twin best this project with WB-funded PPCR.




Figure 1: Planned project organisational structure<sup>5</sup>

At LPAC stage in September 2012, prior to UNDP/Government ERCC project signature in November 2012, was emphasized the need to define options for coordination with WB-funded PPCR: these included the following:

- Use of harmonised CIM plan methodology under PPCR by the ERCC project
- Project setup alignment with PPCR through a common Steering Committee
- Reporting mechanism of both projects under PUMA but with an AF-recruited Project Manager
- Joint PMU under PUMA Strategic Planning Division

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Adapted from original PRODOC during inception workshop

Final decision making by all parties during the inception report was due in November 2012 coinciding with WB mission. The inception workshop actually took place in March 2013.




Figure 2: Actual project organisational structure

The ERCC project went ahead with the recruitment of a Technical Assistant and Programme Assistant and left the common PMU recruitment by PPCR. With initially unsuccessful AF technical team tendering, further negotiations with MoF/WB resulted in AF cancelling the recruitment process for an AF PMU by the end of 2013 to take full advantage of PPCR PMU.

However, the recruitment process for PPCR PMU took time and the PMU eventually became operational by 2015 (2 years after AF start-up date).

In the meantime, PUMA carried out very few activities and at some point, had to accelerate the ERCC project delivery without further waiting for an operational PMU.

Eventually, PUMA entirely managed the ERCC project (operational, financial, administrative) for the whole duration of the project without a PMU as planned in the PRODOC (see Figure 2). Nonetheless, the AF took partially advantage of PPCR PMU staff expertise in 2015 and early in 2016 (see effectiveness on page 31).

#### 3.2.1 Adaptive management

The project under the NIM modality was due to be implemented from January 2013 to January 2017: although the AF had agreed to the project in March 2012, it took nearly a year to actually to officially start the project in January 2013 and carry out the inception workshop in March 2013 focusing on stakeholders' understanding of the project's goal, results, planned activities and the NIM modality.

The project was significantly constrained at the start with much delayed initial recruitment processes (failed tendering twice) resulting in little or no activities implemented during 2013 but the recruitment of the initial project team (Year 1). In addition, the decision to combine PMUs with PPCR resulted in further delaying the ERCC project implementation due to slow PMU tendering carried out by PPCR.

Eventually, the project delivery became so delayed that robust decision making had to be carried out by MNRE to ensure reasonable project results by early 2017.

These issues resulted in several key decision made to accelerate project implementation:

- The recruitment of the technical CIM plan team was unsuccessful through the regular Government tendering process; to raise the degree of successful recruitment, the AF requested successfully the support of UNDP for the recruitment of the team using the MIE modality<sup>6</sup>
- The project took advantage of existing modalities/interventions to channel funds instead of creating new mechanisms to deliver financial support: (i) small grants were channelled through MoF / CSSP on water supply (component 2) through 2 calls for proposals; (ii) replanting activities were integrated within the Forestry Division managed "2 million tree campaign" under component 2
- As suggested in the PRODOC, the focus of the project was mainly on coastal infrastructures by adopting a watershed / R2R approach; the project followed thoroughly that logic and eventually financed the most critical priorities of communities not necessarily linked to coastal infrastructures only but from ridge to reef
- The original plan was to review CIM plans and them finance part of them through component 2; however, the extensive implementation delays resulted in late CIM plan technical team contracting (2016); the ERCC project instead reviewed and updated the previous generation of CIM plans and started to finance the most critical communities' priories through component without newly upgraded CIM plans
- MNRE delayed much of the delivery because of trying to align the project with PPCR with a common PMU; this strategy proved to be unsuccessful and it eventually reverted back to speeding up implementation with PUMA's own HR; this proved difficult because of constrained HR availability in PUMA (most staff dealing with Planning & Policy Development for the delivery of Development consent/permits); however, it provided substantial experience to the PUMA Planning

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Possibility of Executing Agency to request support from UNDP through its country office, regional and headquarters networks on project identification, formulation, and appraisal; determination of execution modality and local capacity assessment of the national executing entity; briefing and de-briefing of project staff; oversight and monitoring of AF funds, including participation in project reviews; receipt, allocation and reporting to the AF Board of financial resources; thematic and technical capacity building and backstopping; support with knowledge transfer; policy advisory services; technical and quality assurance; and troubleshooting assistance to the national project staff (source: PRODOC)

Unit on complex project delivery as they had to both implement PPCR activities and provide support to MoF/PMU on the project.

The governance structure of the project was as follows:

- National Project Director (NPD), head of PUMA to oversee the overall project delivery
- National Technical Assistant ('Project Manager [NPM] as per PRODOC): contracted professional ensuring that the project produces the results specified in the project document to the required standard of quality and within the specified constraints of time and cost.
- *Project-Support*: the NPM was supposed to be assisted by a PMU with a series of professionals; eventually (see Figure 1 and Figure 2), the execution of project activities, including day-to-day operations of the project, and the overall operational and financial management and reporting was carried out by PUMA's own human resources with some intermittent support from PPCR's PMU
- Weekly meetings UNDP/PUMA for day-to-day implementation
- Quarterly TAG "Steering Committee or Project Board' meetings, to discuss operational matters with relevant key ministries and stakeholders (MNRE, MWCSD, MoF, UNDP: review quarterly reports, agree on the next quarterly work plan, launch of major project activities
- *CRSC meeting* (sectoral ministries with MoF) with ministries' CEOs and excluding donors to discuss strategic / sector-wide approaches regarding climate resilience (e.g. decision to have AF/PPCR separate planning committees)

The TAG meeting was the main governance body for reviewing periodically the project delivery and adjust planning as agreed between core stakeholders; minutes confirmed that most technical issues were solved during the monthly meetings.

Extensive delays affected the implementation of the project for the first two years with the lack of PMU with activities postponed (e.g. CIM plan technical team & subsequent CIM plan review).

A 12 months no-cost extension was granted due to slow delivery, just before the MTR and a further 6 months extension granted again in 2017 so as to finalise the CIM plans.

Still, the overall focus of the project (project goal, objective, and outcomes) remained unchanged over the whole project period; quantitative results were however modified to reflect better the capacity to deliver outputs (e.g. reduced road construction/rehabilitation mileage).

#### 3.2.2 Partnership arrangements

As per PRODOC, the key partnership of the project would have been WB-funded PPCR as it was a sister project delivering the same results but in other districts.

Extensive discussions were held between Government, UNDP and WB to ensure proper alignment in terms of methodology. In addition, further discussions resulted in initially considering a common PMU. However, the late recruitment by PPCR of the PMU staff slowed the ERCC implementation that eventually did take little advantage of PMU's expertise; instead, the ERCC project moved forward with a number of activities without close alignment at first with PPCR and with the recruitment of the CIM Plan technical team.

Overall, the ERCC did not fully take advantage of PPCR added value (e.g. extensive TA).

On the other hand, both CIM Plan technical team did cooperate successfully and aligned closely all community consultations and CIM Plan development methodologies with eventually a harmonised CIM Plan product at national level that was piloted by MNRE.

#### 3.2.3 Feedback from M&E used for adaptive management

Feedbacks from regular monitoring and evaluation of the project as well as from UNDP oversight were not immediately incorporated into changes of planned project activities, results and log frame. Still, discussions between MoF, MNRE and UNDP about the slow implementation pace of the project that was significantly affecting the overall project delivery resulted in key decisions to accelerate implementation over the following planning periods without further close alignment but regular liaison with PPCR by 2015:

- Recruitment of the technical CIM plan team prior to PPCR by 2015 and CIM plan accelerated review by year 4 (instead of planned year 1/2)
- Decision to move on with Lidar procurement by early 2015
- Despite an official agreement (MoU) with PPCR, the PMU's Environmental Safeguard Expert's services were not fully utilised and PUMA resorted to using its own environmental safeguards guidelines though internal staff and liaison with relevant ministries to ensure compliance
- Project extension: from January 2017 to June 2018 in order to reflect the extensive implementation delays and late review of CIM plans (2016/2018)

Discussions with PPCR about the R2R approach adopted by both projects resulted in the CIM plan name changed from 'Coastal Infrastructures Management' to 'Community Integrated Management' plan to reflect better the issues under CIM plans that are more inclusive than just coastal infrastructures. This was reflected in the review of the CIM plan strategy by 2015 to incorporate the R2R approach

Discussions with MWTI and LTA early on showed the gross overestimate of road rehabilitation/construction mileage resulting in 50% objective reduction from 80km to 40km in late 2015 prior to MTR.

Looking back, the coordination between PPCR and AF was a difficult process because of asymmetric governance mechanisms and donor widely different requirements: (i) for AF, MNRE was the executing agency in charge of AF delivery; for PPCR, it has been merely the main implementer with MoF overseeing delivery; this made operational (day-to-day) coordination difficult, (ii) the initial decision to merge PMUs and rely on PPCR PMU contracted personnel was detrimental to the ERCC project as it was not clear for PMU (e.g. under the staff's own TORs) that the objective was to contribute to a swift implementation of both projects, (iii) the administrative and financial procedures between UNDP and WB are so different (e.g. staff contracting, reporting, technical requirements [e.g. environmental safeguards and procurement procedures]) that close alignment (e.g. through parallel planning) would have resulted in delaying both project implementation through whichever slowest procedure of both projects.

#### 3.2.4 Project finance

As per PPRs, the total cost of the project (including Q2 2018) from 2013 to 2018 is explained under Table 3.

Co-financing	Planned (mill. US\$)	Actual (mill. US\$)
(type/source)		
AF (excluding UNDP admin. Costs)	8,05	8,05
Communities <sup>7</sup>	0,06	0,06
Government (PPCR PMU <sup>8</sup> + Lidar <sup>9</sup> )	1,67 + 1,40	1,4010
Total	11,18	9,51

*Table 3: Planned vs actual project expenditures*<sup>11</sup>

Table 4 shows that the project initial operationalisation was spread over 2 years (2013 and 2014). This is mainly due to the decision to combine PMUs that ultimately failed, resulting in MNRE reverting back to internal project implementation without a proper PMU.

Table 4 clearly shows, even from 2015 onwards, that PUMA was not controlling delivery with wide differences between work plan and actual expenses (% actual/AWP spent), evidencing the difficulty to control the implementation when different stakeholders (Ministries and authorities) are involved (including within MNRE) suggesting that eventually, a PMU might have been useful.

It became evident that by 2015 a project extension was needed (over 60% of the budget to commit in the last year - 2016 -).

Budget/expenditure Year	PRODOC workplan (mill. US\$)	AWP (mill. US\$)	Actual expenditure (mill. US\$)	% spent (actual/AWP)
2013	1,31	0,65	0,10	15
2014	2,87	1,87	0,30	16
2015	2,51	3,83	2,29	69
2016	1,35	3,49	2,71	154
2017	-	2,69	1,42	53
2018		1,27	1,77	139
2010			(excluding 0,10 M\$ not committed by project's end)	
Total	8,04		8,5912	

Table 4: Annual Work Plan budget and actual expenditures  $(AF)^{l3}$ 

The analysis of the cumulative delivery rate (see Figure 3) show a typical S-shaped curve (sigmoid) against a straight line (linear trend) for the cumulative spending as anticipated at formulation stage; this is more evidence for the need to take into account an extended inception phase to resolve operationalisation difficulties like recruitment and initial involvement of all stakeholders, and to lengthen substantially the project cycle to ensure a smoother implementation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> As per agreement by 2015

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> As per agreement during 2012 LPAC and 2013 inception workshop

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> As per agreement by 2015

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Support from PPCR PMU was limited and not consistent over the entire duration of the ERCC project

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Situation as of September 2017

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Source: PPR; sum of actual expenditure shows unexplained inconsistent values (over actual budget)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Excluding UNDP administrative costs




Figure 3: Cumulative planned and actual delivery rate

Because data is missing for 2018 (Table 5), it is not possible to analyse the planned and committed budgets per outcome.

The project management budget was supposedly contained within the planned envelope despite its very low amount (9%); more common values for similar projects have higher management budget (10-15%).

Component	PRODOC Budget (mill. US\$)	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018 (Q1 & Q2)	Total spent	% delivery
Outcome 1 – CIM plans	0,83	<0,01	0,08	0,04	0,18	0,33	No info	0,54 exc 2018	No info
Outcome 2 – infrastructures	6,02	0,02	0,11	2,15	2,03	1,00		5,29 exc 2018	No info
Outcome 3 – capacity building	0,50	0	0,03	0,04	0,14	0,04		0,23 exc 2018	No info
Project management	0,70	0,07	0,07	0,03	0,37	0,04		0,56 exc 2018	No info
Total	8,04	0,10	0,30	2,29	2,71	1,42	Estim. 1,77	8,03	99%14

Table 5: Project's fund disbursement status (AF only)

#### 3.2.5 Monitoring and evaluation: design at entry and implementation

Because MNRE was expected a common PPCR/AF PMU, no project-specific M&E system was designed at the start of the project. By the time an operational PMU was set, PUMA had assumed most M&E functions until the remainder of the project.

With limited HR, PUMA used the project work plan and result framework with its set of indicators as the main M&E tool for day-to-day monitoring of activities (plan field trips, interactions with LTA, MoF/CSSP, CIM team...). While it may not be surprising, there was no official request from PUMA for associated

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Excluding 0,10 mill. US\$ unallocated and any co-financing

stakeholders to monitor and evaluate AF activities through a formal project M&E mechanism (e.g. periodic progress info from LTA, MNRE divisions). This resulted in weak M&E involvement of associated partners and more ad-hoc M&E activities by PUMA based on discussions and on the actual institutions monitoring tools. This had the advantage of simplified reporting from associated institutions (MNRE divisions, LTA, CSSP) but made it all the more difficult for PUMA to monitor delivery and realign activities during implementation (which is evidenced by the wide differences between the annual work plans and actual budget commitments).

Project M&E was carried out using the following tools and through the following:

- Inception workshop and initial AWP
- Weekly meetings between PUMA and UNDP
- TAG meeting minutes
- Quarterly meetings between UNPD and PUMA prior to presenting Quarterly Progress Reports including updated work plans
- Periodic Monitoring through site visits: UNDP and PUMA conducted monitoring visits several times per year to assess project progress
- One audit for the Year 2015 as per UNDP Financial Regulations and Rules
- Annual PPRs
- Independent mid-term and final project evaluations

The 2015 audit evidenced the need to improve the procurement process: lack of official endorsement for payments), minor errors of aid ledgers and incorrect asset statements; it was assumed to have been rectified soon after the audit (?).

The MTR conducted by the end of 2015 rated the overall performance of the project as moderately satisfactory with an overall weak M&E system, especially from associated stakeholders and insufficient site visits.

Some improvements were made afterwards with more site visits and a better understanding by PUMA of required efforts to accelerate project delivery through improved M&E activities. Still, associated stakeholders' involvement in M&E remained weak for the entire duration of the project.

**M&E design at entry RATING:** Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)

**M&E** at implementation RATING: Moderately Satisfactory (MS)

Overall quality of M&E RATING: Moderately Satisfactory (MS)

3.2.6 UNDP and Implementing Partner implementation/execution coordination and operational issues

Both UNDP and the designated executing agency (MNRE) were involved in project implementation with UNDP having an advisory role with the provision of technical advice and monitoring.

#### **Implementing Partner:**

The project was supervised by MNRE. PUMA was supposed to host the project team (PMU) throughout the duration of the project; eventually, no AF-specific PMU was contracted and the PPCR PMU unit was located

outside PUMA (at MoF), hence an additional difficulty for PUMA to request support from PMU through MoF. One of the main difficulties for PUMA has been the difficulty to align delivery between the two projects; this resulted at some point during implementation in splitting PUMA staff between the ERCC project (ACEO, 3 PUMA staff, CIM plan Team Leader and consultants) and PPCR (ACEO, 3 PUMA staff and CIM plan Team Leader and consultants) for smoother implementation.

To improve implementation and to align it with PPCR, PUMA requested support from the PPCR PMU<sup>15</sup>; because of unclear mandates from the earlier decision to combine PMUs for both projects, support was very partial over time and in intensity resulting in PUMA carrying out most of the AF administrative, procurement and financial activities.

So, despite poor decision making at project start-up (ensure delivery alignment with PPCR), subsequent coordination issues, deficient M&E and the need to obtain support from UNDP, all this evidence the commitment of PUMA to deliver project outcomes, resulting in eventually CIM plan community engagements (CIM plan signature by June 2018) and planned infrastructures budget delivery as per communities' priorities.

Quality of implementing partner execution RATING: Satisfactory (S)

#### **Implementing Agency:**

The added value of the implementing agency (UNDP) in Samoa has been its ability to provide regular support to the project team: UNDP was present at weekly, monthly (TAG) and quarterly meetings (Project Board); support consisted mainly of advice on operationalising activities. UNDP was not under the Government only key strategic decision-making entity, CRSC, that steered both AF and PPCR projects.

If UNDP could provide extensive support on work planning and advice from site visits results, its ability to provide strategic advice was therefore very limited in relation to the coordination issues with PPCR.

In any case, it responded positively to Government requests through its MIE modality, engaging resources in accelerating the ERCC project implementation with the recruitment of most if not all project managing and technical (CIM plans) staff with UN procurement procedures<sup>16</sup>. This sped up the recruitment with a stronger outreach (at international level) for identifying potential candidates.

Quality of implementing agency (UNDP) execution RATING: Satisfactory (S)

Overall quality of implementation / Execution RATING: Satisfactory (S)

#### 3.3 Project results

#### 3.3.1 Overall results

A brief assessment of the project overall results, is presented in the following paragraphs.

Objective Outcome: Strengthened ability of coastal communities to make informed decisions about climate-change induced hazards and undertake concrete adaptation actions. Progress at project's end: as the objective

<sup>15</sup> Team Leader, Financial Specialist, Procurement Specialist, Environment and Safeguard Specialist and M&E Specialist

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Request for Direct Project Services by UNDP endorsed by the AF Board in October 2014

is quite vague, it is somewhat achieved: 139 villages in 25 districts are now potentially protected from climate-induced risks as a result of coastal adaptation measures implemented guided by revised CIM Plans. Village representatives do have the ability to make informed decisions through CIM plans but that does not mean that they will make informed decisions and undertake adaptation actions: they are still prone to risks because of lack of funding to respond to CIM plan priorities but now both communities and Government do have a framework for action for the coming years (CIM plans were estimated valid for 10 years).

# 3.3.1.1 Outcome 1: Strengthened awareness and ownership of coastal adaptation and climate risk reduction processes at community and national levels in 25 Districts and 139 villages

Progress at project's end: partially achieved. There is overall increased awareness about the need for CCA processes at the community level but the focus for coastal infrastructures by communities remains strong; despite this, CIM plans now show a wide variety of priorities that include watershed and R2R approaches to CCA and no longer coastal infrastructures only.

Output 1.1: CIM Plans reviewed in 25 districts with climate-induced disaster risk management elements fully integrated, adopting a Watershed and Ridge to Reef Management approach. All 25 districts have completed their CIM Plan review. All 25 CIM Plans were available in June 2018. In each CIM Plan review, relevant stakeholders both government and local communities (village leaders from target villages, women and youth) have been involved in workshops and their feedback has been included to reflect a set of initial site-specific interventions under each CIM Plan. While the results are not what was expected from the original PRODOC (review CIM plans, update CIM plans and carry out selected prioritised interventions), urgent priorities were covered by component 2 prior to establishing the upgraded CIM plan. As per interviews of final beneficiaries, the result is communities are back to a list of priorities still to be covered by Government future investments, further reinforcing the view by communities that primarily Government has to provide support to enhance CCA of communities.

Output 1.2: Village hazard zone relocation plans formulated at least 15 villages in selected districts. The National Relocation Roadmap/Strategy and Handbook have been developed to facilitate the relocation of potentially vulnerable communities. Fifteen most vulnerable communities have been identified through the selection criteria developed and at the end of the reporting period, all 15 villages now have Relocation Plans developed. This did not mean that relocation would take place; indeed, interviews showed that communities at risk are reluctant to relocate and will engage Government to favour coastal infrastructures (seawalls, wave breakers, sand refilling...) instead of moving away from eroded coastal zones. In the past, communities were very much in favour of such interventions but recent disasters and extreme events (strong cyclones, tsunamis) have shown the limits of these infrastructures; with a long-term view, Government and to a certain extent some communities, are now more in favour of voluntary relocation to better invest scarce financial resources. To support relocation efforts, communities require the government to provide infrastructural services to aid voluntary relocation to safer grounds.

Output 1.3: Training delivered to 300 village leaders in 139 villages on a review of CIM Plans and relocation planning process integrating climate risks. 139 villages (around 1.000 participants) completed their CIM Plan review through consultations and workshops piloted by MWCSD with the support of various Government sectors (LTA, EPC, SWA, various MNRE divisions). The ERCC project went into strong community awareness raising on the diversity of climate change, risks and adaptation measures to aid understanding of CIM Plan review exercises. Still, at individual level, people remain overwhelmingly in favour of coastal

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> It is important to note that the Government only provided major adaptation infrastructural investments for the benefit of the public whereas communities were responsible for village specific interventions

protective infrastructures; the situation is however quite different in the South of Upolu island with communities more inclined to prioritise non-coastal interventions due to the 2009 tsunami trauma. The training of key decision-making community members did initiate a subtle mindset change with a substantial number of requests/priorities to invest into access and evacuation roads (in addition to proposed AF investment options) away from coastal areas which were supported through component 2.

# 3.3.1.2 Outcome 2: Increased adaptive capacity of coastal communities to adapt to coastal hazards and risks induced by climate change in 25 Districts and 139 villages

Progress by project's end: partially achieved; overall, most targets were too ambitious (roads, replanting) with only the water supply subcomponent achieving results as planned in the PRODOC. While there have been extensive discussions about changing the roads target (from 80 km to 40 km), there was little evidence for replanting and flood /coastline protection measures.

Output 2.1: Climate proofing measures implemented on coastal roads and related infrastructure in at least 10 districts and 40 villages. The PRODOC had proposed at least 80km of coastal roads and related infrastructure improvement to withstand climate change and variability-induced stress. In addition to the four access roads (total length of 12 km) completed in 2016, 2 new access roads were due to be completed (approx. 0,40 km in total) with the Salimu / Musumusu access road (2,20 km) with project's end but were delayed during the procurement procedure<sup>18</sup>. Drainage maintenance works in the town area supported by the project in 2015 - 2016 was critical in alleviating flooding of main roads and properties during heavy rain. This covers 16.9kms of flood-prone areas in the town area. Prior to MTR, the target was reduced down to 40km. Even with this reduced target, the allocated budget for this activity remained insufficient in meeting the 40km target. Combining both roads and drainage infrastructures, over 30km of transport-related infrastructures were built/rehabilitated.

As per PRODOC and announced cost per m (280US\$/m), 80km of roads would have required a budget over 22,400 mill US\$... The project managed to cover around 30km at a cost of around 3.10 mill. US\$, corresponding to 100US\$ per meter (detailed information from LTA is included in Annexe 14).

*Output 2.2:* Shoreline protection measures implemented in at least 10 districts and 40 villages. As per PRODOC, climate resilient shoreline and flood protection measures by project's end would have covered at least 140km coastline and riparian streams, including vegetation planting in at least 60km coast and 50km of riparian streams, and beach replenishment techniques applied in at least 2 sites and 10 km coastline.

The Vaiala Seawall (0,66 km) was completed and inaugurated in December 2015. The Saleia Rock Wall (1 km) was completed in June 2016. A new road to be constructed in Salimu/Musumusu also comprised a rock wall (around 1 km) to protect critical sections of the access road prone to coastal erosion. Barely 3 km out of the planned 10 km were covered by the project.

Four major catchment areas have been replanted by MNRE Forestry Division, Environment & Conservation Division and Water Resource Division as part of the "2 million tree campaign" to protect water resources and infrastructure. Replanting coverage was equivalent to 18.9 hectares<sup>19</sup> (see as well Annex 8 for detailed

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Site visits showed that works was still under way in July 2018

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Source: PPR

information) covering 14 sites. Three sites of activities were covered: conservation of fauna and flora within a reserve, ecological restoration to conserve water resources, replanting in degraded areas.

M&E did not follow up the PRODOC indicators or the results framework was not amended to reflect better FD's own M&E system. It appears nonetheless that reforestation activities are most successful when fully controlled by the Forestry Department or when trees are actually individually owned at household level. These replanting activities happened on streams/catchments which is in line with indicators.

Output 2.3: Water supply enhanced in at least 5 districts and 15 villages. The project took advantage of an existing funding modality: CSSP managed by MoF (AF-CSSP MoU); the programme is very popular with other donors (EU, DFAT and WB-funded PPCR) using this modality to fund small subprojects on gender issues, livelihoods... The programme absorbed the AF water supply budget through two calls for proposals (in 2017) (21 projects in Upolu, 12 projects in Savaii) and the reassessment of unsuccessful proposals (12 projects in both islands); most projects proposals related to rainwater harvesting (individual HH and schools), safe havens in case of disasters, spring pool rehabilitation, jetties, walkways/escape routes from the beach, mangrove walkways.

By the end of the programme, it is assumed<sup>20</sup> that 9.000 inhabitants in 45 villages benefitted from the ERCC project (45 X 200 inhabitants/village) (see details in annexe 9).

*Output 2.4:* Flood protection measures are implemented in at least 5 districts and 15 villages. A flood protection measure for the Vaisigano Catchment in Apia has been completed through the LDCF and EWACC funding. The Vaisigano project is protecting 11 communities. The ERCC project contributed with a flood study of the Vaisigano Catchment in Apia. There is no mentioning about the Vaisigano mileage covered by the ERCC project. Other flood protection measures were supported on Savaii Island (one site) or Saleia revetment wall in Savaii

The objective of integrated flood-risk management plans/measures implemented in at least 10 watersheds/80 Km of waterways, involving at least 15 of villages may have been too ambitious.

# 3.3.1.3 Outcome 3: Strengthened institutional capacity of government sectors to integrate climate and disaster risk and resilience into coastal management-related policy frameworks, processes and responses.

Progress by project's end: all activities were achieved. The degree of ownership and empowerment varies with a substantial interest in the institutional review that not only covers how CIM plan should be mainstreamed into line ministries but also how to improve the efficiency of MNRE so as to support more effectively the CIM plans.

Output 3.1: Revised national organisation and institutional structures for CIM Plans implementation. An institutional review of relevant Ministries was conducted in 2016 and 2017. It made recommendations on the roles and responsibilities of institutions and line ministries in charge of CIM Plan Implementation and suggested a timeline for implementation. Substantial changes included the creation of a Ministry of Climate Change and Disaster Management (splitting MNRE), the streamlining of MNRE divisions for improved management, the turning of PUMA into an independent authority and clearer division of tasks on CIM plans

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> There is no information in the documents about the number of inhabitants in the villages despite this being a PRODOC indicator ( $\rightarrow$  M&E issue)

per sector (DRM/CCA support from MNRE, governance support from MWCSD, agricultural support from MAF, health advice from MoH...).

The report was well reviewed at the cabinet level. An implementation plan is underway. However, the proposed changes are beyond the scope of the project and the proposed sector-wide approach is consistent / overlapping with the new MWCSD approach on DDP. Hence additional discussions at Government level are necessary.

Output 3.2: Village relocation handbook prepared to guide further relocation planning activities. A consultant to develop the relocation handbook was recruited in 2016 to align with the CIM Plan Review program. The handbook was completed and is available; it is supposed to guide the development of the selected villages relocation plans. So far, there is little appetite by Government to push for direct relocation of the population under direct CCA disaster threat. The current and future approach looks like more direct resources funding away from coasts and more into land. Hence, this handbook is so far not directly in use although it may constitute a basis for discussion for future Government plans and relocation strategies (possibly in the aftermath of future disaster when population mindset will be more conducive to move away from direct danger).

*Output 3.3:* Regulatory procedures for physical works implementation revised with climate change and disaster risks integrated; related activities included the Review of the PUMA Act 2004. The revision was anticipated to be finalized by the Attorney General's office by Quarter 2 2018. Amendments contain improvement to the development consenting process to ensure developments are resilient to disasters and pose no risks to communities. It is still under discussion (not finalised).

*Output 3.4:* Policymakers and technical officers in the relevant Ministries and Authorities are trained on climate risk assessment and planning processes for coastal adaptation. Training for policymakers and technical officers was scheduled to be conducted after the finalization of the PUMA Act 2004 in the first quarter of 2018. These training took place in 2018.

Output 3.5: Adaptation lessons learned and best practices generated through the adaptation implementation and related policy processes are captured and disseminated nationally and globally through appropriate mechanisms. The ERCC project accounted for a large-scale component on knowledge management and communication of lessons learned; a substantial number of activities were conducted over the course of the project but not under a communication strategy. A communication Specialist was contracted by the end of the project (mid-2017) to develop a comprehensive communication strategy, however too late to ensure MRNE empowerment of new communication mechanisms.

A number of initiatives were carried out prior to and after his recruitment:

- To increase the impact and ensure the future sustainability of the ERCC project, the "Samoa CARES" initiative raised the profile through advocacy and fundraising needs of the ERCC project and supported the communication requirements of all Samoan CCA projects through following up that can now follow the "Samoa CARES" framework (newsletter and social media updates).
- Videos produced under this project, particularly portraying the CSSP impact and results, to succinctly tell a story in less than 3 minutes generating interest and raising CCA + Development awareness among the target communities.
- Six success stories produced under this project (CSSP)
- Samoa CARES newsletter to disseminate CCA/Mitigation news at the local, regional and international level

- Story publishing platform allowing online delivery of stories in real time.
- TV news to cover the launch of several CSSP community projects, infrastructural projects implemented by the relevant IA of the project (e.g. launching road projects and coastal protection walls)
- Boosting posts on social media as an efficient method to raise public awareness and engagement and effective investment
- Use of MNRE's DKBM Facility to integrate project products and experience.
- ERCC project Facebook page

A large number of the most innovative communication activities started at the very end of the project, missing out opportunities to generate knowledge and lessons learned as well as to increase interest and CCA sensibility in Samoa. As a consequence, many 'component 2' activities (roads, replanting) were insufficiently documented and communicated (only through regular media – TV, radio).

Furthermore, the issue of ownership may pose a problem with most developed products insufficiently institutionalised within MNRE-PUMA (see sustainability).

**Overall Project Outcome RATING**: Satisfactory (S)

#### 3.3.2 Relevance

As far as the relevance is concerned, the program concept and design are highly relevant to country policies, strategic objectives and priorities. The consultant concludes that the project is fully conforming to the country strategies, policies and programs related to climate change issues. This also includes all activities under the project, which are well in tune and fully aligned with the national development policy, including all three project components on CIM plans upgrading, small-scale infrastructure development, and sharing lessons learned.

The project was aligned with (i) the *NAPA* (2005) providing an overview of climate change impacts and vulnerabilities, and prioritising adaptation projects for priority sectors, (ii) the *Planning and Urban Management Act* (2004) of MNRE defining land management and enabling land use including the protection of natural and man-made resources and the maintenance of ecological processes and genetic diversity, providing a mechanism for the development of sustainable management plans (« CIM plans ») and various co-ordination, education and promotional roles, (iii) the *Planning and Urban Management* (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations (2007) providing the framework for environmental impacts of development works, (iv) the *National Policy to Combat Climate Change* (2007) under MNRE outlining Samoa's response to climate change, (v) the Disaster and Emergency Management Act (2007) and National Disaster Management Plan (2007) under MNRE and related plan that has to include a comprehensive risk profile to reduce risk as well as preparedness, response and recovery arrangements, (vi) the Coastal Infrastructure Management (CIM) Strategy (2001, 2007<sup>21</sup>) setting out the need for CIM Plans, (vii) the Samoa National Infrastructure Strategic Plan (SNISP) outlining the Government's priorities and strategic directions for major initiatives in the economic infrastructure sector. The policy and legislative framework should have set out the technical standards within which the AF programme should have been executed.

The project was fully aligned with the 2008-12 SDS Priority Area 3: GOAL 7 « environmental sustainability and disaster risk reduction » with an emphasis on strengthening the capacity of PUMA, managing forest

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Integrating climate change considerations

areas and increasing the resilience to the adverse impacts of climate change through works on coastal management and adaptation programs for vulnerable villages and other coastal locations.

A change of approach was initiated under the 2012-2016 SDS with an increased emphasis on the mainstreaming of climate change and disaster resilience into development processes (Priority Area 4 – Key outcomes 14): key priority areas included the *undertaking of climate change and hazard risks analysis and vulnerability assessments*, encouraging the *use of ecosystem-based approach* to adapt to potential climate change impacts, strengthening *awareness and consultation on climate change and disaster risk* man*agement*, strengthening disaster preparedness and response capacity, improving monitoring of climate change through centralized collection of data, *implementing revised coastal infrastructure management plans* and developing financing modalities for CCA and DRM.

Finally, the project was designed in the alignment of GEF and AF priority areas. GEF funds and support projects focused on climate change issues.

**RATING:** Relevant (R)

#### 3.3.3 Effectiveness and efficiency

#### **Effectiveness** (relation between actual outcomes and the project objective):

The initial project objective was to strengthen the ability of coastal communities to make informed decisions about climate-change induced hazards and undertake concrete adaptation actions. Three outcomes were formulated:

- Outcome 1: strengthened awareness and ownership of coastal adaptation and climate risk reduction processes at community and national levels in 25 Districts and 139 villages.
- Outcome 2: increased adaptive capacity of coastal communities to adapt to coastal hazards and risks induced by climate change in 25 Districts and 139 villages.
- Outcome 3: strengthened institutional capacity of government sectors to integrate climate and disaster risk and resilience into coastal management-related policy frameworks, processes and responses.

Outcome 1 results: direct relationship to objective, but awareness seems to be highest amongst community key decision-making people

The participative methodology endorsed by the AF has successfully increased awareness among key community influential resource people (*matais*, man/ women/youth representatives); this ensured an effective orientation of communities in defining their key priorities under the upgraded CIM plans. Interviews with regular community members seemed to show that CIM plans remain somewhat an elusive concept. One of the major shortcomings of the project seems to be the reversed approach for AF implementation due to extensive initial delays resulting in considering first the review of old CIM plans and financing some of their priorities before developing upgraded new CIM plans; interviews have shown insufficient understanding about the linkage between outcome 2 and outcome 1: communities with new CIM plans consider them again as lists of priorities without any formal Government commitment (as for previous generations of CIM plans) because Government commitments under outcome 2 were already met.

Outcome 2 results: direct relationship to objective but less effective than planned under PRODOC

Adaptive capacity in communities has increased but not as initially planned both because of ambitious objective and PRODOC costings not reflecting the assigned targets. All types of investments but small-scale water supply did not fully attain the PRODOC objectives. All were, however, the most effective types of investments to increase CCA and resilience of communities both in coastal and inland areas.

Outcome 3 results: indirect relationship to objective, partially effective because some outputs have not yet been institutionalised to support communities

Effectiveness depends on the outputs under this outcome:

- 'Revised national organisation and institutional structures for CIM Plans implementation': this is key to ensuring CIM plan continuity and break the cycle of periodic CIM plan reviews that systematically require donor support; however, many proposals go beyond the scope of the ERCC project; this process should result in clear responsibilities with appropriate Government budget lines to ensure that CIM plans are monitored, updated as per met priorities and Government budget planning and related donor aid reflect community priorities set under CIM plans.
- 'Village relocation handbook': the original idea was to guide the development of the selected villages relocation plans; however, Government is considering this type of activity very sensitive as it may affect customary land ownership and is in any case very costly to implement; in that context, a relocation strategy was developed instead. So far, this type of activities is little effective as no(t yet) in line with current Government policies.
- 'Regulatory procedures for physical works implementation revised with climate change and disaster risks integrated'; related activities included the Review of the PUMA Act 2004. The revised Act should further strengthen the mandate of PUMA to mainstream CCA and DRM in land management and land use (planning).
- 'Training of policymakers and technical officers in the relevant Ministries and Authorities' on climate risk assessment and planning processes for coastal adaptation. A substantial number of Government officials were trained as part of the CIM plan review in 2017. There is no qualitative information on how effective these trainings are in terms of change attitudes (only attendance indicators).
- 'Adaptation lessons learned and best practices generated through the adaptation implementation and related policy processes are captured and disseminated nationally and globally through appropriate mechanisms. Communication products can be powerful tools if adapted to their targeted public or integrated into existing communication mechanisms; this seems to have been the case for some initiatives (e.g. MNRE website and Facebook page, MNRE's DKMB) but not all; some outputs may be promising but the communication expert was contracted too late to ensure ownership by MNRE and PUMA of some initiatives (e.g. 'Samoa CARES').

#### **Efficiency** (project costs):

The four-year-long project spent in total around 8M\$ over 6 ½ years (1.2M\$/year) to cover 25 districts (140 villages) and an extensive budget for CCA / DRM infrastructures (70% of the project's budget for outcome 2).

Overall, resources were efficiently allocated for roads, replanting, water supply under outcome 2: this has to do a lot with the ERCC project taking advantage of existing delivery modalities: the AF investments on road

were partially mainstreamed into regular LTA activities or adapted to LTA's regular investment programme, replanting and watershed protection was part of the "Two Million Tree Campaign" and water supply support was channelled through MoF's CSSP modality.

Still, there are wide uncertainties as to how efficient the project delivery was: (i) how climate-proof are access/evacuation roads? The project supported MWTI in designing national standards for road construction instead of using adapted New Zealand standards but the new standards are still under discussion within the MWTI, (ii) replanting activities seem most efficient in protected areas where DEC has full control and least efficient in degraded areas under communal land with insufficient community control (e.g. livestock wandering, poor monitoring) requiring extensive efforts for added replanting or resulting in very poor replanting performance, (iii) water supply micro-projects under CSSP seem to be most efficient in either averaging consumer water flows and/or increasing water quality standard through rapid sand filtration or providing clean water to isolated HH that are unable to get connected to SWA or an IWS.

**RATING for Effectiveness:** Moderately Satisfactory (MS)

**RATING for Efficiency:** Satisfactory (S)

Overall project outcome RATING: Moderately Satisfactory (MS)

#### 3.3.4 Country ownership

The level of country ownership for project implementation is very high:

- (i) The steering committee (CRSC) is entirely Government-driven with UNDP providing support only at quarterly meetings and operational support on a weekly basis for short/medium term project implementation
- (ii) Following the sector-wide institutional analysis on how to best empower Government institutions with the newly upgraded CIM plans, there have been extensive inter-ministerial discussions about the existing and future responsibilities of each institution regarding CIM plans monitoring, review and completion; interviews showed that Government is discussing the rolling-out of an implementation plan that originated from the AF CIM Plan institutional analysis.

At community level, results are more mixed with interviews evidencing the difficulty to motivate communities in prioritising replanting and setting-up functional maintenance systems for IWS. Overall, there is a sense from communities that while most CCA and DRR infrastructures do benefit them, it remains up to Government to ensure maintenance and care, evidencing a relative lack of ownership. This is most obvious for road, replanting activities and least for coastal infrastructures and micro-projects (e.g. under CSSP) with communities involved in minor maintenance activities (e.g. after annual storm surges).

The community ownership for micro-projects through CSSP calls for proposals is apparently very high and worth considering as a lesson learned for future Government investments.

#### Project mainstreaming into UNDAF:

The project has applied a holistic approach to CCA and DRM combined with poverty reduction and sustainable development to carry out the planned activities; it covered the 2013-2017 Regional UNDAF.

It significantly contributed to 2013/7 UNDAF's Outcome Area 1 ('Environmental management, climate change and disaster risk management') through:

- (i) Integrating Disaster Risk Management (DRM) and Climate Change policies but with an emphasis on the most vulnerable communities, enhancing their resilience (through CIM plans)
- (ii) Ensuring partnerships and multi-stakeholder involvement (through PPCR and CSSP) for integrated solutions in climate and disaster risk management that address the needs of the most vulnerable.
- (iii) Being supportive in Knowledge and Information Management (through Outcome 3) by strengthening risk assessment and reporting capacities in climate and disaster risk management for greater evidence base in decision-making.
- (iv) Enhancing community resilience so that they are in a better position to assess and understand the various climate change and disaster risks they are exposed to and empower them in managing these risks in a sustainable manner while addressing the underlying causes.

In particular, the project is directly contributing to placing UNDP as a key resource organisation for thought leadership on CCA and risk reduction – in particular, climate resilience of communities - in SIDS.

#### Gender mainstreaming:

The consultant found that gender considerations were somewhat poorly taken into consideration in the PRODOC despite the fact that it is an important factor for success given the differentiated roles of men and women in Samoa in disaster risks reduction and climate change adaptation, and for the overall sustainability of the project. Despite this, gender was adequately mainstreamed for the CIM Plan preparation with gender-specific community consultations but also considering the viewpoints of youth representatives. This work was facilitated by MWCSD as an entry point all the main Government stakeholders in accessing all vulnerable group and identifying their CIM plan priorities.

Women and youth were most positively impacted by improved access infrastructures under component 2 (e.g. new access road resulting in increasing agricultural activities, beach evacuation walkway, water supply (including individual water tanks and IWS that improved tap throughput rate), mangrove walkway....

#### Project linkages to SDG targets:

The project is having direct positive effects on some SDGs: this is particularly the case for:

Goal 6 – "Ensuring availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all": the project has improved access to water through output 2.3 and is therefore directly contributing to Target 6.1 "achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all", 6.4 "substantially increase water-use efficiency across all sectors and ensure sustainable withdrawals and supply of freshwater to address water scarcity and substantially reduce the number of people suffering from water scarcity"; the reforestation and catchment protection activities under output 2.2, have directly contributed to Target 6.6 a & b "protect and restore water-related ecosystems, including mountains, forests, wetlands, rivers, aquifers and lakes".

- Goal 8 "Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all": in some project areas, the protection measures have allowed for continuation of tourism activities that would have all disappeared with accelerated erosion, hence contributing to maintaining economic activity (Target 8.2 "Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high-value-added and labour-intensive sectors" and Target 8.9 "... promoting sustainable tourism that creates jobs and promotes local culture and products").
- Goal 11 "Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable": protection measures either under output 2.1 (infrastructures/road climate-proofing measures including escape routes) or 2.2 (shoreline protection measures) are significantly contributing to Target 11.5 "significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of people affected and substantially decrease the direct economic losses relative to global gross domestic product caused by disasters, including water-related disasters, with a focus on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations" with potentially reducing the impact of natural/man-made disasters on poor coastal households.
- Goal 13 "Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts": Target 13.1 "Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries" with climate proofing measures, Target 13.2 Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning" with CIM plans, Target 13.3 and 13b "Improve education, awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning" with community awareness activities prior to/during CIM plans elaboration,

Goal 15 – "Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss": the project has contributed through reforestation and catchment protection measures to most SDG 15 targets, in particular those related to (i) the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their services, in particular forests, wetlands, mountains and drylands, in line with obligations under international agreements, (ii) promoting the implementation of sustainable management of all types of forests, halting deforestation, restoring degraded forests and substantially increase afforestation and reforestation, (iii) restoring degraded land and soil, including land affected by drought and floods, and striving to achieve a land-degradation-neutral world, (iv) ensuring the conservation of mountain ecosystems, including their biodiversity, in order to enhance their capacity to provide essential benefits for sustainable development.

#### 3.3.6 Elements of Sustainability

Sustainability is the likelihood of continued benefits after the project ends. As under GEF criteria, each sustainability dimension is considered critical, the overall ranking cannot be higher than the lowest one.

Overall project sustainability RATING: Moderately Likely (ML)

#### 3.3.6.1 Social & cultural risks to sustainability

Extensive efforts were undertaken to enhance (outcome 2) project's results ownership - especially at village level -. Despite this, community ownership, while variable, is in general not very high given that the population usually expects Government support for most if not all local infrastructures.

The project has tried to change this attitude with some success for specific activities (e.g. CSSP micro-project and IWS). However, ownership does not necessarily mean good governance as for IWS, there is evidence for still deficient financial contribution mechanisms and maintenance systems.

All CIM plans were formally endorsed by community representatives; the process was finalised in June 2018 instead of early at the start of implementation as per PRODOC.

Socio-cultural sustainability RATING: Likely (L)

#### 3.3.6.2 Technical risks to sustainability

Construction standards for roads remain an issue in Samoa with the recent study commissioned by MWTI so as to assess current road construction standards and to define national standards no longer based on New Zealand / Australian ones. This is important as (road) construction standards will need to evolve to be climate-proof with increasing occurrence of extreme events. Interviews showed that this is not yet the case in Samoa for the road network.

As for coastal protective infrastructures, and despite modelling at feasibility stage, some infrastructures show signs of weaknesses (e.g. need to replenish/repair wave breakers after storm surges) or unexpected effects (e.g. accelerating erosion on the side of coastal infrastructures, unexpected sand accumulation in front of flooding protections).

As for IWS, field visits showed some signs of poor-quality works but the main issue remains the lack of maintenance through regular community contribution. Most often, communities will delay repairs until a major issue breakdown the IWS, requiring emergency cash to put the system back online.

The maintenance of roads under LTA is normally ensured although with an expanding road network and maintenance budget not following up the mileage increase, LTA is ever more resource-constrained for maintenance and repairs.

Because the development of a communication strategy came very late during project implementation with late Communication Specialist recruitment, there has been little time to institutionalise communication products within PUMA: this is an issue that should somehow be tended for.

**Technical sustainability RATING:** Likely (L)

#### 3.3.6.3 Institutional and organisational risks to sustainability

Currently, the management of CIM plans remains under MNRE–PUMA as for previous generations of CIM plans. Following the institutional analysis of MNRE on CIM Plan mainstreaming, Government is reviewing the proposal to implement an institutional reform of MNRE as an attempt to increase its effectiveness. If this institutional reform does go ahead as suggested in the institutional analysis document (splitting MNRE into Environment and Climate Change ministries and mainstreaming MNRE's Division, PUMA as an autonomous agency), there are risks that if the changes drag on for some time, this will be detrimental in the following-up, updating and completion of CIM plans, and may add further confusion to communities about who might be their primary Government interlocutor for completing CIM plan priorities. So, the shorter the period of transition will be, the better it will bring clarity to the communities.

*Institutional and organisational sustainability RATING:* Likely (L)

#### 3.3.6.4 Economic and financial risks to sustainability

The economic and financial risks of the project are, as for previous CIM Plan generations: there is no specific Government budget tied to CIM Plans (yet?). Neither did stakeholders' interviews evidence yet a fundamental change in Government financial resource allocation that would be guided by the CIM Plans for district investments. This is too early in view of the institutional changes that are being discussed at Government level.

With regards to outcome 2, the risks are very limited for roads with annual maintenance budgets requested by LTA but significant for IWS that are characterised by poor governance resulting in uneven financial contributions to IWS's maintenance mechanisms.

The project supported the main Government ministries that in turn provided seedling to both Governmentrun reforestation projects and community-run nurseries; individual interviews showed that despite poor maintenance or even swift discontinuation of community-run nurseries as soon as the provision of seedlings from the Government main nurseries cease, planted trees do have high value as fuelwood and timber but when replanted on an individual basis. This is less so for replanting on community lands or on degraded areas as livestock roaming remains unchecked by communities unless there is a tight Forestry Department control.

Economic and financial sustainability RATING: Moderately Likely (ML)

#### 3.3.6.5 Environmental risks to sustainability

There are no immediate environmental risks to the project. However, on a longer time frame (5-10 years), it is unknown whether some infrastructures may result in adverse effects on the environment (ex. coastal protections change sedimentation patterns, facilitating access to inland agricultural areas for escape routes and possible voluntary relocation may result in environmental degradation [deforestation and increased chemicals use]), meaning, these should be monitored on a long-term basis by the GoS.

**Environmental sustainability RATING:** Unable to Asses (U/A)

#### 3.3.6.6 Socio-political risks to sustainability

The socio-political risks are very low for this project: all ministries are committed to getting involved in CIM plans' rolling-out. Following up the institutional analysis of PUMA-MNRE, mainstreaming the CIM plans into ministries is currently being debated. It remains to be seen whether this willingness will be turned into new institutional and organisational mechanisms that will ensure the sustainability of CIM plans as the new Government tool for district development plans.

In relation to CIM plans under outcome 1, and possibly because of MWCSD's newly sponsored DDPs, interviews showed that some village representatives are mobilising efforts to enhance district community representativeness through formalising district meetings in a CBO/NGO-type decision-making authority so as to enhance their negotiating power with Government and be more able to control CIM plan funding at district level.

Socio-political sustainability RATING: Likely (L)

#### 3.3.7 Potential impact

In this terminal evaluation, the impact of the project has been assessed in terms of changes or benefits achieved in social, economic, institutional, environmental areas as well as the changes achieved in terms of gender. An average rating for the impact was given.

**Impact RATING:** Significant (S)

#### 3.3.7.1 Social Impact

The impact of the ERCC project has been mainly through Outcomes 1 and 2: first, the participative nature in reviewing the existing CIM plans to select Outcome 2 projects and then, the consultative approach to select priorities for the upgraded CIM plans under Outcome 1 has strengthened community sense of ownership and command.

The understanding of CIM plan technicalities seems somewhat limited for the non-decision-making community representatives but awareness-raising through the CIM plan approach has nonetheless increased substantially the understanding of CCA and DRM amongst the population. With that in mind, mindset changes have been most visible through activity implementation by the communities without much Government piloting (e.g. CSSP projects).

As for roads, the impact has been positive with enhanced connectivity between villages and improved access to carry out traditional agricultural activities.

For replanting, the social impact seems more limited with few positive effects on communities as a whole (e.g. communities abandon systematically village nurseries).

The situation may be better for IWS: despite defective water maintenance mechanisms, there is a feeling of ownership with most if not all community members contributing to the system when emergency repairs become necessary.

**Social impact RATING:** Significant (S)

#### 3.3.7.2 Economic Impact

Although there was no measurement or estimate, the ERCC project is having a significant indirect economic impact through Outcome 2: 1. Inland roads construction/upgrading is opening up access to agricultural land; site visits have shown that there is very significant increased agricultural activity when tracks are turned into roads; from extensive coconut harvesting to intensified taro and fruit trees plantations with possibly some negative effects such as agriculture in very slopy areas; 2. coastal infrastructures are having a positive impact in urbanised areas by avoiding the destruction of property and other economic assets; this may be less so for isolated homes or groups of houses nearby the coast with a more livelihood / sensible logic allowing the population access to ocean resources and avoiding socially costly relocation but resulting in very high costs per person and ultimately diverting financial resources from more communal investments (transport, education, energy, health); this approach is actually being reconsidered by Government given the latest development with the 2009 tsunami and increased storm surges frequency that inevitably damages coastal infrastructures; 3. Replanting by allowing community members to access tree saplings through community

nurseries is providing long-term sources of income or direct use of timber and fuelwood instead of purchasing; this activity is well appreciated by community members as long as it is carried out on an individual basis but little organised at village level (soon abandoned nurseries for more profitable shorter term crops [e.g. bananas]); 4. Seawall construction is having mixed results on tourism: from one side, it allows the protection of touristic infrastructures but the seawalls also contribute to sandy beach destruction, reducing the tourism appeal of the Samoan coast.

**Economic impact RATING:** Significant (S)

#### 3.3.7.3 Institutional Impact:

The impact of the project has been substantial on local institutions and at national level: (i) through the drafting of CIM plans community governance has improved with village representatives clustering at district level with a trend from informal district meetings to more formalised district gatherings through a district CBO/NGO with a view to having a stronger say over CIM Plans and decision-making power over district financial infrastructures resource allocation.

The ERCC project has no doubt allowed PUMA to gain a substantial experience in managing complex donor-funded interventions but this process has yet to be accompanied with increased formal budget allocation to monitor and oversee the implementation of CIM plans; this may be one of the weakest points of the project as this was not successful; even more so now with the negotiations over PUMA's status and MNRE's institutional reform that cast (hopefully temporary) doubt over the future responsibilities of the various CIM plan Government stakeholders.

Interviews showed a high degree of satisfaction of most if not all trained technical staff, in terms of capacity building activities with an increased understanding in CCA and resilience and the need to ensure improved livelihoods and population safety through both short and long-term measures. There was however little information as to whether most trainings under Outcome 3 have resulted in the adoption of more resilient working approaches to Government investments on regular budget lines; there was little collaboration of potentially complementary institutions (e.g. EPC, SWA, MAFF) evidencing the difficulty to align sectorwide Government resources for community development despite the availability of secured external funding.

It is worth mentioning the increased capability of MNRE in surveying and imagery analysis through the ERCC project.

**Institutional impact RATING:** Significant (S)

#### 3.3.7.4 Environmental Impact:

If most if not all activities were implemented with a view to limit as much as possible any negative environmental effects in mind, the project has not been devoid of unexpected environmental issues; this may be the result of insufficient environmental and safeguard analysis but also lack accompanying measures: opening up and/or improving inland road access (e.g. new road, upgrading from dirt to tarred roads) was not accompanied with land use considerations. While coastal wave breakers result in sand replenishment on the spot, there may also result in accelerated erosion on the outside of these infrastructures, coastal infrastructures like seawalls may result in accelerating sandy beach removal, contributing to beach ecosystem damage.

Despite variable die-out rates (see annexe 8), the replanting of trees in degraded terrain and in riparian habitats under DEC management is having a very positive environmental impact with the limitation of erosion, flooding and preservation of species biodiversity. The environmental impact of community managed replanting seems to be somewhat limited.

**Environmental impact RATING:** Significant (S) / Minimal (M) depending on the type of infrastructure project

#### 3.3.7.5 Impact on Gender:

The technical CIM plan team approach has greatly facilitated the mainstreaming of gender-specific issues in community discussions leading to the inclusion of CCA / DRM priorities into the upgrading of CIM plans.

Still, so far, the impact of the project is more obvious for the actual infrastructures: (i) the change from dirt pedestrian track to tarred road has facilitated mobility, especially for women and reduced risks in steep terrain for all people, (ii) the upgrading of IWS/individual water tanks has resulted in more steady pressure/flow rates (increased water quantity for personal hygiene and better availability during the entire year) and lesser health risks (rapid sand filtration), (iii) pool rehabilitation under CSSP is improving water access.

There was no obvious positive or negative impact on gender for replanting activities.

**Impact RATING for gender:** Significant (S)

### 4. Conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned

4.1 Corrective actions for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project

#### (i) Project design:

The budget allocation at project formulation stage (see Figure 3) was typically skewed as too optimistic without any period of low delivery corresponding to the project initial operationalisation period (inception workshop, purchase of initial equipment, recruitment of staff and consultants).

Most if not all projects experience an initial period of very low project activity that is not considered by project designers that expect immediate delivery of activities; typically, the budget allocation will follow a linear or logarithmic spending curse (scenarios a. or b. in Figure 4); this is in contradiction with any real-world situation, which is why all projects experience major budget reallocations over the entire project duration resulting from significant implementation delays. These readjustments complexify project delivery (need to reallocate budget and review logical output sequencing) and put unnecessary pressure on project teams that are unable to follow up PRODOC results framework and work plans, inevitably leading to suboptimal delivery and systematic requests of project extensions. In real situation though, nearly all projects follow either (sometimes) an exponential or most often a sigmoid spending curve (scenarios c. or d. in Figure 4).

There is a **need at the formulation stage** to reflect better actual development project implementation with the **inclusion of an extensive inception period to allow for initial project operationalisation**. This can have significant positive consequences as it will allow the project team to follow better the PRODOC framework with more logical activity sequencing and allow progressive delivery more in tune with reality.




Figure 4: Four types of gray-level transformation. (a) Linear, (b) logarithmic, (c) exponential, and (d) sigmoid

(ii) Following up on (i), fixed delivery timeframes even with a limited number of project extensions remain an issue for complex programmes or projects that experience unexpected implementation issues. Somehow, UNDP and the AF have shown flexibility with allowing the use of direct project services to ensure adequate project delivery after all.

This is a lesson learned: donor and implementing agency flexibility in support of executing agency can resolve outstanding issues that else could have compromised project delivery.

#### (iii) Inadequate M&E:

PUMA has used the results framework and work plan as monitoring tools. When activities are being implemented by associated stakeholders (e.g. LTA, CSSP, Forestry and Water Divisions), the work plan or PRODOC result framework may be insufficient tools to assess project progress. **Ideally, a customised M&E matrix would be the best tool to monitor project results**, whether directly completed by the stakeholders as necessary as per project team's request or by the project team gathering directly data or using stakeholder's own M&E tools.

In practice, different stakeholders may have different approaches to monitoring results; therefore, M&E alignment between all stakeholders would have become paramount; hence the **need to train each stakeholder in M&E and RBM**, ensuring that useful data (SMART indicators) is collected to assess project progress and achievement of outputs.

#### (iv) Exit strategy:

It was assumed in the PRODOC that the "Government would ensure the sustainability of the project results by integrating climate resilience and adaptation-related activities in the work programming and budgetary planning processes of the relevant sectors"<sup>22</sup>. There has been little evidence of this process yet in associated Government Ministries and authorities for actual project results; ex1: national road standards, preferably integrating climate-proofing methods, are still being debated between LTA and MWTI, ex2: CIM Plans are to be followed-up by PUMA but the approach looks little different from previous CIM Plans (no additional resources to monitor or coordinate between ministries), ex3: MWCSD is to engage dialogue with communities, should there be Government investments as per CIM Plans (on "infrastructures"). However, MWCSD is already engaged on DDP (social/human aspects of district development) resulting in interacting with communities on two different "plans", possibly adding confusion as to how communities are to interact with Government on key development (human/social and CCA/DRM issues). How to take ownership of the CIM concept as a development tool by Government implies a much wider reflection on the key roles and responsibilities of Government ministries that are currently being debated at the highest level (including discussions on a potential institutional reform of MNRE).

Interviews showed that there is little information within Government institutions as to how different the new CIM Plans will be managed from previous ones (in particular what kind of additional financial resources is Government able to commit to ensure CIM Plan monitoring and alignment of sector-wide investments as per priorities set by communities in CIM Plans – e.g. through enhanced CRSC Operational Secretariat or Coordinating Unit -); this should be clarified asap (once there is a consensus reached on MNRE's institutional reform and how other ministries will intervene on CIM Plans) by communicating better on the new roles and responsibilities of each Government stakeholder in

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Source: PRODOC pg. 3

monitoring CIM Plans and coordinating infrastructures investments (e.g. what mechanism will be in place to ensure that Government institutions align their annual / 5 year work plans according to CIM Plans).

#### (v) Project strategic decision-making:

Government takes very seriously project ownership through project-specific (e.g. project Technical Working Group) or thematic sector-wide steering groups (e.g. CRSC on climate resilience); this may be the most effective approach to ensure project results ownership and empowerment by national institutions; however, while the implementing agency can provide valuable advice and expertise at project level - discussing operational issues - (e.g. TAG meetings), it may play an insufficient advisory role at sector level when key decisions can have ripple effects throughout different interventions such as ERCC and PPCR (e.g. CRSC).

There is a need to revisit the relationship between Government and **implementing agencies** (including UNDP) so that they **can contribute better at sectoral level with good advice and injecting a more regional/donor perspective to strategic issues**; this might be achieved through an observatory / advisory role for strategic sector decision-making (e.g. under CRSC) or as a separate donor-wide advisory group providing its own perspective towards key strategic decision-making on CCA and DRM issues.

#### (vi) Co-financing:

AF does not require co-financing; still, for project activities that target communities, the lack of co-financing may be a very weak signal to ensure local ownership of project results with ensuing community fatigue and lack of commitment; besides, Government most often (but not always) requires some sort of community co-financing for on-the-ground results (mostly infrastructures through labour). However, this is not reported.

There is a need to **integrate systematically local co-financing into project monitoring** so as to evidence community commitment. Community co-financing should be measured and integrated (preferably into the PRODOC indicatively) or *a posteriori* in annual work plans to evidence local stakeholders' commitment to project delivery.

#### 4.2 Actions to follow-up or reinforce initial benefits from the project

#### (i) Monitoring capacity of CSSP:

CSSP has devised an efficient system at screening relevant community projects on CCA and DRM through the AF, focussing mostly on water supply and on DRM. Still, issues could be detected: (i) site visits and interviews showed that the quality of works to ensure infrastructures sustainability may suffer from a lack of monitoring and support (e.g. insufficient maintenance mechanisms of IWS, faulty or at least somewhat poor quality of works in some cases); (ii) project selection may miss unrealistic community expectations as to what project budgets can offer (e.g. vehicle ramp abandoned in favour of pedestrian ramp because of budget).

This points out towards the need to (i) **beef up CSSP monitoring capacity** to ensure that works are of good quality through more regular site visits by project work's end (ii) involve and possibly **strengthen** 

**IWS national CBO** to develop a capability to support IWS in maintenance (technical) skills and water governance (contribution mechanisms) and (iii) **ensure better involvement of <u>technical</u> Government staff** to support communities in adjusting their technical proposals to budget realities and avoid community disappointment at village level.

#### (ii) Communication:

A number of conventional communication activities were carried out under this project prior to the recruitment of a communication specialist; then, a communication strategy was developed to consider the communication needs for CIM Plans. However, this strategy was not fully mainstreamed into MNRE-PUMA. Other activities included a social media campaign, a resource mobilization strategy, a technical description of the new website (including required resources) and the development

In particular, a knowledge-based platform ("Samoa Cares") was partially developed where all the valuable content generated under the ERCC (and possibly PPCR) would serve for information purposes on CIM Plan completion targeting community members and as lessons learned how to develop, monitor and interact with communities on CCA/DRM-related infrastructures development.

This kind of platform would have been an ideal tool for CIM Plan monitoring while catering for the individual needs of each donor by offering specific information pertaining to their field of interest such as women and vulnerable groups, children, water and sanitation, economic growth, social development...

It is recommended that **this platform "Samoa CARES" is endorsed by MNRE** as well as other government stakeholders, to become the leading GoS platform for advocacy and fundraising for CCA and DMR activities at community level. If necessary, **the remaining AF funds could be allocated to strengthen PUMA's ability to mainstream this communication strategy** (e.g. through additional technical assistance).

#### (iii) Climate-proof road standards:

A major part of the Outcome 2 budget was allocated to road rehabilitation/construction; as part of ensuring sustainability of community road network, there is a need to ensure in the future that the infrastructures are climate-proof in view of increased extreme events (storm surges, flooding's, erosion hazards...).

MWTI should **follow-up the definition of new national road standard**s in close collaboration with LTA, then analyse Samoa's CPIER as a baseline for estimating additional budget to make the road network climate-proof, **then integrate the additional costs into regular Government budgets** for future road work at community level.

#### (iv) CIM Plan database:

Following up on (ii), monitoring CIM Plans becomes a key critical element of community climate resilience and disaster risk management. So far, CIM Plans are stored but not yet integrated into a monitoring mechanism.

PUMA should be given the means to maintain a database for CIM Plans with a number of entries on monitoring, updating, modifications, completion... Should an external consultant develop this DB, (s)he should do it in very close collaboration with PUMA technical staff and MNRE IT Specialists so that (i) the actual DB is user-friendly, (ii) maintenance can be performed internally by MNRE staff, (iii) the DB can be improved and its functions updated by MRNE staff (e.g. through Excel / Visual Studio / SQL programming) and avoiding the need for external assistance.

#### (v) Insufficient sector-wide budget alignment:

The AF supported Government in very specific sectors: roads, water supply, replanting. Other sectors were associated through the TAG and CRSC meetings (e.g. EPC, SWA...). However, interviews did not evidence many actual interactions with the ERCC project (e.g. working plan alignments) and LTA prioritising ERCC activities according to its own regular work plan. Other sectors were not either involved (e.g. infrastructures for health, education sectors, small rural infrastructures under MAFF).

There is a need to adjust the climate resilience sector-wide approach to ensure much closer budget and work plan alignment according to the CIM Plans for all community-related infrastructures.

#### (vi) PUMA and institutional reform:

With MNRE's restructuring, there may be institutional changes for PUMA although its core functions would remain similar.

PUMA should accompany closely the institutional reform and ensure through MNRE and MoF that adequate HR and financial resources (budget line) are been made available for the M&E of CIM Plans.

#### 4.3 Proposals for future directions underlining main objectives

#### (i) CIM Plan institutionalisation:

The ERCC project supported Government into upgrading CIM Plans and supporting communities in meeting some of their CIM Plan priorities. Under Outcome 3, capacity building activities were conducted targeting mostly Government staff (but also community members in CCA and DRM through CIM Plan consultations).

Support should be provided to the Government to ensure that CIM Plans are being institutionalised and become the key reference documents for community development. This should be achieved through (i) following up the MNRE institutional reform proposals to streamline MNRE's division, and PUMA's status, (ii) formalise the roles and responsibilities of major CIM Plan stakeholders (MNRE, MWTI and MWCSD) and (iii) ensure Government budget to these stakeholders so that CIM Plans are adequately monitored and updated/upgraded as needed.

The objective is to avoid the same fate of previous CIOM Plan generation: remaining at the planning stage.

#### (ii) Ecosystem rehabilitation (replanting):

Conventional tree replanting at community level is little effective with systematically awareness difficulties to ensure activities ownership. Empowerment is, even more, an issue with most community nurseries abandoned soon project's support ends.

There is a need for a more **holistic approach in ecosystem management** involving MAFF, MNRE and MESC: replanting should be approached through education of children and/or adults but only if there is an economic advantage in replanting.

#### (iii) Institutional review – strengthening institution in charge of CIM Plan M&E:

Follow up the institutional review's main recommendations on CIM plans and MNRE, there needs to be a clearly recognised institution in charge of overall monitoring and evaluation of CIM Plan compliance in addition to a regular intersectoral Government meeting on district infrastructures; this role was to be played by PUMA. Should this be confirmed in the institutional reform roadmap, there is a need **to strengthen M&E's capability within PUMA**: Government should commit financial resources to create the function and could request AF support through UNDP (up to 1.3MUS\$) for that purpose.

#### (iv) District development plans:

CIM Plans should become the basis for district infrastructure development through: (i) **improving district governance for CIM Plans** by supporting the creation of district CBOs made of community representative to discuss internally how to best allocate (non-)Government financial resources as per CIM plans, (ii) **establishing a formal district platform** (district CBO/NGO + Government representatives) **to discuss investment plans at district level** (e.g. meeting on a quarterly basis including prior/after annual budget allocation in May/June).

#### (v) Community development plans:

Interviews showed that there is community fatigue with "at least as much planning as there is actual Government support in the village"<sup>23</sup>. Previous CIM Plans were not spared this trend with very partial compliance. Furthermore, new types of plans regularly emerge (e.g. Village Development Plans, now District Development Plans under MWCSD).

There is a need to streamline Government support to communities by integrating all initiatives under a single unified community development plan, avoiding at all costs the multiplication of community plans (PUMA CIM Plans, more recent DDP under MWCSD). For communities, social or infrastructure investment are part of community development and it makes little sense to monitor different plans from community representative's perspective; only a district plan makes sense for communities to ensure the best CB ratio for community commonalities (e.g. infrastructures).

- 4.4 Best and worst practices in addressing issues relating to relevance, performance and success
- (i) - The development of sister projects financed by donors with widely different implementation procedures is an ineffective approach if the alignment is sought both through implementation and output sequencing; it can be effective only on a methodological basis.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> matai interview quote

- Actually, Government should review its donor approach to development, in particular, adopt a more holistic approach and not necessarily give in into the development of similar projects; it would be best to combine different donor funding's through a basket fund or similar delivery mechanism to streamline aid support.
- (ii) +++ the original PRODOC approach through 1<sup>st</sup> CIM Plan review (Outcome 1) and 2<sup>nd</sup> infrastructure investments (Outcome 2) could be considered as a **very effective approach to ensure both**Government empowerment of a new community infrastructure investment mechanism and of community ownership of project results
- (iii) - Unfortunately, the initial delays combined with **the project extension limitations resulted in a mixed/inverted implementation**: old COPM Plans priorities were reconsidered, then upgraded CIM Plans reformulated; Results: communities feel that they have a new product by project's end with no funding in view.
- (iv) - **Projects cannot be dependent from outputs of another project and vice-versa**: any delay from one project will inevitably affect negatively the other and delays will affect both projects; activity intertwining will result basically in near implementation stand-still.
- (v) +++ Parallel project implementation should be the way forward between donors, avoiding the formulation of dependent / sequenced activities (e.g. PMU expecting TA support from PPCR); this is most difficult for donors with different reporting procedures such as the World Bank and UNDP
- (vi) +++ **The methodological approach** adopted by the ERCC technical team, in combination with PPCR resulted **in positive including gender community involvement** with genuine issue prioritisation.
- (vii) --- interviews showed that there is still insufficient community interest in CCA and DRM unless there are very direct threats to livelihoods (flooding, storm surges, landslide risks...): ex: in the case of replanting, it is recommended to privatise Government tree nurseries: the development of commercial tree nurseries supplying saplings to Government has the advantage to put value on trees (timber and fuelwood); in that case, the development of community nurseries can be seen as co-financing; in the same vein, for seawalls, more awareness is needed through using cost/benefit analysis (training of village/community representatives) to make better-informed decisions on CCA and DRM to increase resilience and reduce climate/ disaster risks at community level.
- (viii) --- The involvement of all key infrastructures stakeholders in TAG meetings did not result in planning and investment alignment to take advantage of potential complementarities so as to increase impact and to enhance effects through the ERCC project; this a lesson learned about insufficient intersectoral dialogue: Government institutions have a tendency to better cooperate when there is direct donor support involved.
- (ix) - Swifter implementation may have resulting in ERCC project taking some risks on outputs delivery quality: (i) there is partial information as to how roads were built with ERCC project financial resources (what type of guideline and standard used by LTA, which is actually being debated still under MWTI with the recent analysis of the Samoa standards currently used that might lead to the formulation of new national road guidelines and standards), (ii) microproject through

- calls for proposals have shown excessive community expectations in relation to the available budgets that may have resulted in slimming down actual infrastructures through quality and/or quantity reductions.
- (x) +++ CIM plan development has been under the supervision of Government with technical CIM plan team contracted by UNDP through the project; Government has been in full control of the CIM Plan elaboration process: this ensures Government ownership of project results (under previous CIM Plan generation, plans development was fully externalised as a service delivery).
- (xi) +++ The **project team made great efforts to ensure delivery despite initially extensive delays** because of initial agreement to align both PPCR and ERCC projects for improved efficiency and delivery: this was accomplished through a series of measures: (i) taking advantage of **UNDP procurement expertise** to increase advertisement outreach for the recruitment of international technical staff (CIM Plan team) so as to ensure project delivery, (ii) **using different existing Government modalities** (CSSP for water supply and "Two Million Tree Campaign" for replanting) to complete Outcome 2 outputs.
- (xii) +++ PUMA delivered qualitatively (but not necessarily quantitively as per PRODOC) on most project outputs despite the lack of a PMU, using its own internal staff. But there is a fundamental question as to how relevant is PUMA in implementing sector-wide programmes involving (infrastructures) district development. This question should be reverted back to the institutional review recommendations and possibly the need to beef up PUMA (e.g. as an autonomous agency) so as to increase its legitimacy to CIM Plan M&E and central role in coordinating Government infrastructures investment planning.

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## Annexe 1: Terms of Reference

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE TERMINAL EVALUATION OF THE ENHANCING RESILIENCE OF COASTAL COMMUNITIES OF SAMOA TO CLIMATE CHANGE (PIMS 4667)

#### Introduction:

This is the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the UNDP-AF Terminal evaluation (TE) of the full-sized project titled *Enhancing resilience of coastal communities of Samoa to Climate Change* (PIMS 4667) implemented through the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment- Planning and Urban Management Division, which is to be undertaken in early 2018.

#### **PROJECT SUMMARY TABLE**

Project Title: Enh	ancing resilience of coastal con	nmunities of Samoa to Clir	mate Change	
AF Project	WSM/MIE/Multi/2011/1/PD			at MTE
ID:				(Million US\$)
UNDP	00079525	AF financing:	0.040.350.00	8,048,250.00
Project ID:	4667		8,048,250.00	
Country:	Samoa	IA/EA own:		
Region:	Pacific	Government:		3,126,244.20
Focal Area:	Climate Change Adaptation	Other:		
FA		Total co-financing:		3,126,244.20
Objectives,	Coastal Management			
(OP/SP):				
Executing	Ministry of Natural	Total Project Cost:		
Agency:	Resources and Environment		8,048,250.00	
	(MNRE)			11,174,494.20
Other		ProDoc Signature (date p	roject began):	9 <sup>th</sup> November
Partners	Government Ministries i.e.			2012
involved:		(Operational) Closing	Proposed: 8	Actual:
	LTA, MWCSD, CSSP, MOF	Date:	November	30 June 2018
			2016	

#### **Project Description or Context and Background:**

The project was designed to enhance the resilience of coastal communities through a set of interventions at the community and sub-national policy levels.

The objective of the project ' Enhancing resilience of coastal communities of Samoa to Climate Change is to strengthen the ability of all Samoan communities, and the public service, to make informed decisions and manage anticipated climate change driven pressures (including extreme events) in a proactive, integrated and strategic manner. This programme is designed to complete a holistic and countrywide approach to climate change adaptation in the coastal zones in Samoa. The programme has a 3-pronged structure, focusing on the implementation of on-the-ground adaptation measures at the community level, integrated with sustainable

development processes and supported through enhanced national institutional and knowledge management capacities. The programme has a 3-pronged approach:

- 1. A main focus upon on-the-ground implementation of coastal adaptation measures, addressing climate change impacts on key infrastructure elements and coastal ecosystems in an integrated way. Integration is achieved within the framework of a comprehensive village land use plan the CIM Plan.
- 2. Strengthened institutional policies and capacities to provide an enabling environment for climate resilient coastal development; and,
- 3. The systematic capture and dissemination of knowledge and lessons learned to aid and inform further implementation and pursuit of climate resilient development.

The programme components and relative outcome are:

- 1. Community-engagement in coastal vulnerability assessment, adaptation planning and awareness
  - 1. Strengthened awareness and ownership of coastal adaptation and climate risk reduction processes at community and national levels in 25 Districts and 139 villages.
- 2. Integrated Community-based coastal adaptation and disaster risk management measures
  - Increased adaptive capacity of coastal communities to adapt to coastal hazards and risks induced by climate change in 25 Districts and 139 villages.
- 3. Institutional strengthening to support climate resilient coastal management policy frameworks
  - 1. Strengthened institutional capacity of government sectors to integrate climate and disaster risk and resilience into coastal management-related policy frameworks, processes and responses.

The Project Management Unit is shared with the AF sister project PPCR funded under the World Bank and implemented by the Ministry of Finance. This PMU supported AF until the end of year 2016.

The project is implemented, as Executing Agency, Government of Samoa, Planning and Urban Management Agency under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment. The project recruited an Administrative Assistant and Promotion and Awareness Officer to support the project.

The TE will be conducted according to the guidance, rules and procedures established by UNDP and the AF.

The objectives of the evaluation are to assess the achievement of project results, and to draw lessons that can both improve the sustainability of benefits from this project, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP programming.

#### **Scope of Work:**

The objective of this consultancy is to undertake the Terminal Evaluation of the Adaptation Fund project- Enhancing resilience of the Coastal Communities to Climate Change.

#### **Evaluation Approach and Method:**

An overall approach and method<sup>1</sup> for conducting project terminal evaluations of UNDP supported AF financed projects has developed over time. The evaluator is expected to frame the evaluation effort using the criteria of **relevance**, **effectiveness**, **efficiency**, **sustainability**, **and impact**, as defined and

explained in the <u>UNDP Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed Projects.</u> A set of questions covering each of these criteria have been drafted and are included with this TOR (<u>Annex C</u>) The evaluator is expected to amend, complete and submit this matrix as part of an evaluation inception report, and shall include it as an annex to the final report.

The evaluation must provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful. The evaluator is expected to follow a participatory and consultative approach ensuring close engagement with government counterparts, in particular the AF/GEF operational focal point, UNDP Country Office, project team, UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based in the region and key stakeholders. The evaluator is expected to conduct a field mission to Samoa, including the following project sites: Taelefaga and Musumusu, Vaiala Seawall, Manase wave breakers, Sili Water Scheme, 2 small grants project sites (1 in Upolu and 1 in Savaii), 2 Roads (TBC). Interviews will be held with the following organizations and individuals at a minimum: MNRE (PUMA, Forestry), LTA, MWCSD, MOF (PPCR, CSSP), MWTI.

The evaluator will review all relevant sources of information, such as the project document, project reports — including Annual PPRs, project budget revisions, midterm review, progress reports, AF focal area tracking tools, project files, national strategic and legal documents, and any other materials that the evaluator considers useful for this evidence-based assessment. A list of documents that the project team will provide to the evaluator for review is included in (See: Annex B) of this Terms of Reference.

#### **EVALUATION CRITERIA & RATINGS**

An assessment of project performance will be carried out, based against expectations set out in the Project Logical Framework/Results Framework (See: Annex A), which provides performance and impact indicators for project implementation along with their corresponding means of verification. The evaluation will at a minimum cover the criteria of: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact. Ratings must be provided on the following performance criteria. The completed table must be included in the evaluation executive summary. The obligatory rating scales are included in Annex D.

Evaluation Ratings:			
1. Monitoring and	Rating	2. IA& EA Execution	Rating
Evaluation			
M&E design at entry	6 point	Quality of UNDP Implementation	6 point
	scale		scale
M&E Plan Implementation	6 point	Quality of Execution - Executing Agency	6 point
	scale		scale
Overall quality of M&E	6 point	Overall quality of Implementation / Execution	6 point
	scale		scale
3. Assessment of Outcomes	rating	4. Sustainability	rating
Relevance	2 point	Financial resources:	4 point
	scale		scale
Effectiveness	6 point	Socio-political:	4 point
	scale		scale

Efficiency	6 point	Institutional framework and governance:	4 point	
	scale		scale	
Overall Project Outcome	6 point	Environmental :	4 point	
Rating	scale		scale	
		Overall likelihood of sustainability:	4 point	
			scale	

#### PROJECT FINANCE / CO-FINANCE

The Evaluation will assess the key financial aspects of the project, including the extent of co-financing planned and realized. Project cost and funding data will be required, including annual expenditures. Variances between planned and actual expenditures will need to be assessed and explained. Results from recent financial audits, as available, should be taken into consideration. The evaluator(s) will receive assistance from the Country Office (CO) and Project Team to obtain financial data in order to complete the co-financing table below, which will be included in the terminal evaluation report.

Co-financing (type/source)		nancing (mill. US\$)		Government (mill. US\$)		gency )	Total (mill. US\$	)
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Actual	Actual
Grants								
Loans/Concessions								
• In-kind support								
• Other								
Totals								

#### **MAINSTREAMING**

UNDP supported AF financed projects are key components in UNDP country programming, as well as regional and global programmes. The evaluation will assess the extent to which the project was successfully mainstreamed with other UNDP priorities, including poverty alleviation, improved governance, the prevention and recovery from natural disasters, and gender.

#### **IMPACT**

The evaluators will assess the extent to which the project is achieving impacts or progressing towards the achievement of impacts. Key findings that should be brought out in the evaluations include whether the project has demonstrated: a) verifiable improvements in ecological status, b) verifiable reductions in stress on ecological systems, and/or c) demonstrated progress towards these impact achievements.<sup>2</sup>

#### **CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS & LESSONS**

The evaluation report must include a chapter providing a set of **conclusions**, **recommendations** and **lessons**. Conclusions should build on findings and be based on evidence. Recommendations should be prioritized, specific, relevant, and targeted, with suggested implementers of the recommendations. Lessons should have

wider applicability to other initiatives across the region, the area of intervention, and for the future.

#### **Expected Outcomes and Deliverables:**

The evaluation consultant is expected to deliver the following:

Deliverable	Content	Timing	Responsibilities
Inception	Evaluator provides	No later than 2 weeks	Evaluator submits to UNDP CO
Report	clarifications on timing	before the evaluation	
	and method	mission.	
		(16 March 2018)	
Presentation	Initial Findings	End of evaluation mission	To project management, UNDP
		(27 April 2018)	СО
Draft Final	Full report, (per	Within 3 weeks of the	Sent to CO, reviewed by RTA,
Report	annexed template) with	evaluation mission	PCU, AF/GEF OFPs
	annexes	(18 May 2018)	
Final Report*	Revised report	Within 1 week of receiving	Sent to CO for uploading to
		UNDP comments on draft	UNDP ERC.
		(25 May 2018)	

<sup>\*</sup>When submitting the final evaluation report, the evaluator is required also to provide an 'audit trail', detailing how all received comments have (and have not) been addressed in the final evaluation report. (see <u>Annex H</u>)

#### **Institutional Arrangement**:

The principal responsibility for managing this evaluation resides with the UNDP MCO in Samoa. The UNDP Samoa MCO will contract the evaluators and ensure the timely provision of per diems and travel arrangements within the country for the evaluator. The Project Team will be responsible for liaising with the Evaluators team to set up stakeholder interviews, arrange field visits, coordinate with the Government etc.

#### **Duration of the Work:**

The total duration of the evaluation will be **30** days according to the following plan:

Activity	Timing	Completion Date
Preparation	03 days	6 April 2018
Evaluation Mission	15 days	27 April 2018
Draft Evaluation Report	07 days	18 May 2018

Final Report	05 days	25 May 2018

\* The indicated max duration takes into account consultant's initial desk review and quality check of the final report from UNDP MCO, as well as potential delays due to unforeseen circumstances, not included as deliverables in the table above

#### **Duty Station:**

Home-based with 1 travel to Samoa. It is expected that the consultant will spend 15 (working) days on mission in Samoa.

#### **Competencies:**

- Demonstrates commitment to the Gov. of Samoa mission, vision and values.
- Displays cultural, gender, religion, race, nationality and age sensitivity and adaptability
- Focuses on result for the client and responds positively to feedback
- Consistently approaches work with energy and a positive, constructive attitude
- Demonstrates openness to change and ability to manage complexities
- Good inter-personal and teamwork skills, networking aptitude, ability to work in a multicultural environment

#### **Oualifications of the Successful Contractor:**

The evaluation team will be composed of *1 international evaluator*. The consultant shall have prior experience in evaluating similar projects. Experience with AF financed projects is an advantage. The evaluator selected should not have participated in the project preparation and/or implementation and should not have conflict of interest with project related activities.

The Team members must present the following qualifications:

- Minimum 10 years of relevant professional experience working in climate change adaptation, disaster risk management and related fields; (20%)
- Experience working with AF or GEF evaluations; (15%)
- Demonstrated knowledge of UNDP and AF; (10%)
- Previous experience with results-based monitoring and evaluation methodologies; (15%)
- Technical knowledge in the targeted focal area(s): Climate Change Adaptation, Disaster Risk Management and related fields; (10%)
- Project evaluation experiences within United Nations system will be considered an asset;
   (15%)
- Masters Degree in Climate change related discipline, environment, disaster risk management, social sciences or closely related field. (15%)

#### **Evaluation criteria: 70% Technical, 30% financial combined weight:**

Technical Evaluation Criteria (based on the information provided in the CV and the relevant documents must be submitted as evidence to support possession of below-required criteria):

#### **Scope of Bid Price & Schedule of Payments:**

DELIVERABLES	DUE DATE (%)	AMOUNT IN USD TO BE PAID AFTER CERTIFICATION BY UNDP OF SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF DELIVERABLES
At contract signing	30 March 2018 (10%)	\$xxx
Upon submission and approval of the 1 <sup>st</sup> draft terminal evaluation report	18 <sup>th</sup> May 2018 (40%)	\$xxx
Upon submission and approval (UNDP-CO and UNDP RTA) of the final terminal evaluation report	25 <sup>th</sup> May 2018 (50%)	\$xxx
TOTAL	100%	\$xxx

#### Recommended Presentation of Proposal: Recommended Presentation of Proposal:

Given below is the recommended format for submitting your proposal. The following headings with the required details are important. Please use the templates provided (P11, Letter of Interest and Availability, Financial Proposal, Reference Check).

P11 with a proposed methodology addressing the elements mentioned under deliverables must be submitted by 28<sup>th</sup> March 2018 electronically via email: procurement.ws@undp.org . Incomplete applications will not be considered and only candidates for whom there is further interest will be contacted.

#### Proposals must include:

- 1. Cover letter that includes
  - i. a concise explanation as to why the bidder is the most suitable candidate for the consultancy assignment;
  - ii. a concise description of the bidder's understanding of the consultancy assignment;
  - iii. a summary of the comments on the TOR; and,
  - iv. a brief description of the proposed methodology and approach in carrying out the required tasks, specifying the number of days it will take complete each task.
- 2. Updated and signed P-11 that includes description of qualifications/competencies and relevant past experiences in similar projects
- 3. Financial Proposal specifying the daily rate and other expenses. Refer to <a href="https://icsc.un.org/map/">https://icsc.un.org/map/</a> for the latest UN per diem rates for Samoa. Per diem rate cannot be more than the Samoa rate for the month.
- 4. Letter of interest and availability of the firm/consortium specifying the available date to start and other details
- 5. Reference Checks Templates to be completed by referees. Please include at least 3 completed and signed referee letters (using the attached template). UNDP staff may contact referees to verify details of the reference provided if required.

The abovementioned documents, information and requirements are mandatory and as such are required to form a complete proposal. <u>A proposal will be rejected if it is not substantially responsive to the abovementioned requirements.</u>

All proposals should be sent to the procurement email: <a href="mailto:procurement.ws@undp.org">procurement.ws@undp.org</a> with the subject clearly labelled as "consultancy name and the procurement number"

## Annexe 2: Methodological Approach

#### Evaluation principles

The consultant will use a participatory and consultative approach. It will ensure constant and effective exchange of information with the project's main stakeholders.

Several basic principles will be used to carry out the evaluation:

- Effective participation of all stakeholders (government, agencies, donors, final beneficiaries)
- Crosschecking of gathered information
- Emphasis on consensus and agreement on the recommendations by the stakeholders.
- Transparency of debriefing

#### Methodology

The consultants will elaborate an evaluation matrix of topics/questions per evaluation criteria to be investigated during the field mission and prepare questionnaires as required (see annexe 3).

#### The evaluation matrix structures the in-country mission:

- 1. Which information to gather?
- 2. Where to get it (from whom? which different sources of information for cross-reference),
- 3. **How** to gather it (which appropriate tools? Interview, report, focus group, individual interviews, government data, etc.)?

Field mission check-list objectives

#### Evaluation questions and criteria's

The consultant will use the 5 DAC evaluation criteria to review the project.

Prospective key areas to review as per evaluation criteria's:

#### **Project design**

- Adequacy of project design in relation to identified objectives
- Project design re. other donor funded-interventions
- Design changes over time according to changing conditions

#### Relevance

- Adequacy of thematic & sectors in relation to issues / national priorities
- Relevance re. final beneficiaries
- Level of consulting / participation of other stakeholders

#### **Effectiveness**

- Degree of progress towards achieving the project's results

- Level of streamlining with UNDP Country Programme/GEF-AF priorities
- How were risks and assumptions considered during implementation
- Communication and visibility including towards donor/external stakeholders
- Lessons learned on implementation modalities/mechanisms

#### **Efficiency**

Project's results delivery:

- Effective operational & financial management of the project/RBM
- M&E system and mechanisms to discuss progress
- Quality of communication between stakeholders
- Promotion of joint activities for improved efficiency/partnerships

#### Adaptive management:

- Log frame changes and analysis of indicators
- Review of the procurement plan
- Responsiveness according to changing conditions/ability to adjust to change

#### **Impact**

- Visible change re. final beneficiaries/Samoa
- Contribution to change as per outcomes
- Partnerships/synergies to enhance the impact
- Added value of the project for beneficiaries
- Communicating on project's results

#### Sustainability

- Level of participation of national stakeholders
- UNDP exit strategy options and appropriation of results by beneficiaries/Samoa
- Level of ownership & empowerment of (institutional) beneficiaries to follow-up/ upscale/ replicate

#### Evaluation delivery

#### **Evaluation methodology**

For a TE, the consultants will use a mix of tools that will enable them to gather data for the project's overview, its potential impact and progress towards the global environmental benefits of the project:

- Semi-structured interviews with Samoa institutional beneficiaries/ external stakeholders (donors, NGOs)
- Focus group for gender-based final beneficiaries (communities)
- Survey of benefits for communities
- Bilateral interviews with project's staff and local project staff
- In-situ review of infrastructures and assessment of new mechanisms put in place

#### The evaluation matrix structures the field mission:

- What information to gather?
- Where to get it (from whom? which different sources of information for cross-reference),

**How** to gather it (which appropriate tools? Interview, report, focus group, individual interviews, government data, etc.)?

#### **Evaluation delivery**

A classical 4-step approach is to be adopted to carry out the evaluation: 1. *Preparatory phase* (passive data acquisition), 2. *Data collection phase* (active data acquisition), 3. *Data analysis and interpretation* of relevant information & preliminary findings and 4. *Draft and Final Reporting:* 

#### **Deliverables:**

- Inception report for review and comment by the Commissioning Unit
- Presentation of preliminary findings of the TE on the last day of the in-country mission
- Draft TE report
- Final TE report incorporating/addressing comments received on the draft TE report and attaching completed audit trail showing how comments were addressed.

Timeframe related to deliverables and benchmarks:

Activity / deliverables	Estimated dates/deadlines
TE inception report	27 JUN
TE mission dates	2 JUL – 16 JUL
Presentation of preliminary findings. Initial findings presented to project management and the Commissioning Unit	16 JUL
Draft TE report	30 JUL
Collated comments from all stakeholders on draft TE to be sent by UNDP to Int. Consultant	10 AUG
Final TE report. Report incorporating comments with annexed audit trail detailing how all comments received were addressed in the final TE report	15 AUG

#### **Proposed mission schedule:**

#### 2 JUL:

- UNDP briefing
- Executing agency/project team leader (can be together)

#### 3-5 JUL: 1<sup>st</sup> round of interviews (see below)

- Project team members (preferably separately)
- MoF, MWTI, MWCSD, MNRE, (MAF?), national authorities, NGOs...
- Complementary stakeholders (e.g. WB, GEF... projects)
- Selected consultants / operators

#### 6-12 JUL: field visits

Outcomes 1, 2 and 3 in Upolu & Savaii

Project sites visits outcomes 1 & 2:

o In-situ review

o Interviews final beneficiaries, village representatives, community leaders...

Indicative project sites: Taelefaga and Musumusu, Vaiala Seawall, Manase wave breakers, Sili Water Scheme, 2 small grants; 2 project sites (1 in Upolu and 1 in Savaii), 2 Roads (TBC).

13 JUL: 2<sup>nd</sup> round of interviews

As required

14-15 JUL: debriefing preparation

16 JUL: debriefing

#### **Stakeholders consultations:**

The TE consultant will meet diverse stakeholders including but not necessarily limited to:

- 1. Commissioning Unit (UNDP)
- 2. National Project Director/Coordinator
- 3. Ministry of Finance
- 4. Land Transport Authority
- 5. Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
- 6. Samoa Water Authority
- 7. Ministry of Works, Transport & Infrastructure
- 8. Samoa Tourism Authority
- 9. Ministry of Women, Community and Social Development
- 10. Chamber of Commerce
- 11. Ministry of Health
- 12. CSSP representatives
- 13. Institution of Professional Engineers
- 14. Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
- 15. Villages representatives
- 16. Women representatives
- 17. Community leaders
- 18. Complementary stakeholders (GEF, WB [PPCR])
- 19. Private (tourism, transport, water) operators/representatives
- 20. Samoa Umbrella for NGOs, collaborating NGOs, local organisations

## **Annexe 3: Interview Guides and Questionnaires**

#### 1. Project team

#### Relevance:

- Did the project address the main issues on climate resilient planning and managing climate risks?
- Were the planned activities in line with the actual sector needs?
- Were there differences from the project's start-up until now re. the relevance of activities to be delivered?
- How relevant were/still are the identified assumptions and risks / what was done to mitigate these risks? Was there a risk/mitigation strategy set up at the beginning of the project?

#### Efficiency:

- What have been the major implementation issues/hurdles of the project? Internal and external contributing factors and measures taken to reduce their impact?
- Timeliness of activities?
- How did eventual discontinuities/shortages in funding or donor agendas affect the overall implementation of the project?
- Were the financial resources for the planned activities in place before they were implemented i.e. how smooth was the implementation process in relation to financial resources availability -?
- Were the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder clearly spelt out in terms of planning, implementation, reporting (data collection and information transmission), M&E tools? What could be improved for future interventions?
- What type of support did you receive from UNDP / MNRE (other sectors?)? How effective was it?
- Were there mechanisms in place for the coordination of the project's activities with other donors' interventions (PPCR)?
- What project governance system and M&E system is in place? How effective has it been?
- How SMART were the (results/impact) indicators and easy to track?
- Was the contribution of national partners timely and effective for a smooth project implementation / what were the main constraining factors?

#### Effectiveness:

- What results have (were not) been achieved? Why?
- What were the main constraints for the project implementation?
- Review in detail each activity
- What were the main factors for success/failure for each result?
- Was the implementation strategy flexible enough to consider changing conditions? Was it adapted to ensure maximum effectiveness?
- How effective is the planning process currently (weaknesses and strengths)?

#### Impact:

 Are there intended or unintended, positive or negative (long-term) effects of the project in the districts/communities?

- Did the project contribute to the empowerment/capacity building of institutions / final beneficiaries through one or more results and to which goal/s?
- Did the project result in activities upscaling / innovation by stakeholders for enhanced impact?

#### Sustainability:

- What results/achievements are most/least sustainable?
- Which results are most likely owned by the (institutional) beneficiaries; how likely will they be sustained / what is required for enhancing sustainability?
- Is there an interest and support to implement similar initiatives in the future / how differently should they be implemented?
- What has been the project's exit strategy?

#### 2. Institutional stakeholders (Ministries, Authorities...)

#### Relevance:

- What are the responsibilities of your institution in the project
- Were the planned activities in line with the actual sector/institution needs? (give examples)
- Was the project design based on (i) contextual analysis, (ii) participatory needs assessment?
- Did it respond to local demands?

#### Efficiency:

- Did delays (explain) affect significantly or not the project implementation and achievement of results (give examples)?
- Based on your experience, are there more efficient types of activities that could have achieved the same results?

#### Effectiveness:

- What was your actual involvement/contribution to the project (as an implementer/beneficiary) / own or project financial resources?
- Were the planned activities effective enough to achieve the outcomes or were there additional unplanned activities needed?
- What support did you benefit from the project?

#### Impact:

- What + and/or change has come up with the project's implementation to date in the sector/your institution
- What actual/visible change did the project achieve and that benefit final/institutional stakeholders?

#### Sustainability:

- Can the changes be maintained on a long-term basis?
- Are there mechanisms (not) in place to adjust to change and maintain benefits of results?

#### 3. Partners / collaborating institutions / subcontracted institutions

#### Relevance:

- What is your role in the project?
- What has been your contribution to the project?
- Did you contribute to the project design/formulation (including indirectly) / enhancing (in)directly its implementation

#### Efficiency:

- Did you receive financial/ technical support/resources to conduct your activities
- What limitations/issues did you encounter in the delivery of planned activities?

#### Effectiveness

- Did the implemented activities contribute to the overall objective of the project?
- How complementary were these activities to the project?
- Has there been a need for additional support (from your institution/other institutions) to improve the effectiveness of the activities that you carried out?
- What achievements did this project do?
- What are the main issues of this project?

#### Impact:

- What change has resulted from the support you provided in relation to the beneficiaries
- Is there more need for support in the future?
- In your view, what change did the project bring to the participatory institutions and final beneficiaries?
- Ownership of the project's results

#### Sustainability:

What is the likelihood that the beneficiaries will take advantage of the changes/initial support (with)
without additional activities (need for follow-up, another type of support to
complement/consolidate) - empowerment level?

#### 4. Technical departments

#### Relevance:

• What are the limitations of the sector/your activity so as to achieve your objectives (technical, environmental, legal, infrastructures, planning, financial...)?

#### Effectiveness:

- Support received
- Timeliness of support
- What adaptations were made during implementation?
- What issues/needs were not being addressed by the project?

#### Impact:

•	What change did the project support bring through your department to the final beneficiaries?
	☐ Directly (direct effect on improved living conditions)
	☐ Indirectly (Increased income, better working conditions, added free time)

- Positive and/or negative changes? How to limit the negative changes?
- What is the level of ownership of the project's results by the final beneficiaries?

#### Sustainability:

- What is the strategy for infrastructures maintenance and ecosystem improvements (replanting)?
- Can the changes provided by the project be sustained on a long-term basis?
- Is there a need for additional support to sustain these changes?
- Are there activities by the final beneficiaries to enhance (some of) the project's results (empowerment)?

#### 5. Project's final beneficiaries (community representatives / villages)

#### Relevance:

- What are the advantages/disadvantages of the projects' supported infrastructures and improved protection of ecosystems (replanting)
- Are you expecting benefits from these? (explain)
- What issues/needs were not being addressed by the project?

#### Effectiveness/efficiency:

- Support received and timeliness
- Support provided and timeliness
- Were the proposed technical solutions in line with the actual problems you experience (how participative was the process)?
- Quality of support (infrastructures and mechanisms in place to ensure ecosystem improvements [replanting])

#### Impact:

- What change did the project support bring? (Increased income, better working conditions, added free time...)
- Positive and/or negative changes? How to limit the negative changes?
- What long-term benefit if any would the project's result bring on a long-term basis to the community

#### Sustainability:

- What is your contribution in ensuring that infrastructures and ecosystem improvements will be maintained after the project ends
- Are there (in)formal agreements at village level on these aspects
- Is there a need for additional support to sustain these changes?

#### 6. REMINDER PROJECT VISIT FOR INFRASTRUCTURES

#### Background info:

- What?
- Where?
- Inhabitants?

#### Relevance

- Selection of priorities
- What was the issue -why this?
- Conflict
- Involvement of women
- Beneficiaries?

#### Effectiveness

- Changes in design
- Changes in implementation
- Planned / actual result

#### Efficiency

• Works: budget, delays, payments, savings

#### Impact

- Situation before after
- Positive/negative aspects of the project
- Effects/utilisation (social, economic, gender...)

#### Sustainability

- Maintenance / costs
- Commitment
- Engagement to continue / do more

# Annexe 4: Mission Itinerary and Sites Visited

Date	Time	Location	Name/s of Person/s	Function	
2 JUL 18	10h00	UNDP	Yvette KERSLAKE	Assistant Resident Representative Programme Manager - Environment & Climate Change Unit	
			Prudence RAINE	IUN Volunteer – Programme Officer	
			Ioane IOSEFO	Programme Associate - Environment & Climate Change Unit	
	13h00	MoF	Lita	AC for Climate Resilience	
			Ronda AUMAGA	Development Aid & Coordination Management Officer	
3 JUL 18	10h00	MNRE	Kirisimasi SEUMANUTAFA	PUMA Principal Strategic Planner / Project Manager	
	13h00	MWTI	Leilani GALUVAO	Assistant CEO MWTI	
	15h00	SWA	Heseti SIONE	Manager, Commercial Division	
			Mele BETHAN	Legal Consultant	
4 JUL 18	10h00	MWCSD	Afama SAGA	MWCSD CEO	
	11h30	LTA	Bill MAUA	Engineer	
			Jonathan FONG	Engineer	
	15h00	EPC	Tologata Galumalemana Lupematasila Tagaloatele TILE	General Manager	
5 JUL 18	10h00	CSSP	Cecilia AMOSA	AF Project Officer	
			TAEAONE	CSSP Financial Officer	
	12h00	Moata'a village	Visit AF funded mangrove w	alkway	
	13h00	Magiagi village	Visit AF funded individual water tanks		
	14h00	MRNE	Kirisimasi SEUMANUTAFA PUMA Principal Strategic Planner project Manager		
6 JUL 18	All day	Lefaga &	& CIM plan signature / DDP inauguration		
	14h00	Falese'ela district	Tuasani RETI Matai		
9 JUL 18	10h00	MNRE	Fetolo'ai Wandall'Alama	PUMA Assistant Chief Executive Officer	

	10h30		Moafanua Afuvai Tolusina POULI	Assistant Chief Executing Officer – Forestry Division
	11h30		Grace Laulala	Principal Land Development Specialist – Land Management Division
	12h30		Malaki lakopo	Water Resource Division Chief
	13h30		Telesia SILA	Senior GIS Mapping Officer, Technical Division
	14h15		Petania TUALA	Principal Surveyor, Technical Division
10 JUL 18	09h00	Apia	Visit Vaiala seewall	
	10h30		Kirisimasi SEUMANUTAFA	PUMA Principal Strategic Planner / Project Manager
	11h30	Luatuanu'u	Visit nursery	
		village	Visit Independent Water Sys	tem
			Interview Matai / village ma	yor
			Interview woman represent	ative
	13h00	Fusi Saoluafata	Visit access road construction	on
		village	Interview farmer resident	
	13h30	village	Visit access road	
	15h00	MNRE	Satui BENTIN	AF CIM Plan Team Leader
11 JUL 18	AM	Travel to Savaii		
	PM		Ioane IOSEFO	Programme Associate - Environment & Climate Change Unit
			Kirisimasi SEUMANUTAFA	PUMA Principal Strategic Planner / Project Manager
	16h00	village	Visit staircase beach-village	(CSSP funding)
			Interview village carpenter	
12 JUL 18	10h00	Manase village	Visit wave breaking structur	e & meeting residents
	12h00	-	Visit reforested area	
			Ben Salima	Savaii Forestry Officer
	14h00	Saleia village	Anti-flooding protection	
	14h45	lufutafoe village	Visit Independent Water Sys	stem
	20h00	Savaii hotel	Kirisimasi SEUMANUTAFA	PUMA Principal Strategic Planner / Project Manager
13 JUL 18	06h00	Travel back to Apia		
	09h00	UNDP	Tessa TAFUA	Programme Analyst Environment and Climate Change

	14h00	MNRE	Ruth UESELANI	Sector Coordinator; Water and Sanitation Sector - MNRE		
	16h00	UNDP	Tessa TAFUA	Programme Analyst Environment and Climate Change		
	17h00		Ann Trevor	National Programme Officer		
16 JUL 18	10h00	MNRE	Kirisimasi SEUMANUTAFA	PUMA Principal Strategic Planner / Project Manager		
	11h30	DMO	Aussie Simano	Principal Community Disaster Preparedness Officer		
	13h00	STA	Rita Marita	Principal Officer		
			Robert AH Sam	Senior Officer		
			Inu Suifua Faamatuainu	Manager		
	15h00	MNRE	Kirisimasi SEUMANUTAFA	PUMA Principal Strategic Planner / Project Manager		
	15h30		Ulu Bismark Crawley	Chief Executive Officer		
17 JUL 18	10h00	UNDP	Noto Negoro	Deputy Resident Representative		
			Tessa TAFUA	Programme Analyst Environment and Climate Change		
			Ioane IOSEFO	Programme Associate - Environment & Climate Change Unit		
				M&E Specialist		
	14h00	MNRE (debriefing)	Kirisimasi SEUMANUTAFA	PUMA Principal Strategic Planner / Project Manager		
			Ulu Bismark Crawley	Chief Executive Officer		
			Tessa TAFUA	a TAFUA Programme Analyst Environment and Climate Change		
23 JUL 18	15h00	Musu and Salimu villages	,			
	16h00	Maai'sina &nd Lona villages	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
03 AUG 18	09h00	skype	Reis Lopes RELLO, AF Regional Advisor RBAP			

# Annexe 5: List of Persons Consulted

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## Annexe 6: List of Documents Consulted

- PPR 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017
- 2017/03, Institutional Review of the Organisation Structure and Roles for the Implementation of Community Integrated Management (CIM) Plans, Paradise Consulting
- VHZR Plans (Apolima, Asaga, Falealupo, Lano, Laulii, MAtafaa, Neiafu, Salimu Musumusu, Satui, Sauonosaletele, Vaisala), 2017/09
- Status Review of the National Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans in Samoa final report, GEOL, IPA,
   2015/05
- Samoa Relocation Strategy, MNRE, 2017/07
- Samoa VHZR Handbook, MNRE-PUMA, 2017/08
- Communication strategy project lessons learned and recommendation report, Alvaro Hoyos Ramos, Communication Officer, 2018/06
- 2015 Project Audit Report, 2016/03
- Anoamaa West District CIM Plan, 2018/07
- CSSP Evaluation Report for the Savaii Call for Proposals, 2017/05
- CSSP Evaluation Report for the Upolu Call for Proposals, 2017/07
- SSP Evaluation Report for the Declined Proposals from the Savaii and Upolu Call for Proposals, 2018
- Midterm Evaluation Report- Enhancing resilience of coastal communities of Samoa to climate change, Guido Corno, 2016/02
- CSSP-MNRE MoU, 2016/11
- Inception workshop Report, 2013/03
- Project LoA Government UNDP, 2013
- MNRE Support Letter LOA, 2014/09
- MNRE Annual Report 2015-2016
- AF PRODOC, 2012/03
- Strategic Programme for Climate Resilience (SPCR) (Climate Resilience Investment Programme), 2011/02
- Quarterly Progress Reports, 2013 Q1Q2 Q3 Q4, 2014 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4, 2015 Q1 Q2 Q3, 2016 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4, 2017
   Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4, 2018 Q1
- Strategy for the Development of Samoa 2008-2012, MoF, 2008/05
- Strategy for the Development of Samoa 2016/7-2019/20 "Accelerating sustainable development and broadening opportunities for all", MoF, 2016/12
- TAG meeting minutes (2016/01, 2016/04, 2016/07, 2016/10, 2017/01, 2017/07, 2017/08, 2017/10, 2018/01, 2018/04)
- Direct Project Services, AF decision, 2014/10
- AF Tranche Approval, 2016/09
- AF approval for project extension (2016/05 2017/11), 2015/05
- Samoa Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans and their Application in Tsunami Recovery Planning, Michele Daly, GNS Science & Graeme Roberts, Beca International Devnet 2016, 2010/12

# **Annexe 7: Evaluation questions matrix**

Evaluative Criteria Questions	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
Relevance: How does the project relate to the main objectives of the GEF focal are	a, and to the environment and development pri	iorities at the local, regional and na	tional levels?
<ul> <li>Is the project relevant and coherent with Samoa needs, policies, and strategies?</li> </ul>	References in Samoa policies, strategies	Documents	Documentary review
Is the project reflecting the needs of the beneficiary communities?	Level of satisfaction/participation of beneficiaries	Beneficiaries	Interviews
Is the project coherent with UNDP programming strategy for Samoa?	References of key thematic in relevant documents; perception of implementation by UN staff	UNDAF / UNDP country programme	UNDP staff interview, documentary review
To what extent is the project suited to local and national development priorities and policies?	Level of satisfaction/participation of institutions	Institution work plans, staff	Interviews communities /     Government) & review of     operational plans
To what extent is the project in line with AF/ GEF operational programs?	Coherence with GEF focal areas	GEF website & GEF focal point	UNDP staff interview, documentary review
Effectiveness: To what extent have the expected outcomes and objectives of the p	roject been achieved?		
To what extent the project did enhance capacities for communities to integrate climate risks into planning and financing of CCA / DRM infrastructures	<ul> <li>New mechanisms in place at the community level for consultation, implementation &amp; M&amp;E of infrastructures</li> <li>Review/degree of utilisation of guidelines</li> <li>Induced actions due to project's results; review of indicators</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Government institutions at national and community levels</li> <li>Final beneficiaries</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Specific project documents (guidelines)</li> <li>Interviews</li> </ul>
To what extent did the incentives/infrastructure projects enhance/protect communities against climate/disaster related risks?	Number of beneficiaries from Outcome 2 infrastructures	<ul><li>Project sites</li><li>Project staff</li></ul>	• In situ verification; interviews

	<u> -</u>	<ul><li>Final beneficiaries</li><li>Community representatives</li></ul>	
What is the level of management of coastal /R2R infrastructures to reduce risks?	management of assets (level of involvement)	<ul> <li>Annual report,</li> <li>Project team</li> <li>District technical staff</li> <li>Community leaders and final beneficiaries</li> </ul>	Documentary review, interviews
<ul> <li>What factors have led to the project (or parts of the project) outcomes/results' being successful, and what national lessons can be learned?</li> </ul>	Analysis of lessons learned / best & worst practices	Specific technical documents;     UNDP & project staff	Documentary review, interviews
What factors were crucial for the achievement or failure of the project objectives (managerial, institutional, technical)		<ul> <li>PIR</li> <li>Steering Committee minutes</li> <li>UNDP, project staff and community representatives</li> </ul>	Documentary review, interviews
Efficiency: Was the project implemented efficiently, in-line with international and r	national norms and standards?		
<ul> <li>The extent to which the results have been achieved with the least costly resources possible, compared with alternative approaches to attain the same results.</li> </ul>	, ,	<ul><li>Project staff</li><li>National technical staff</li><li>PPR &amp; quarterly reports</li></ul>	• Interviews & documentary review
<ul> <li>To what extent the project was delivered on time and budget, and reasons/lessons for discrepancies - has the project been implemented efficiently, and cost-effectively?</li> </ul>	delivery delays	<ul><li>Project staff</li><li>National technical staff</li><li>PPR &amp; quarterly reports</li></ul>	Interviews & documentary review
Degree of operationalization of the project's M&E system and effective leverage to induce changes of implementation/adaptation to changing implementation conditions	meetings • Feedback system review	<ul> <li>Project staff &amp; UNDP staff; steering committee minutes; PPR &amp; quarterly reports</li> <li>Community representatives</li> </ul>	Interviews & documentary review

What is the project's exit strategy?	Degree of ownership of results and anticipated level of (in)dependence after project completion		• Interviews & documentary review
Impact: Are there indications that the project has contributed to, or enabled pro	gress toward, reduced environmental stress a	and/or improved ecological status?	
To what extent were the originally intended, overriding objectives in terms of development policy (goals) realistic?	Degree of achievement of primary objectives (indicators)	<ul> <li>Quarterly reports &amp; PPR, project &amp; UNDP staff</li> </ul>	• Documents review, interviews
What is the level of results' ownership by the final/institutional beneficiaries?	Level of project results achievements and appropriation by relevant stakeholders	Quarterly reports & PPR, beneficiaries, project & UNDP staff	• Documents review, interviews
Did the project empower the beneficiaries to enhance the impact of project's results/outcomes?	Level of independence of beneficiaries to pursue project related activities	Quarterly report & UNDP, project staff, beneficiaries	• Documents review, interviews
<ul> <li>What real changes (economic, social, institutional, environment, gender)     have the activities made to the beneficiaries as a result of the project     interventions? How many people have been affected?</li> </ul>		Final beneficiaries,     Government staff	• Interviews
(Non-) project-induced replication effect	Number of replications (copy-paste effects)	<ul> <li>Project staff and local Administration</li> </ul>	• Interviews
Sustainability: To what extent are there financial, institutional, social-economic,	nd/or environmental risks to sustaining long-to-	erm project results?	
How likely is the ability of the project to continue to deliver benefits for an extended period of time after completion in the project areas?	Review of activities that will strengther sustainability	Quarterly reports, project staff	Documentary review and interviews
Did the project empower the final/institutional beneficiaries to increase the likelihood of sustainability of the project's results?	<ul> <li>Likelihood or evidence of off-project actions that will increase the sustainability of project results</li> <li>Additional external support</li> <li>Evidence of beneficiary taking over or project's results</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Ministries / Authorities</li><li>Communities</li></ul>	• Interviews
To what extent is the project sustainable at technical, institutional, social and cultural, levels? Are results financially / economically sustainable?	<ul> <li>Review of risks &amp; mitigation measures</li> <li>Level of satisfaction of beneficiaries</li> <li>Mechanisms to ensure maintenance of infrastructures</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>PRODOC &amp; PPR, quarterly reports</li> <li>Final beneficiaries/communities</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Documentary analysis</li><li>Interviews</li></ul>

To what extent did the capacity building activities contribute to sustaining the	Level of institutional ownership	<ul> <li>Ministries</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Interviews</li> </ul>
project's objectives?		<ul> <li>UNDP &amp; project staff</li> </ul>	

# Annexe 8: Detailed Results for Replanting

Site Name	Cause of replanting	Upolu/Savaii	Date Replanting (month/year)	Actual number of trees/grass initially transplanted	Area (acres or Ha)	Species replanted (code)	Nursery origin	Kind of issue within 12 months after replanting (technical, community	Die-out estimated after 12 months	Replanting necessary (Y/N)	Replanting actually carried out (Y/N)
a.Vailima (Mt Vaea)	Conservation and preservation of fauna and flora of Mt Vaea reserve and its historical values.	Upolu	29-Sept-16	450	0.2 ha	syin, past, cane, popi	Division of Envir & Conservation (DEC)	No issues related to replanting in reserve areas.	est. 5	Yes	Yes
Vailele Reserve	Replanting the newly established government reserve	Upolu	30-Sept-16	800	2 ha	popi, syin, teri,	Water Resource Division (WRD)	No issues related to replanting in reserve areas.	est. 5	Yes	Yes
a. Vaipouli State Land	Rehabilitation of open areas and to minimize occurrences of invasive species.  Ecological restoration for the lake as	Savaii	19 & 20 October 2016 18 & 25 Nov	850	0.8 ha	syin, teri, popi, flfl	Forestry Division (FD)	No issues related to replanting within government-owned lands.	est. 5	Yes	Yes
Lake Lanotoo - National Park	well as contributing to sustainable management of freshwater resources.	Upolu	2016 / 02 Dec 2016	2000	1.27 ha	popi, syin, cane, inbi, teri	FD	Cows owned by an unknown farmer seen within the area.	est.600	Yes	Yes
b. Vailima (Mt Vaea)	Conservation and preservation of fauna and flora of Mt Vaea reserve and its historical values.	Upolu	11-mars-17	983	0.4 ha	teri, popi, syin, stfa, caod	DEC	No issues related to replanting in reserve areas.	est. 5	Yes	Yes
a. Malololelei Biodiversity Park	Restoration of critical ecosystems and enhance conservation status of the newly established protected area.	Upolu	24-mars-16	985	0.5 ha	teri, popi, syin, caod, heor, inbi	DEC	No issues related, but reported good maintenance carried out by DEC.	est. 5	Yes	Yes
b. Malololelei Biodiversity Park	Restoration of critical ecosystems and enhance conservation status of the newly established protected area.	Upolu	31-mars-17	1000	0.6 ha	teri, popi, syin, caod, heor, inbi	DEC	No issues related, but reported good maintenance carried out by DEC.	est. 5	Yes	Yes
c. Malololelei Biodiversity Park	Restoration of critical ecosystems and enhance conservation status of the newly established protected area.	Upolu	05-avr-17	957	0.6 ha	teri, popi, syin, caod, heor, inbi	DEC	No issues related, but reported good maintenance carried out by DEC.	est. 5	Yes	Yes
Tanumapua Farm Supplies	Replanting degraded open areas	Upolu	07-avr-17	1030	0.8 ha	syin, popi	FD	Issues with land been reused for commercial farming destroying most of the seedlings.	est. 800	No	Yes
Lalomanu Sosaiete Group	Replanting degraded slope areas	Upolu	11-august-17	700	0.7 ha	syin, teri, cane, popi, flfl	FD	Issues of poor maintenance by the community.	est. 350	No	Yes

b. Vaipouli State Land	Rehabilitation of degraded and water catchment areas	Savaii	23 & 24 Aug 2017	1330	2.3 ha	syin, plto, cane, popi	FD	No issues related to replanting within government-owned lands.		Yes	Yes
Salelesi	Replanting degrade inland and coastal areas	Upolu	01-Sept-17	700	1.7 ha	syin, stfa, cain, cema, cane	FD	Most of the inland planted seedlings have been destroyed by pigs except some of the plants been planted along the seawall.	est. 560	No	Yes
Aopo Community	Restoration of degraded areas to minimize occurrences of invasive species.		23-May-18	1300	2 ha	popi, syin, teri, cane, inbi	FD	Newly established community woodlot	unknown	unknown	Yes
c. Vaipouli State Land	Restoration of degraded areas to minimize occurrences of invasive species.		24-May-18	1796	2.5 ha	teri, inbi, cane, syin, popi, swma		Newly established woodlot but positive expectation of replanting within government-owned land.	unknown	Yes	Yes

Tree Species recorded within the table					
Samoan Name	Scientific Name	Code			
Asitoa	Syzygium inophylloides	SYIN			
Fanaio	Sterculia fanaiho	STFA			
Fetau	Calophyllum inophyllum	CAIN			
Gasu	Palaquium stehlinii	PAST			
Ifilele	Intsia bijuga	INBI			
Leva	Cerbera manghas	CEMA			
Ma	Heritiera ornithocephala	HEOR			
Malili	Terminalia richii	TERI			
Mamalava	Planchonella torricellensis	PLTO			
Mosooi	Cananga odorata	CAOD			
Poumuli	Flueggia flexuosa	FLFL			
Tamanu	Calophyllum neo-ebudicum	CANE			
Tava	Pometia pinnata	POPI			
Maoki	Swietenia macrophylla	SWMA			

# Annexe 9: Detailed Results for Water Supply

## 1st call for proposal: Assessment of Upolu proposals - successful applications

VILLAGE  1. Matafa'aLefaga	PROJECT DESCRIPTION Water Tanks	<b>BUDGET</b> SAT \$50,000.00
2. Salua Manono	Water Tanks	SAT \$50,000.00
3. Satuimalufilufi	Water Tanks	SAT \$50,000.00
4. ManinoSiumu	Nursery for Coastal Replanting	SAT \$5,000.00
5. Saoluafata	Drainage & Water Tanks	SAT \$50,000.00
6. Falefa	Safe Haven	SAT \$50,000.00
7. Tafitoala	Deepening of River Channel & Bed	SAT \$50,000.00
8. Faleu Manono	Construction of Village Wharf	SAT \$50,000.00
9. GagaifoLefaga	Water Tanks	SAT \$35,000.00
10. PataFalelatai	Water Tanks	SAT \$38,000.00
11. Falevao	Water Tanks	SAT \$28,500.00
12. SiufagaFalelatai	Water Tanks	SAT \$48,900.00
13. Laulii	Water Tanks	SAT \$39,000.00
14. Faleapuna	Water Tanks	SAT \$25,000.00
15. Lalovi	Water Tanks	SAT \$50,000.00
16. Safa'atoaLefaga	Upgrading Water Catchment Pipes	SAT \$37,623.20
17. Sa'anapu	Water Tanks	SAT \$50,000.00
18. Manunu	Water Tanks	SAT \$50,000.00
19. Moata'a	Design/ Supervision/ M&E for	SAT \$30,000.00
20. Siumu i Sisifo	Mangrove Walkway Water Tanks	SAT \$28,500.00
21. Magiagi	Water Tanks	SAT \$39,000.00

**TOTAL COST** 

SAT \$854,523.20

### 2nd call for proposal: Assessment of Savaii proposals - successful applications

VILLAGE	PROJECT DESCRIPTION	PROJECT COST (ST \$\$\$)	
1. Gataivai	Water Tanks	SAT \$49,120.00	
2. Eveeve/Vaimaga	Upgrade Spring Pool	SAT \$50,000.00	
3. Faia"ai	Cliff Walkway	SAT \$46,700.00	
4. Sa"asa"ai	Water Tanks	SAT \$50,000.00	
5. Asau	Spring Pool & Waste	SAT \$35,400.00	
6. Fagamalo	Management Systems Upgrading Water System	SAT \$50,000.00	
7. Sataua	Upgrade School Building (Evacuation site)	SAT \$ <b>50,000</b> .00	
8. Asaga	Upgrade Spring Pool &	SAT \$44,302.00	
9. Malae –Faga	Rehabilitate Mangrove reserve Water Tanks	SAT <b>\$50,000</b> .00	
10. Fatausi	Water Tanks	SAT <b>\$50,000</b> .00	
11. Sapini	Water Tanks	SAT \$50,000.00	
12. Lalomalava	Water Tanks	SAT \$49,600.00	
TOTAL COST	SAT \$1,429,12	2.00	

## Reassessment of 31 unsuccessful proposals (Upolu and Savaii) - successful proposals

VILLAGE	PROJECT TITLE	PROPOSED ROJECT COST (SAT)
1. Uafato	Construct River Revetment Wall	\$40,000.00
2. Vailele	Upgrade Independent Water Source	\$35,000.00
3. Fagali'i	Construct Revetment Wall	\$50,000.00
4. Sauano&Saletele	Construct Culvert Bridge	\$50,000.00
5. Sataoa	Construct New Reservoir for Independent Water Source	\$50,000.00
6. Savaia	Upgrading Steps & Railings for better Access to the Sea	\$11,000.00

7. Lalomauga	Rainwater Harvesting and \$50,000.00
	Storage System
8. Eva	Construct Revetment Wall & \$50,000.00
	Deepening of River Channel
9. Gautavai	Access to the spring pool \$22,000.00
10. Safaí	Rainwater harvesting and \$30,000.00
	Storage systems
11. Sapulu	Biodiversity audit of the Sapulu \$15,354.00
	mangrove and Rehabilitation of
	the tilapia pond/farm
12. Tapueleele	Rainwater Harvesting and \$27,000.00
	Storage Systems
TOTAL	SAT \$430,354.00

## Annex 10: Brief Expertise of Consultant

#### Mr Vincent Lefebvre:

#### (lefebvrevinc@gmail.com)

- Program management & coordination / project formulation & implementation, M&E knowledge of PCM, logical framework & ZOPP methodologies / equipment specifications.
- MA in tropical agriculture and post-graduation in business administration
- Program & project evaluation / technical audit / institutional appraisal: analysis of relevance / effectiveness / efficiency / social, institutional & economic impact / political, social & cultural, technological, institutional & financial sustainability / cross cutting issues (gender, AIDS, environment & institutional capacity building); questionnaires design & interviews of beneficiaries.
- Data acquisition methods for evaluations: questionnaires drafting & interviews of beneficiaries; SWOT analysis; (semi-) structured interviews, focus groups.
- Knowledge of monitoring & evaluation methodologies (incl. Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool).
- Food security / Agronomy / agro-forestry / agro-industry / agro-climate and climate mitigation adaptation / horticulture.
- Cartography / remote sensing / mapping / GIS (Arcinfo, Mapinfo, Ilwis) / Database management systems (MECOSIG, COONGO).
- Land & water resources evaluation / crop potential analysis / participatory rural appraisals / natural resources management / mountain agro-ecosystems.
- Soil survey / soil conservation / soil fertility.
- Statistics including programming in SAS & Delphi.
- Renewable energies (wind, bio-diesel, rape seed oil).

# Annexe 11: Evaluation Consultant Code of Conduct and Agreement Form

#### **Evaluators:**

- Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions
  or actions taken are well founded.
- 2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
- 3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
- 4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
- 5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.
- 6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study limitations, findings and recommendations.
- 7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form <sup>24</sup>					
Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System					
Name of Consultant:Vincent LEFEBVRE					
Name of Consultancy Organization (where relevant):					
I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.					
Signed at Brussels on 25/09/2018 Signature:					
Signature:					

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct

# Annexe 12: Evaluation Report Clearance Form

<b>Evaluation Report Reviewed and Cleared b</b>	у
UNDP County Office Name: Challes Chawel	_RR ai
Signature:	
Date: 26/11/2018	
UNDP GEF RTA	
Name: Reis Lopez Rello	
Q.	
Signature	
Signature	

## Annexe 13: Audit Trail

Comment # & Page Reference	Comment & Source	Response
UNDP		
Cover page	GEF Project ID: 4667 should be changed to UNDP PIMS ID: 4667	Done
Cover page	UNDP Project ID: 079525 can then be changed to UNDP Atlas ID: 079525 (Is this the Atlas Award ID or Project ID?)	Done
Pg Iv, Project Summary Table	In this table, the UNDP Project ID is shown as 00084024. This is different than the number on the cover page (079525). I assume that one is the Atlas Award ID and the other is the Atlas Project ID. I think it1s fine to use either or both, but indicate which ones they are.	Amended
Pg Iv, Project Summary Table	In the second row, remove (GEF) from AF (GEF) financing:	Done
Pg 2, 1.2.1 Scope	In the last paragraph, change "supported by UNDP/GEF" to "supported by UNDP"	Amended
Pg 21, 3.2.3 Feedback from M&E used	So, feedback from the Project Performance	Para better explained;
for adaptive management	Reports and the Mid-Term Evaluation were not used at all for adaptive management?	there was not necessarily planning changes of the period in consideration because of feedback but improved planning for the next planning periods
Pg 34, 3.3.5 Mainstreaming	Although it is not part of the TE guidance document, it would be good to include a brief discussion on linkages between the project and relevant SDG targets/indicators.	Paragraph added
Pg 36, 3.3.6.5 Environmental risks to sustainability	Are there really no environmental risks to sustainability?  Are there any environmental factors that sould	Not immediately; there may be risks on a long-term basis but it is all speculative;
	Are there any environmental factors that could reverse the progress made by the project?	paragraph changed to reflect it
Annexes	List the "Audit Trail" in the Annexes but be sure to indicate that the Audit Trail is "annexed in a separate file". The Audit Trail should not be attached to the final file that will eventually be posted in the ERC.	Added

Suggest rewording to reflect the reason behind unavailability of key village persons on site.  It should be noted that key community representatives (village mayor and chiefs) for the chosen project sites (Sili IWSA & Saleia Revet. Wall & Bridge) attended the National Annual Methodist Church Conference during the visit hence the unavailability.	Paragraph amended
Suggest an alternative heading - the focus was not on resolving Problems'	This is standard GEF report formatting
A very broad assumption on why the Building code and CIM Strategy was developed by Govt.	Source of information is Gov's Coastal Infrastructure Management Strategy
The wording of this paragraph is confusing. Note that the CIM Plans were not intended to be seen as investment plans but rather a planning / guiding document that details possible solutions to build community resilience. it is clearly stated in the CIM plans that funding is an issue but that the document can be used by various stakeholders to find/secure funds because not all these interventions will be and can be accommodated via the Government budget. The consultant's statement "this had resulted in little community interest into these planning exercises" is very negative and unfounded. Why make a general statement about the interest of the community in planning exercises? Is, it just this work or all other community work undertaken by other Government Authorities such as MWCSD, MoH, MoF, MNRE etc. as PUMA is not the only entity that carries out planning workshops/meetings/consultations.	Paragraph reformulated
Please note highlighted texts and suggested changes.  Note that these stakeholders were members of the project because of their	Changes made
	behind unavailability of key village persons on site.  It should be noted that key community representatives (village mayor and chiefs) for the chosen project sites (Sili IWSA & Saleia Revet. Wall & Bridge) attended the National Annual Methodist Church Conference during the visit hence the unavailability.  Suggest an alternative heading - the focus was not on resolving Problems'  A very broad assumption on why the Building code and CIM Strategy was developed by Govt.  The wording of this paragraph is confusing. Note that the CIM Plans were not intended to be seen as investment plans but rather a planning / guiding document that details possible solutions to build community resilience. it is clearly stated in the CIM plans that funding is an issue but that the document can be used by various stakeholders to find/secure funds because not all these interventions will be and can be accommodated via the Government budget. The consultant's statement "this had resulted in little community interest into these planning exercises" is very negative and unfounded. Why make a general statement about the interest of the community in planning exercises? Is, it just this work or all other community work undertaken by other Government Authorities such as MWCSD, MoH, MoF, MNRE etc. as PUMA is not the only entity that carries out planning workshops/meetings/consultations.  Please note highlighted texts and suggested changes.  Note that these stakeholders were

	issues relating to their functions not necessarily to "reprioritise support	
	according to updated CIM plans".  Their input into the CIM plans was more substantive than what it refers to here because their technical know-how and advice about certain issues (water/electricity/drainages, etc.) informed the new CIM plans.  The consultant seems to have missed the point about why IAs were part of the project.	
	For example; he says that GoH' s involvement was to ensure that project activities do not have unexpected effects on the beneficiary population.	
	Although this is true to some extent, the project never said that each stakeholder would have a role	
	to play in the implementation of interventions. This is because the interventions were based on issues raised by the villages in relation to CC. The IAs that are mentioned in the CIM Plans as stakeholders in the implementation phase have been identified because of the relevance of their mandates to the interventions in the CIM plans.	
	STA is not a private sector stakeholder and we do not have any District authorities.	
Pg 8 3.1 where it mentions 'National Climate Change Country Team'	The new committee that is chaired by MoF is the Climate Resilience Steering Committee. Suggest to re-word	Done
Pg 9 "This project twinning approach apparently was viewed as efficient and effective; however, time told the implementers that it was not to be so."	Suggest to re-word	Amended
Pg 9, "The project was significantly different from previous interventions on CIM plans as it included the infrastructure component; this was a major step forward as interviews had shown a community fatigue with numerous planning exercises but too	Suggest to re-word to make clear. To some extent the fatigue Note the designing phase of the project it took into account such component purely the result of the planning exercise from the 'first' and 'second' generation of CIMPs not because of community fatigue	Paragraph reformulated

few Government interventions to actually implement them."		
Pg 9 "The design lacked somehow ambition on how to empower central government with the future lessons learned from the project"	Please clarify 'future lessons from the project'? We would only be able to inform the government of any lessons learnt after the project has been completed and reviewed.	The project stopped short of supporting GoS into institutionalising the CIM plans as a development tool usable by Ministries
Pg 12 on Samoa public service 3.1.2 "interviews showed that nearly all institutional stakeholders but PUMA's project officer in charge of the project (Strategic Policy Unit) had swapped positions / or left the public service during the Project with virtually no one but him able to provide a Government historical perspective of the project"  "This has had negative repercussions on the project with reduced project interest from newly appointed staff"	Para not substantiated Unclear as to who this paragraph is referring to and unfair to say that this is the only person who has knowledge about the history/development of the project. Suggest removing. Again all relevant government agencies were involved in the consultation with communities and the actual assessments which are a critical aspect of the process which also serves capacity building needs to a larger extent, the very focus of the project. The next update of the CIM Plans shall be 100% localised.  Also note the institutional restructuring Framework that was developed under the project to institutionalize the implementation of the CIM Plan within MNRE, the Sector and intersectoral. You should have access to this report.  Request to please clarify what the negative repercussions were and ta verify 'reduced project interest' - how many persons were interviewed stated this? This is incorrect and the consultant should rephrase the statement as it does not reflect the strong support from implementing partners during the implementation phase of the project.	Paragraph substantiated through various interviews; anyway, paragraph removed
Pg 12 on risk assessment "5. land disputes amongst village members adversely affecting village relocation land use planning, not enough gender-specific techniques and technologies developed increasing inequity or changing negatively social roles, unsupportive Government to	On risk assessment: what is the basis for this assumption? Some of these risks are too presumptuous and far-fetched Is, there a basis for #5 because we don't recall any land disputes occurring because of village relocation land use planning? For #7 - please elaborate as we are unclear as to what this means. All techniques/technologies (interventions)	The source of information is the project document; these were risks to be considered at project formulation stage

embrace a cross-sectoral and integrated approach to the management of climate risks and opportunities,"	proposed in CIMP and implemented by the project (i.e) roads, water tanks, seawalls, upgraded water reticulated systems improve gender inequity.  For #8 - 'unsupportive government'. This is a far- fetched statement given that it is the Government that instigated the project (an integrated approach) and that sector plans etc endorsed by Government shows the government's commitment to cross-sectoral approaches.	
Pg 15, 3.1.6 Reference to' UNDP's comparative advantage "while other (non-)UN agencies/donors are more sectors based" "while many other donors will support large-scale interventions that will benefit large swaths of the population but based only on economic cost/benefit ratios;" "instead of large-scale nation-wide infrastructure programs"	Perhaps it would be best to generalise UNDP's focus rather than compare it against other non-UN agencies/donor roles and focus. It does not serve a purpose in this report to compare the roles of different donor agencies as they(donors) also have different policies to comply with	These are the reasons why Gov. prefer to work with UNDP than other agencies accessing AF and GEM funding
Pg 22, 3.2.3 regarding safeguards expert	Changed wording	Done
Pg 22 on PPCR and AF coordination 3.2.3 last paragraph "even painful - process" "this made operational (day-to-	The consultant seems to focus a lot on the differences of procedures between UNDP and the World Bank. The report should not reflect/speak poorly of other development partners' procedures, including the Government of Samoa.	Obviously Amended!!!  Yes, it is necessary to emphasize the issue of aligning projects that are supported by 2 donors with very different procedures; this is at the heart of AF implementation issues
projects."		
•	What does this mean?	Paragraph reformulated

	planting activities which complement and reflects such project effort	
Pg 33, "instead of using adapted New Zealand standards"	Suggest to remove reference to NZ standards here	Amended
Pg 33 outcome 3 results on village relocation handbook	it should be noted that relocation is not only costly activities but considered very sensitive given the implications on affected customary lands to which the communities will be relocated to. Hence why the government is taking a very careful approach in this activity. The relocation plans/guidelines provide for what should be considered by both communities and government via relevant ministries when such process occurs but doesn't give a guarantee to immediate effect.	paragraph amended
Pg 38, 3.3.6.4 "Despite poor maintenance or even swift discontinuation of community nurses"	This should be made clear that the AF Project did not provide community nurseries. It reads as AF project did provide maintenance or discontinue use of community nurseries thus a failed activity. The project only supported the ministry main nurseries to support community replanting efforts on their catchment areas/coastal replanting to meet the indicators for Outcome 2	Paragraph entirely reformulated
Pg 40, "opening up inland road access was not accompanied by land use considerations"	This comment makes it sound like the project opened up several roads inland. Under AF, only 1 new road was formed (Fusi). All other works relating to roads was for upgrades of existing roads.	Paragraph amended
Pg 40-41 3.3.7.4 "superficial" "and there are now examples of cultivated plots in steep terrain (MAFF was not involved in this process)"	Suggest to remove the word superficial There have always been cultivated plots/plantations on steep terrain. This should not be an indicator of the AF project. Suggest removing reference to MAF if it cannot be corroborated.	Removed
Pg 43, iv, exit strategy "There has been little evidence of this process yet in associated Government Ministries and authorities; ex 1: national road standards, preferably integrating climate-proofing methods, are still being debated between LTA and MWTI. ex2: CIM Plans are to be followed-up by PUMA but the approach looks little different from previous CIM Plan s (no additional	document also the CRSC under MoF has assured that the CIM Plans will be used by Government Agencies to develop their future	Source of info is the project document; paragraph amended to reflect Government discussions on how to take ownership of new CIM plans

resources to monitor or coordinate between ministries), ex3: MWCSD is to engage dialogue with communities, should there be Government investments as per CIM Plans (on "infrastructures"); however, MWCSD is already engaged on DDP (social/human aspects of district development) resulting in interacting with communities on two different "plans", possibly adding confusion as to how communities are to internet with Government on key development issues	afford/resource them.  If LTA and MWTI are debating over certain issues it's because of their conflicting mandates/legislation - this should not be reflected in the report. A narrow view of CIM Plan follow up and implementation - the new CIMs have just been updated with a 10 year implementation period. it is too early to make a statement comparing the approaches then (>10 yrs ago} and now, 2018. A lot of activities have been set in motion to monitor and implement the CIM plans.  We do not need to engage with MWCSD if we are to implement activities of the CIMs.  MWCSDs District Plans have a very different focus from CIM plans. They cave social issues while CIM Plans caver climate-related adaption measures.  The comment sounds condescending - our communities can think for themselves and their own judgements about various plans	
Pg 44, "There is a need to revisit the	All partners including UNDP have been	Noted
relationship between Government and implementing agencies	informed of the Government Sector Approach and it is up to the government to	
(including UNDP) so that they can	ensure that this is followed when	
contribute better at sectoral level	implementing projects. Government	
with good advice and injecting a more regional/donor perspective to	inform partners on implementing agencies for each project and it is MNRE in this case.	
strategic issues;"	it is a requirement that partners like UNDP	
	(% of the project) provide the necessary	
	operational and technical assistance when	
Pg 46, iv, CIM plan database	requested.  Already done by the PMU (PPCR and AF	Slightly amended
PUMA should develop a database for	database for monitoring)	
CIM Plans with a number of entries	As discussed, this is the next step in which	
on monitoring, updating,	the CIM Plan will be tabled through cabinet	
modifications, completion"	with their endorsement as the plan for all climate change and disaster risk	
	management activities and efforts.	
Pg 46, (i) CIM plan	Focus is not on 'community infrastructure'	Removed
institutionalisation	these are for climate	
""Support should be provided to	resilience/adaptation options	

Government to ensure that CIM Plans are being institutionalised and become the key reference documents for community infrastructures development."  Pg 47, "Empowerment is, even more,	(infrastructure and others)  Under AF, no community nurseries were	The project through
an issue with most community nurseries abandoned soon project's support ends".	funded therefore suggest to remove these general statements. it will be unfair for related projects as they were not interviewed especially when this a stage of the process where farmers and families are urged to take ownership with their own setups.	Gov nurseries provided seedlings to community nurseries; no change
Pg 48, "Actually, Government should review its donor approach to development, in particular, adopt a more holistic approach and not necessarily give in into the development of similar projects; it would be best to combine different donor funding's through a basket fund or similar delivery mechanism to streamline delivery mechanisms".	Please clarify advice and what basis was this advice given as MoF/MFAT coordinates all development/donor agencies. This comment would be a reflection on MoF and MFAT processes. This is in the current approach by Government through budget support, however, I am not sure how this fits in this part of the review.	This is a suggestion so as to avoid parallel project delivery by different donors in the future as in this project
Pg 48, "this a lesson learned about failed intersectoral dialogue: Government institutions will only cooperate when there is direct donor support involved."	A very naïve view by the consultant; not taking into account the competing demands of different agencies and their availability to attend meetings.  This statement is unfounded and insulting to government agencies, particularly when the government is investing on sector development and integration which was the very concept that drove this project to maximize benefits, sound synergies for sustainability after the life of the assistance	Reworded
Pg 49, 4.4 best & worst practices (xi)	UNDP's procurement mechanism (tender/evaluation/recruitment/payment) was used because it was an option that was made available to MNRE but not because we wanted to bypass GoS procedures.  This comment is insulting to the GoS. Please remove or reword – at no time did we say it was ineffective	Paragraph reformulated obviously!

# Annexe 14: Detailed Results for Roads

Actual area of works	Actual mileage covered by works	Upolu / Savai (U/S)	Nature of works (road, drainage) rehab / construction	Prior status (damaged, dirt track)	Categorisation of road (national, access)	Type of standard used	Actual date start-up and completion (any delay observed)	Issue within 12 months after completion
Mullifanua	1.7k	Upolu	Road Reconstruction	Dirt Road	Public Road	AUSRoads	22nd September 2015 – (4 months). (EOT- 8th March 2016.)	None
Pata Falelatai	1.5k	Upolu	Road Reconstruction	Dirt Road	Public Road	AUSRoads	22nd September 2015 – (4 months)	None
Fusi	1.4k	Upolu	Road Construction	Walking track	Public Road	AUSRoads	31st March -31st August 2015 – (5 months) Delayed cause by unforeseen circumstances and budget constraints.	Damages due to natural disasters.
Tufutafoe Link Road	2.8k	Savaii	Road Reconstruction	Dirt Road	Public Road	AUSRoads	11th November 2015 – (5 months)	None
Foua Road	310m	Savaii	Road Construction	Dirt Road	Public Road	AUSRoads	11th August 2017 – (4 months)	None
Maota	295m	Savaii	Road Construction	Dirt Road	Public Road	AUSRoads	11th August 2017 – (4 months)	None
Drainage Zone 6	13k	Upolu	Drainage Maintenance	Open Earth Drainage	Public Reserve	AUSRoads	11month Contract (FY 2015/16-FY2016/17)	None
Drainage Zone 7	14.5k	Upolu	Drainage Maintenance	Open Earth Drainage	Public Reserve	AUSRoads	11month Contract (FY 2015/16-FY2016/17)	None